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       Introduction
James Muldoon
In 1980, the top five most valuable companies in the world were Exxon Mobil, 
General Motors, Mobil, Ford Motor and Texaco. By the second quarter of 2019, 
every position on this list was now occupied by a tech firm, with Apple, Microsoft, 
Amazon, Alphabet (Google) and Facebook rounding out the top five. Key to this 
dramatic shift in wealth and power has been the rise of digital platforms as a 
model capable of generating enormous revenue and controlling the interactions 
and data of its users. Ownership of platforms enabled many of these companies to 
build up ecosystems of goods and services for the ever-more-sophisticated collection 
of data, refining of algorithms and optimising of user experience.
The digital economy consists of a vast array of digital infrastructure, platforms, 
networks, computational machinery and data. Estimates of the size of the digital 
economy range from 4.5 to 15.5 per cent of the world’s GDP, depending on the 
criteria. The current Covid-19 crisis has further crystallised the power of global tech 
companies, enabling them to become instrumental in governments’ data-driven 
pandemic response units and in the new realities of remote and flexible working.
Technology companies were once regarded as harbingers of a new world full of 
sharing, connection, and technological solutions to a range of pressing social issues. 
However, over the past five years we have become more aware of the troubling 
aspects of their business models and practices. Tech companies have been shaken 
by scandals such as the Cambridge Analytica data breach, their influence on the 
2016 American Presidential Election, and collusion with authoritarian governments. 
Ongoing concerns over their businesses include a decline in labour standards, 
an extractive model of harvesting data and profit, the evasion of regulatory 
apparatuses, and monopolistic tendencies. Alarmed citizens have rallied against 
them and sought new regulatory frameworks that could remedy these concerns.
Research on the digital economy has also reached new levels of sophistication, with 
numerous studies on platform work, algorithmic management, the transformation 
of labour markets and new digital business models. But the literature also remains 
skewed towards high-profile and visible aspects of the digital economy, neglecting 
a number of crucial aspects that remain more hidden from public view. We now 
have greater insight into food delivery and ride-hailing apps and their forms 
of algorithmic management, but know less about the digital infrastructure that 
sustains it or how this work relates to other aspects of the labour market.
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One of the aims of this collection is to probe deeper into under-examined topics 
in the digital economy and to shed light on how they operate. Few have closely 
examined the reliance of the gig economy on migrant labour and how a regime 
of precarity and insecure citizenship intersect with new forms of low-paid platform 
work. We also tend to overlook global hierarchies engendered by an American-
led tech revolution and the neo-colonial relations that have arisen in its wake. For 
every platform worker that we see driving or cycling out in the streets there are 
also several that remain less visible, working on “microwork” projects in their homes, 
undertaking caring jobs in private households and working throughout the global 
supply chain that makes tech products possible. 
A second aim of the collection is to explore policy options for alleviating a range 
of new challenges that have emerged within the digital economy. Contributors 
move beyond theoretical discussion of the problems themselves and turn towards 
an analysis of responses that are open to activists, municipal authorities and 
government policy makers. Articles suggest a range of policy recommendations and 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches. Each contributor 
examines a specific issue based on their own research and an analysis of the 
existing literature. They then provide their own perspective on the policies and 
approaches that would be most suitable to tackling the issue. I provide an overview 
of the different articles below.
In ‘From a Wage to a Wager: Dynamic Pricing in the Gig Economy,’ Niels van 
Doorn shows how variable wages in the gig economy act as a new mechanism of 
labour control, incentivising workers to work when and for how long companies 
require. Drawing on empirical evidence from Berlin, New York and elsewhere, he 
examines new experiments in dynamic pricing in the gig economy and the resulting 
insecurity and inequality for workers. He discusses a range of new grassroots 
labour organising initiatives and regulatory responses to the wage obfuscation 
and price-setting power of digital platforms. Attention is also directed to the 
strategies companies employ to evade regulatory regimes and to work around 
new schemes. Following the implementation of a minimum wage for ride-hailing 
workers in New York City, van Doorn reveals the perverse result of how Uber and 
Lyft started limiting drivers’ access to their platforms, leading to a virtual ‘lockout’ 
which negatively impacted on drivers’ wages. He calls for stronger enforcement 
mechanisms of local laws and highlights the need to reclassify gig workers ad 
employees in order to guarantee them not only the right to a minimum wage but 
other rights and insurances currently lacking.
Phil Jones writes about the less visible labour of ‘clickworkers’ who transcribe audio, 
check images, clean data and ensure the smooth functioning of our digital world. 
In  ‘Rethinking Microwork: the Invisible Labour of the Platform Economy,’ Jones 
examines the hidden workforce of platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
Appen and Clickworker, which host short tasks from requesters and enable new 
forms of short-term, piecemeal work. In this setup, platforms act as intermediaries 
between workers and requesters and take a small cut from every job that is 
completed on the platform. He analyses the growth of microwork and finds that 
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most of the those engaged in this work do it to top up their income from other 
full-time jobs. However, a significant minority are employed part-time or are self-
employed, highlighting the rise of microwork as a response to underemployment. 
Jones creates a new typology of microwork and outlines the emerging problems of 
wage theft, insecure working conditions, and a one-sided rating system. In response, 
he proposes a new framework of universal workers’ rights regardless of the type 
of job or employment contract a particular worker may have.  He also outlines 
how this could be supported by a new model of a national insurance system and 
enhanced workers’ rights.
In ‘Against Digital Colonialism,’ Renata Avila analyses the global hierarchies 
that have emerged in new forms of colonialism exercised through the ownership 
of digital infrastructure and control over networks and data. She reveals the 
connections between new tech empires and systems of state surveillance in which 
companies have acted in the service both of Western intelligence agencies and 
authoritarian regimes seeking to silence dissidents. Avila shows how technology 
companies aim to connect the next billion people in low and middle-income 
countries through ‘free services’ that offer a limited access to essential Internet 
services while installing privatised digital infrastructure under the control of 
the company. In what is similar to the ‘access for data’ model that Google and 
Facebook have used to support their advertising-based businesses, companies 
deploy frameworks that give them a hegemonic position in Internet infrastructure 
and allows them to remain dominant within the system. This is a particular danger 
with the latest round of WTO negotiations, with the possibility of terms favourable 
to the companies being inserted in new international agreements that could solidify 
their position for decades. She also points to the influence of tech CEOs in global 
diplomacy and brings to light some of their more questionable interactions with 
dictators and human rights abusers.
Dalia Gebrial writes on the intersection between austerity urbanism, migrant labour 
regimes and the platform economy. In “Dangerous Brown Workers: How Race and 
Migration Politics Shape the Platform Labour Market,” Gebrial highlights how 
platform companies typically rely on a labourforce that is dominated by migrants 
and racially minoritised workers. She shows that global cities’ reliance on low-
wage migrant work is heightened in the platform economy, with accompanying 
poor working conditions, low pay and a higher proportion of ‘irregular’ work. 
By examining the case study of Uber in London, she points to the way migrant 
workers are constructed as security and terror threats and subjected to a regime 
of surveillance and control. In response, Gebrial calls for an end to the hostile 
environment, especially the condition of no recourse to public funds. She also 
argues for the need to establish a framework of fair dismissal for platform workers 
and new state-led job creation schemes to help replace exploitative platform labour 
jobs.
Autonomy     Platforming Equality 8
Stacco Troncoso and Ann Marie Utratel present a new model of co-operative 
organisation in ‘Care before Code: Supporting the Development of Distributed 
Co-operative Organisations (DisCOs).’ DisCOs are a model for organising a co-
operative and commons-oriented workplace rooted in feminist economics and 
prioritising trust, care and human relationships. Drawing on their own experiences 
working in the Guerrilla Media Collective, a Spain-based co-operative which 
provides translation and communications services, Troncoso and Utratel introduce 
the DisCO model and show how it provides an alternative to the tech-centric world 
of blockchain and distributed ledgers. The DisCO framework builds on innovations 
in the commons, P2P, open co-operativism and other digital alternatives in the form 
of a practical working model of how an organisation could face the challenges 
of sustaining itself alongside providing social value to its community. Building on 
their groundbreaking work in ‘the DisCO Manifesto,’ published in 2019, the authors 
explain how their model works and how other organisations could adopt it for 
their own workplaces. The authors also extend their framework in new directions, 
outlining how policymakers could support the development of DisCOs through 
tax incentives, community spaces, commons-public partnerships and co-operative 
development funds.
In ‘The Co-operativist Challenge to the Platform Economy,” James Muldoon 
examines the potential for the development of UK platform co-operatives 
and provides policy recommendations for how this sector could be supported. 
He examines the growth of the platform co-operative movement and its goal 
of creating a more collaborative solidarity economy. Platform co-operativism 
challenges the precarious labour and hidden forms of data capture inherent in 
the corporate platform economy ad seeks to provide an ethical alternative for 
businesses. Platform co-operatives raise the question of the extent to which a co-
operative enterprise can operate in a broader capitalist economy without creating 
contradictory tendencies that undermine its goal of social transformation. Despite 
the limitations of platform co-ops as agents of broader social transformation, 
Muldoon recommends a series of measures to foster the development of co-
operatives including a new co-operative-friendly legal and regulatory framework; 
the creation of a national platform co-operative incubator; new municipal-level 
digital centres to nurture new platform co-operatives; and a Digital Innovation 
Fund for the co-operative sector to provide capital for scaling.
The collection concludes with two thought pieces from McKenzie Wark and Nick 
Srnicek. Srnicek offers an overview of research on the digital economy, highlighting 
gaps in the existing research and avenues for further studies. In ‘Paths Forward for 
the Study of the Digital Economy,’ he points to the neglect of platform care labour, 
data brokers, and the way in which AI is provisioned as fruitful avenues for future 
research. Wark writes a letter to digital labourers, reflecting on the changing nature 
of digital work and how new forms of solidarity could be constructed between 
workers. 
                     From a Wage to a Wager:
       Dynamic Pricing in the Gig Economy
Niels van Doorn
Under capitalism, the wage has always functioned as an incentive to work. We sell 
our labour power in exchange for money – paid per unit of time or product/service 
– so we can survive. In large parts of the gig economy, however, this incentivizing 
role of the wage has been both amplified and reconfigured: the wage is no longer 
just an incentive but also becomes an object of prediction and experimentation; a 
constantly changing figure and shifting target appearing on a gig worker’s phone 
as a peculiar form of clickbait (see image 1 below). If this sounds odd or outlandish, 
that’s because it is – or at least it should be, even though it constitutes the daily 
reality of millions of gig workers who try to make a living via their apps.
These apps show them gigs that are priced ‘dynamically,’ meaning that the wage 
they receive will be ‘based on perceived [real-time] changes in market conditions.’1 
While the use of dynamic pricing techniques has existed for quite some time in 
the world of e-commerce, particularly in the airline and hospitality industries, their 
implementation in the world of work is relatively novel and – as I will argue – 
particularly problematic. Such techniques essentially turn the wage into a recurring 
wager: a series of risky bets animated by the belief or hope that you will be able to 
cobble together a livelihood one gig at a time. The problem, as research shows, is 
that the house always wins.
Most sectors of the formal economy have collective agreements and/or legally 
enforced wage floors in place to ensure that ‘the house’ – i.e. private employers – 
does not always win. Yet this is almost never the case in the gig economy, where 
workers are classified as independent contractors and thus lack access to basic 
labour protections.2 This legal status also bars gig workers from unionizing or 
collective bargaining. As I will discuss below, this gives corporate gig platforms 
extraordinary leeway to determine, segment, and adjust workers’ wages at any 
given moment in time, resulting in profound wage insecurity and inequality. I start 
by providing an overview of various critical and empirical approaches to dynamic 
pricing and related techniques of wage experimentation in the gig economy. I then 
discuss some grassroots labour organising initiatives and one thought-provoking 
regulatory response that have pushed back against these developments. Finally, 
the closing section offers three policy recommendations, based on the preceding 
discussion. 
1. Aaron Shapiro, “Dynamic Exploits: The Science of Worker Control in the On-Demand Econ-
omy.” Media, Inequality & Change Center. 21 March 2019. https://mic.asc.upenn.edu/media-in-
equality-change-center-launches-inaugural-report-dynamic-exploits-the-science-of-worker-con-
trol-in-the-on-demand-economy/.
2. For a rare exception, see Julian Hale, “In Denmark, a Historic Collective Agreement Is Turning the 
‘Bogus Self-Employed’ into ‘Workers with Rights,’” Equal Times. 4 July 2018. https://www.equaltimes.
org/in-denmark-a-historic-collective.
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Image 1. Screenshot showing a Deliveroo order and a wage
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Dynamic Pricing
As Melinda Cooper has suggested, ‘[u]nder post-Fordist conditions, the wage itself 
has become something of a speculative proposition,’ one that is contingent on 
‘unspecified hours of unpaid work readiness’ and ‘conditional on the achievement 
of performance indicators.’3 On gig platforms, the contingency of a worker’s 
wage is not just connected to unpaid, unpredictable waiting time (e.g. in between 
rides or at a restaurant) but is also amplified by pricing algorithms that turn this 
already ‘speculative proposition’ into a hyper-dependent variable whose process of 
determination is hidden as a trade secret. I am thus primarily concerned with the 
algorithmic price-setting power of gig platforms – a power that is not only market-
making but also potentially livelihood-taking. 
Price can be understood as ‘a productive force, organizing and shaping the relation 
between markets and persons,’4 by engendering ‘incipient forms of inequality’ and 
inflecting ‘the relationship of the present to the future.’5 While price is generally 
conceived as a signal that enables one to engage in calculative activities such 
as ‘imagining and estimating courses of action,’6 recently ‘the possibilities of 
understanding that signal in meaningful ways are changing’ under the influence 
of dynamic pricing techniques.7 Accordingly, app-based workers are having a much 
more difficult time estimating their future income and the attendant courses of 
action required.
Recent work on dynamic pricing in the fields of economics, information science, and 
operations research has been grappling with questions regarding the optimization 
of financial and behavioural incentives in order to achieve a gig platform’s desired 
just-in-time service level in the most cost-efficient way possible.8 Securing an optimal 
service capacity in a volatile marketplace remains a challenge for ride-hailing 
and food delivery platforms alike. After all, while the imposition of app-based 
management techniques can to a large extent shape how gig workers do their 
job, such techniques provide less grip on when and how much they work, because 
this workforce is largely composed of independent contractors who can – at least 
nominally – determine their own schedules. 
3. Melinda Cooper, “Workfare, Familyfare, Godfare: Transforming Contingency into Necessity,” South 
Atlantic Quarterly 111, no. 4 (2012): 646.
4. Liz Moor and Celia Lury, “Price and the Person: Markets, Discrimination, and Personhood,” Journal 
of Cultural Economy 11, no. 6 (2018): 501.
5. Lisa Adkins and Turo-Kimmo Lehtonen, “Price: An Introduction,” Distinktion: Journal of Social Theo-
ry 19, no. 2 (2018): 109.
6. Michel Callon and Fabian Muniesa, “Peripheral Vision: Economic Markets as Calculative Collective 
Devices,” Organization Studies 26 no. 8 (2005): 1231.
7. Moor and Lury, “Price and the Person,” 502.
8. See, for example, M. Keith Chen and Michael Sheldon, “Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge 
Pricing and the Supply of Uber Driver-Partners,” Working Paper, 11 December 2015; Gad Allon, Max-
ime Cohen, and Wichinpong Park Sinchaisri, “The Impact of Behavioral and Economic Drivers on Gig 
Economy Workers,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 29 Oc-
tober 2018); Harish Guda and Upender Subramanian, “Your Uber Is Arriving: Managing On-Demand 
Workers Through Surge Pricing, Forecast Communication, and Worker Incentives,” Management 
Science 65, no. 5 (2019): 1995–2014; Saif Benjaafar and Ming Hu, “Operations Management in the 
Age of the Sharing Economy: What Is Old and What Is New?,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, 
NY: Social Science Research Network, 17 April 2019).
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Let us take food delivery as an example. In order to coax freelance couriers to log 
onto the app, start accepting orders, and keep working as long as is needed, food 
delivery platforms have had to transform how they approach the notion of a wage 
and how it is paid out to their courier fleets. Whereas, traditionally, couriers would 
work directly for restaurants that pay them a set hourly or daily wage (often off 
the books), to which cash tips are expected to be added with each delivery, most 
food delivery platforms have not only formalised and automated these financial 
transactions through an electronic payment system that bypasses the courier (and 
thus makes it easier for customers not to tip), but have also switched to a piece-rate 
model in which couriers are paid per delivery. Paying couriers per delivery affords 
platform companies a much tighter grip on their flexible labour supply, allowing 
them to design data-driven financial incentives that respond to sudden fluctuations 
of service demand in a more granular and agile manner. In economic terms, it 
enables operations managers to better exploit positive wage elasticities.9 
Incentivising Gig Workers
From a behavioural economics perspective, per-delivery payment schemes come 
with particular ‘reward schedules’ whose irregular ‘hit frequency’ can have a 
powerful effect on the behaviour of couriers who no can longer count on the 
security of an hourly wage.10 When logged into the app and waiting for orders to 
be dispatched, which is often referred to as receiving a ‘ping,’ couriers are faced 
with questions like ‘When will I get my next ping?’; ‘When I don’t get one for a while, 
what may be the reason?’; ‘When I do get one, what happens if I reject the offer – 
how will it affect my future income opportunities?’ 
These negotiations are then further complicated by the introduction of dynamic 
delivery pricing, which reconfigures the piece-rate wage into a dependent variable 
whose value is usually determined by a combination of the following components: 
a pickup fee, a drop-off fee, distance-based compensation, (estimated) time-
based compensation, and – in some cases/markets – order ‘desirability.’11 Crucially, 
these components are themselves variables whose value and relative share can 
be continually adjusted in the calculation of the composite fee. Moreover, besides 
the components communicated by the platform, gig companies likely use their 
analytics capacity to incorporate additional real-time pricing factors such as market 
demand, weather conditions, or even a courier’s behavioural data.12 Dynamic pricing 
techniques and more order transparency together allow for the capture of more 
9. Allon, Cohen, and Sinchaisri, “The Impact of Behavioral and Economic Drivers on Gig Economy 
Workers.”
10. Natasha Dow Schüll, Addiction by Design (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).
11. For example, the food delivery platform DoorDash includes a ‘desirability’ factor into its calcula-
tion of order prices, taking into account the number of times an order has been rejected by previous 
couriers. See https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/22/20828742/doordash-tipping-policy-change-driv-
ers-earning-more-money.
12. Ryan Calo and Alex Rosenblat, “The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power,” Columbia 
Law Review, no. 117 (2017): 1623–90; Priya Kamat and Candice Hogan, “How Uber Leverages Applied 
Behavioral Science at Scale,” Uber Engineering Blog (blog), 28 January 2019. https://eng.uber.com/
applied-behavioral-science-at-scale/.
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data on couriers’ situated decision-making processes, enabling operations managers 
to explore questions like ‘What will it take for this courier to accept this type of 
order?’ or ‘How far is this courier willing to go for this fee – and what if we add a 
bonus incentive?’
Back on the courier’s side, such experimentation produces new questions such as 
‘When I get my next order, how much will they offer me?’; ‘If I reject this offer, 
will the next offer be better or worse?’ As Schüll notes with respect to machine 
gambling, the most potent behavioural reinforcement can be achieved through 
schemes ‘in which subjects never know when they will be rewarded, or how much.’13 
Likewise, platform-mediated food delivery turns into a game-like experience in 
which couriers are constantly evaluating variable offers (substituting for set wages) 
intended to incentivise them to work. When an offer is deemed worth the effort, 
a courier accepts the ‘deal’ by swiping or tapping the screen and gets going. But 
to what extent are couriers able to determine if an offer is worth their effort – i.e. 
whether they should stay or go – and what can they do if it isn’t? 
Dynamic Pricing as a Distinctive Form of 
Labour Control 
When considering how gig platforms orchestrate modes of algorithmic control and 
uncertainty, more critical attention should thus be given to the gamified conditions 
under which a wage can be earned and the loss of grip on these conditions. So 
far, however, few critical studies on algorithmic management in the gig economy 
have focused explicitly on the impact of dynamic pricing strategies and/or wage 
gamification on gig workers’ experiences of insecurity – beyond Uber’s infamous 
surge pricing system.14 When they do, this attention is frequently subsumed under a 
broader concern with algorithmically mediated forms of labour control. 
For instance, an insightful study by Griesbach and colleagues on platform-
mediated food delivery work in New York City reports that ‘[p]latforms do use 
market mechanisms (i.e. price and choice) to match labor supply with consumer 
demand, creating frameworks within which workers can strategize to maximize 
earnings […] But they do so within the context of technical control systems 
that shape and constrain workers’ choices.’15 In this account, platforms’ use of 
ostensibly straightforward ‘market mechanisms’ is thus held to be conceptually 
and operationally distinct from a larger ‘context of technical control systems.’ In 
13. Schüll, Addiction by Design, 108.
14. For example, see Alex Rosenblat and Luke Stark, “Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymme-
tries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers,” International Journal of Communication 10 (2016): 3758–84; 
Luke Munn, “I Am a Driver-Partner,” Work Organisation, Labour & Globalisation 11, no. 2 (2017): 
7–20.
15. Kathleen Griesbach et al., “Algorithmic Control in Platform Food Delivery Work,” Socius: Socio-
logical Research for a Dynamic World 5 (2019): 5. For a similar analysis set in the Chinese context, 
see Hao Qi and Zhongjin Li, “Putting Precarity Back to Production: A Case Study of Didi Kuaiche 
Drivers in the City of Nanjing, China,” Review of Radical Political Economics (online first).
Autonomy     Platforming Equality 14
contrast, I would argue that dynamic pricing algorithms are in fact an integral part 
of the technical control systems that shape the very market mechanisms through 
which workers’ strategic choices are constrained. Importantly, market control is 
labour control in the case of service work such as food delivery, insofar as the 
production and consumption of this service overlap temporally and ‘the market’ 
thereby coincides with what in the manufacturing paradigm would have been the 
‘hidden abode’ of production.16 
Moreover, as Shapiro has noted, ‘control is a pervasive feature of the market’s 
configuration, not an artefact of its algorithmic execution.’17 Rather than focusing 
on the role of algorithms per se, his study directs our critical attention to how 
gig economy platforms ‘exploit calculative asymmetries that they design into the 
market architecture.’18 Calculative asymmetries are created not just by enforcing 
information asymmetries but also through the unequal distribution of access to 
calculative equipment (e.g. analytics engines) and their inputs (i.e. data), which 
together minimize the calculative agency of gig workers trying to figure out 
whether a delivery or trip is worth their while. Shapiro’s main contribution here is 
to show ‘how the asymmetrical application of [dynamic] price setting allows firms 
to exert control over labour at the aggregate level while maintaining the façade 
of autonomy for the individual worker,’ which helps to justify the independent 
contractor classification.19
The Situation in Berlin and NYC
            
My own recent research strongly resonates with Shapiro’s analysis. Around the 
time when I was working as a Deliveroo rider in Berlin, as part of my fieldwork, the 
company introduced its ‘distance-based fees’ system, which substituted dynamically 
priced deliveries for the set fee of 5 euros per delivery that had until then been the 
standard. Although ostensibly based on the distance of a trip and the projected 
time the company estimated it would take to complete an order, riders were never 
informed about how fees were calculated – i.e. how much they were being paid 
per kilometre or minute. This wage obfuscation was met with a growing discontent 
and frustration among members of the city’s rider community, especially among a 
group of activist riders who were part of the grassroots Deliverunion campaign (see 
image 2). As I have elaborated elsewhere, some of these riders attempted to gain 
calculative power by building their own do-it-yourself computational equipment – in 
the form of a web-based application – that enabled them to collect data on the 
distances and fees of their deliveries and to subsequently approximate Deliveroo’s 
pricing algorithm.20 This move to advance their calculative grip was then used as a 
16. Julia Tomassetti, “Digital Platform Work as Interactive Service Work,” Employee Rights and Em-
ployment Policy Journal 22, no. 1 (2018): 1–58.
17. Aaron Shapiro, “Dynamic Exploits: Calculative Asymmetries in the on-Demand Economy,” New 
Technology, Work and Employment 35, no. 2 (2020): 12.
18. Ibid, 2.
19. Ibid.
20. Niels Van Doorn, “At What Price? Labour Politics and Calculative Power Struggles in on-Demand 
Food Delivery,” Work Organisation, Labour & Globalisation 14, no. 1 (2020): 136–49.
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stepping stone to inspire other riders to become involved, not just in the project but 
in Deliverunion’s more comprehensive labour struggle.   
In New York City, where I also conducted fieldwork, such an endeavour would have 
been much more difficult to pull off. There are two primary reasons: first, because 
delivery workers often use multiple (up to 3-4) different apps, which makes data 
collection more complex and organising activities more diffuse (which company 
should be addressed?); and second, because wages are much more thoroughly 
gamified in comparison to European cities. Each company offers its own daily and 
weekly bonus incentives, usually presented in game-like formats, which couriers 
assess and compare in order to determine which app may be most lucrative for 
them on any given day. 
Add to this that couriers frequently use the instant pay-out feature offered on 
nearly every app and it becomes clear how this way of working resembles the 
experience of gamblers in the networked, data-driven casinos studied by Schüll.21 As 
they play multiple ‘machines’ at the same time and evaluate which ones are ‘giving 
them love’ and which are ‘trash,’ they run the risk of being bamboozled by delivery 
companies deploying wage gamification techniques to conceal the fact that, 
across the board, the dynamically determined base fees are slowly being adjusted 
downward.22 So what can be done to curb the calculative and price-setting power of 
gig economy platforms and ensure that they pay out a decent, reliable wage? This 
will be the topic of the next section. 
21. Schüll, Addiction by Design.
22. Niels Van Doorn and Julie Yujie Chen, “Odds Stacked Against Workers: Labor Process Gamifica-
tion on Chinese and American Food Delivery Platforms,” Socio-Economic Review, forthcoming.
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Image 2: A Deliverunion flyer inviting riders to a join a meeting and take 
action
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Grassroots Labour Organising in the 
Gig Economy
Although grassroots labour organising is more challenging in the gig economy, 
it certainly is far from impossible, as has been demonstrated by gig workers and 
labour advocacy groups around the world. Indeed, as Woodcock and Cant have 
argued, the days of emergent struggles against platform capitalism are well behind 
us and we can discern the formation of a more mature and institutionally robust 
(even if often fragmented) global movement.23 Nevertheless, campaigns dedicated 
specifically to gig workers’ struggles against the wage obfuscation and price-setting 
power of platforms are still relatively rare. 
One prominent example in the North-American context is the #PayUp campaign 
organised by Working Washington, a state-wide labour advocacy group. The 
campaign has formulated three demands – a minimum wage floor of $15 plus 
expenses; treating tips as a supplement instead of a substitute; and wage 
transparency – pertinent to all gig economy platforms but addressed to delivery 
companies DoorDash, Instacart and Postmates in particular. So far, its biggest 
labour victory came at the start of 2019, when it played a pivotal role in a wave 
of worker protests and media attention that eventually pushed Instacart to 
discontinue a payment scheme using customer tips to subsidize workers’ base pay – 
a scheme facilitated by dynamic delivery pricing insofar as this allows companies to 
surreptitiously integrate tips into variable offers.24 At the end of 2019, the campaign 
once again played a central role in organising a nation-wide strike of Instacart 
workers who opposed how the company disincentivised tipping on the app.25 
Moreover, echoing Deliverunion’s attempt to gain calculative agency in Berlin, the 
#PayUp website provides ‘calculators’ that allow app-based workers to submit their 
payment data to better understand the composition of delivery offers and how 
much these pay after expenses. 
In the UK, meanwhile, the Worker Info Exchange (WIE) is an organisation that 
seeks to counter the gig economy’s calculative asymmetries by leveraging the EU’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to gain access to all pertinent data 
Uber (whose European headquarters are in Amsterdam) collects on its workforce. 
While its interest in driver data – obtained by pooling the outcomes of so-called 
‘Subject Access Requests’ submitted to Uber by individual drivers – is not limited 
to wage issues alone, one of the organisation’s primary goals is to work with data 
scientists in order to determine how much drivers actually make when taking into 
account things like idle or ‘dead’ time, which is a common problem in large markets 
23. Jamie Woodcock and Callum Cant, “The End of the Beginning: The Struggles of Platform Work-
ers,” Notes From Below, June 8, 2019, https://notesfrombelow.org/article/end-beginning.
24. Kevin Roose, “After Uproar, Instacart Backs Off Controversial Tipping Policy,” The New York 
Times. 6 February 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/06/technology/instacart-doordash-tip-
ping-deliveries.html.
25. April Glaser, “Instacart Workers Are Striking Because of the App’s User Interface,” Slate. 
5 November 2019. https://slate.com/business/2019/11/instacart-workers-striking-app-user-inter-
face-dark-pattern-design.html.
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saturated with drivers. To achieve this, however, WIE would need access to drivers’ 
GPS data during periods they are not completing a trip, and so far Uber has failed 
to make this data available.26 
The battle over data has recently made it to an Amsterdam district court, 
where four UK-based Uber drivers – supported by WIE and the App Drivers & 
Couriers Union, among others – are appealing to the GDPR to claim not just 
more comprehensive and consistent data access but also the right to have insight 
into how Uber’s algorithms work.27 The problem with this latter claim, which 
would include information on the company’s blackboxed pricing algorithm, is 
that algorithmic systems are continually being adjusted to optimise operations 
and are thus volatile epistemic objects. Platform-governed markets are basically 
giant experimental sandboxes operating at a velocity designed to resist public 
transparency, critique, and regulation.
Regulatory Responses: A Minimum Wage 
for Gig Workers
This means, in turn, that regulation and public policy will have to be more proactive 
and creative. Perhaps the best example of such regulatory innovation comes from 
New York City, where, following persistent pressure from the New York Taxi Workers 
Alliance and the (Uber-approved) Independent Drivers Guild, the City Council and 
the Taxi & Limousine Commission (TLC) introduced ground-breaking regulations at 
the end of 2018, setting a one-year cap on the number of ride-hail vehicles allowed 
on the road and a minimum hourly wage for drivers of US$17.22 after expenses.28 
This wage floor was informed by an inventive city-commissioned study by Parrott 
and Reich, which produced a payment formula that included the ‘utilisation rate’ of 
all ride-hailing companies active in the city, based on data the TLC could collect 
from these companies.29
This utilisation rate represents the percentage of time drivers have passengers 
on board, which was found to be very low (58% on average) across the platforms 
– confirming drivers’ complaints about unpaid dead time. As Ongweso concisely 
explains: ‘The incentive, then, was to use utilization rate in the pay floor formula 
to stop perpetual growth and have drivers spend less time on the road empty, 
hopefully reducing congestion as well. The lower the utilization rate, the higher 
26. Sarah Holder, “For Ride-Hailing Drivers, Data Is Power,” Bloomberg CityLab. 22 August 2019. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-22/why-uber-drivers-are-fighting-for-their-data.
27. Natasha Lomas, “UK Uber Drivers Are Taking the Algorithm to Court,” TechCrunch. 20 August 
2020. https://social.techcrunch.com/2020/07/20/uk-uber-drivers-are-taking-its-algorithm-to-court/.
28. Shirin Ghaffary, “New York City Has Set the Nation’s First Minimum Pay Rate for Uber and Lyft 
Drivers,” Vox. 4 December 2018. https://www.vox.com/2018/12/4/18125789/uber-lyft-drivers-wage-mini-
mum-new-york.
29. James A. Parrott and Michael Reich, “An Earnings Standard for New York City’s App-Based 
Drivers: Economic Analysis and Policy Assessment,” Report for the New York City Taxi and Limousine 
Commission (Institute for the Research on Labor and Employment, 2 July 2018). https://irle.berkeley.
edu/an-earnings-standard-for-new-york-citys-app-based-drivers/.
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the per-trip pay floor.’30 Instead of seeking transparency with respect to pricing 
algorithms, which is a reactive effort bound to play catch-up with platforms’ 
dynamic operational strategies, the City of New York thus took control by 
implementing a minimum wage rule that limited the price-setting power of ride-
hailing firms: when drivers make less than US$17.22 an hour after expenses, these 
firms are required to pay up. 
   
In response to these measures, however, Uber and Lyft promptly started limiting 
drivers’ access to their platforms during times of lower demand, introducing tiered 
quota systems and work scheduling schemes that prioritised drivers who were able 
to complete exceedingly difficult to reach trip targets while also maintaining a 
near-perfect rating. This so-called ‘lockout’ has had a severely detrimental impact 
on NYC’s ride-hail drivers, who either had to be working constantly in order to 
maintain their spot in the top tier or had to wait around (and sometimes sleep) in 
their car to be available when a potentially lucrative slot opened up.31 
Whereas the new regulations were intended to limit drivers’ idle time and increase 
their wages, Uber and Lyft’s counter-strategies thus resulted in the exact opposite 
and rendered ride-hail driving even more precarious. What I find striking here 
is how these regulatory measures made both firms act more like regular low-
wage employers than ever before, resorting to automated work scheduling and 
segmentation techniques that are so common in service industries where margins 
are thin and companies are continually looking to minimize labour costs.32 
Ominously, it also tells us something about how these companies are likely to 
respond if they would be classified as such.
As the Covid-19 pandemic hit New York and the demand for ride-hailing services 
tanked, Uber decided to temporarily lift its restrictions.33 While this move was 
ostensibly intended to help drivers during the city-wide lockdown, it has also 
enabled a situation where driver supply can (again) vastly outnumber customer 
demand. This would inevitably have a negative impact on the company’s utilisation 
rate, meaning it has to pay out more per trip to meet the minimum wage 
regulations. Now that a public health crisis has collapsed the market, however, Uber 
seems to be less worried about these expenses. After all, the lockdown essentially 
produces the same outcome as its lockout: fewer drivers are active on its platform. 
Or perhaps it is just even less concerned with playing by the rules. Even before 
the pandemic, drivers and labour advocates expressed their dismay at how the 
TLC was failing to properly enforce its own regulations and had started changing 
its language from ‘minimum pay per hour’ to ‘average pay per hour,’ thereby 
30. Edward Jr. Ongweso, “The Lockout: Why Uber Drivers in NYC Are Sleeping in Their Cars,” Vice. 
19 March 2020. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pkewqb/the-lockout-why-uber-drivers-in-nyc-are-
sleeping-in-their-cars.
31. Ibid.
32. Alex J. Wood, “Powerful Times: Flexible Discipline and Schedule Gifts at Work:,” Work, Employ-
ment and Society 32, no. 6 (2018): 1061–77.
33. Andrew J. Hawkins, “Uber Is Lifting Restrictions on Drivers in NYC in Response to Coronavirus,” 
The Verge. 19 March 2020, https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/19/21187261/uber-lift-restrictions-driv-
er-app-nyc-coronavirus.
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relinquishing the universal wage floor.34 While the pandemic has rightfully shifted 
public attention to how ride-hailing and delivery companies are inadequately 
protecting workers’ health and safety, it also appears to have further weakened 
the city’s commitment to minimum wage enforcement.35 Consequently, drivers who 
see themselves forced to stay logged on are reporting sharp income drops and can 
barely survive,36 especially as Uber and Lyft are delaying access to the State of 
New York’s unemployment insurance.37 
Proper regulatory enforcement would ameliorate this situation, especially for high-
volume drivers, yet it would undoubtedly also result in new restrictions. The reason 
why so many drivers can continue to work on these platforms at a time when 
masses of low-wage workers are being laid off or furloughed is precisely because 
gig economy companies continue to find ways to evade labour laws, including 
minimum wage regulations. As such, drivers cannot make a living with Uber during 
the pandemic, yet they cannot really do without the app either. I address this 
conundrum in the final section below.       
34. Peter Rugh, “Uber Exploited, Lyfted Down: How Ride-Share Companies Cheat Drivers Out of 
Minimum Wages,” The IndyPendent. 6 October 2019. https://indypendent.org/2019/10/uber-exploited-
lyfted-down-how-ride-share-companies-cheat-drivers-out-of-minimum-wages/; Ongweso, “The Lock-
out.”
35. For example, see Dara Kerr, “Uber Hears Drivers’ Demands, Ships out Masks for Coronavirus 
Protection,” CNET. 9 April 2020. https://www.cnet.com/news/uber-hears-drivers-demands-ships-out-
masks-for-coronavirus-protection/.
36. Aziz Bah, “I’m a New York City Uber Driver. The Pandemic Shows That My Industry Needs Fun-
damental Change or Drivers Will Never Recover,” Business Insider. 29 July 2020. https://www.busines-
sinsider.com/uber-lyft-drivers-covid-19-pandemic-virus-economy-right-bargain-2020-7.
37. Noam Scheiber, “Drivers Say Uber and Lyft Are Blocking Unemployment Pay,” The New York 
Times. 24 March 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/24/business/economy/coronavirus-uber-ly-
ft-drivers-unemployment.html.
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Policy Recommendations
The reason I have been dwelling on the fate of Uber drivers in New York City is 
because it presents a unique case study of the ongoing struggle to abolish the 
wage as a wager. In conclusion, three policy recommendations can be derived from 
this case: 
Policy Recommendation 1: Gig economy companies should be statutorily 
obliged to share their data with city authorities. 
Obtaining relevant and comprehensive data from gig economy companies is a 
critical base requirement for achieving meaningful regulatory change. The unique 
data sharing arrangement between the TLC and New York-based ride-hailing 
platforms enabled Parrot and Reich to calculate existing hourly wages after 
expenses and recommend a new minimum wage for app-based drivers.38 Their 
study thereby effectively side-stepped the wage obfuscation introduced by dynamic 
pricing algorithms and the gamification of payouts.
Policy Recommendation 2: City authorities should strengthen their enforcement 
capacities to ensure gig economy companies adhere to new regulatory 
frameworks. 
Policymakers should not only work toward establishing minimum wage requirements; 
they should also increase their commitment to regulatory enforcement once these 
requirements are in place, especially now that the Covid-19 pandemic is plunging 
national economies into a major recession. As platform companies are attempting 
to leverage this crisis by courting local governments, emphasising corporate social 
responsibility and reformulating their value proposition for cities,39 it is important 
not to surrender the political will to maintain the rules, norms, and standards 
that protect workers. This includes not replacing universal wage floors with 
average wage objectives, however determined, given that such averages to not 
accurately represent ‘large deviations in the income ditribution of drivers.’40 There 
38. In contrast, the city of Seattle could not establish such an arrangement with Uber and Lyft as 
it explored the implementation of a minimum wage. Instead, it commissioned Parrot and Reich to 
conduct their own survey in order to calculate how much drivers were making. Yet shortly before this 
study could be sent to the city, a research team from Cornell’s ILR School submitted their alternative 
report – commissioned by Uber and based on exclusive access to the company’s data (Kerr 2020). 
Beyond the ensuing controversy over diverging results and methods, this incident shows the ethi-
cal and political importance of ensuring open access to data that may be proprietary but is in the 
public interest. As an open letter denouncing the Cornell/Uber study (signed by this author) states: 
“The acceptance of the company’s data and analytical parameters, especially when policymakers 
have commissioned a study on this very matter, normalises the company’s systematic withholding of 
basic information needed by regulators to govern.” For the open letter see: https://medium.com/@
gigeconomyresearchersunited/open-letter-and-principles-for-ethical-research-on-the-gig-economy-
3cd27924cc08. 
39. Niels Van Doorn, Jelke Bosma, and Eva Mos, “Disrupting ‘Business as Usual’: COVID-19 and Plat-
form Labour,” Futures of Work. 13 July 2020. https://futuresofwork.co.uk/2020/07/13/disrupting-busi-
ness-as-usual-how-covid-19-is-impacting-platform-mediated-labour-and-social-reproduction/.
40. Eszter Bokányi and Anikó Hannák, “Understanding Inequalities in Ride-Hailing Services Through 
Simulations,” Scientific Reports 10, no. 1 (2020): 1; See also Louis Hyman et al., “Platform Driving In 
Seattle” (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, ILR School, Institute for Workplace Studies, 6 July 2020). 
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is no ‘average driver.’ Instead, all drivers should earn at least the local minimum 
wage. In countries where local jurisdictions cannot set wage floors autonomously, 
policymakers should endeavour to include gig workers in national or state-wide 
minimum wage legislation.
Policy Recommendation 3: National legislation should be passed to ensure a 
comprehensive system of labour rights and protections for all gig workers.  
This could be achieved by reclassifying gig workers as employees, which would not 
only guarantee that all gig workers have the right to a minimum wage, regardless 
of where they work, but would also grant them additional rights and insurances 
they are currently missing (e.g. the right to collective bargaining and sick pay). 
The tide seems to be turning, as more courts and legislators are deciding that 
platform companies should treat their workforce as employees.41 Yet we should also 
anticipate how these firms will react to reclassification efforts. They will not only 
fight court decisions and ignore new laws, as they have done in California,42 but 
will also limit gig workers’ access to their platforms, as in New York, or ultimately 
withdraw from a city or country altogether – as Deliveroo did in Germany.43 To 
shrug or celebrate and say ‘good riddance’ is to ignore the elephant in the room; 
namely the reason why so many workers, predominantly immigrants and minorities, 
continue to seek out and rely on app-based gig work.44 This is not an argument 
against reclassification per se, but rather a warning that it is not a solution in 
and by itself. We need more ambitious and truly comprehensive approaches that 
overcome the shortcomings of existing employment law.  
Make no mistake, there are no easy fixes here. Beyond concrete policy 
recommendations, even beyond the realm of policy proper, what is required is the 
political vision and will to achieve more radical forms of redistributive social justice. 
Ultimately, then, my most urgent and far-reaching recommendation is to raise 
wages and improve working conditions across low-wage industries, so that workers 
have real alternatives and do not have to accept the ever-changing rules of the 
games gig economy companies play – with their wages and access to the app. 
Until this happens, Uber and its ilk will continue to attract mostly racialised labour 
market outsiders and will be able to leverage the plight of these precarious workers 
to justify their operations and resist regulation (as Uber has done in response to 
the revocation of its operating license in London). Moreover, to truly abolish the 
wage as a wager, the decommodification of labour needs to extend beyond the gig 
economy and involve stronger interventions in welfare and immigration regulation 
to ensure a robust defence of workers’ rights. Only a policy and political agenda 
geared toward the emancipation of the most vulnerable and dispossessed can keep 
workers in need from taking a chance on predatory platforms. 
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports/71.
41. Bama Athreya, “Uber’s Achilles Heel: The Rule of Law,” Connected2Work (blog), 29 July 2020. 
https://connected2work.org/blog/ubers-achilles-heel-the-rule-of-law.
42. Carly Graf, “Uber, Lyft and Doordash Bring Their Battle Against AB5 to November Ballot,” The 
San Francisco Examiner, July 5, 2020. https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/uber-lyft-and-doordash-
bring-their-battle-against-ab5-to-november-ballot/.
43. Van Doorn, “At What Price?”
44. Niels van Doorn, Fabian Ferrari, and Mark Graham, “Migration and Migrant Labour in the Gig 
Economy: An Intervention,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 
8 June 2020). https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3622589.
                     Rethinking Microwork: the Invisble
       Labour of the Platform Economy
Phil Jones
The rapid development of artificial intelligence over the last decade has not 
yet brought about the dystopian scenario of mass unemployment predicted by 
its critics. Paradoxically, on arriving at automation’s ‘last mile’ there has been a 
flourishing of new work – precarious and poorly paid – pushing the horizon of 
human redundancy ever-further into the future.1
Indeed, present AI innovations turn on an illusion. What so often appears as 
algorithmic power is in fact an ambient workforce, supervising Uber’s algorithms, 
rating Google’s search results and making sure our Facebook feeds are clear of 
violent imagery. These ‘ghost workers’ train the data for autonomous vehicles and 
facial recognition software; they transcribe audio for chatbots and power the cloud 
computing of companies like Microsoft. They are the workers that step in when the 
algorithm falls short, the workers that clean the data and, ultimately, make our 
digital lives legible.2
We find this hidden workforce of on-demand workers on microwork platforms such 
as Amazon Mechanical Turk, Appen and Clickworker. These platforms host short 
data tasks that are outsourced by requesters ranging from smaller start-ups to 
companies like Google, Amazon and Microsoft. The platforms act as intermediaries 
and take a cut from every transaction between the two parties.3
Tasks on the platforms might include labelling objects on a photo, transcribing 
audio of voices, copying or translating short pieces of writing and filling in surveys. 
These tasks fulfill the work that:
1. Algorithms are still unable to complete 
2. Workers can complete more precisely and efficiently
3. Workers can complete at a lower cost
For this reason, workers on these platforms have been described as ‘artificial 
artificial intelligence,’ ‘humans in the loop,’ and ‘data with a human touch.’4
1. Mary Gray and Siddharth Suri, Ghost Work: How to stop Silicon Valley from building a new under-
class  (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt: USA, 2019).
2. Ibid.
3. Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Polity Press: London, 2016).
4. Appen, “Data with a human touch.” August 2017. https://appen.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/
Appen-Healthcare.pdf; Appen, “What is human-in-the-loop machine learning.” 2019. https://appen.
com/blog/human-in-the-loop/.
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The use of microwork sites is growing rapidly. A survey by the Trades Union 
Congress and the University of Hertfordshire found that as much as 5.8% of the UK 
working age population use microwork sites at least once a week.5 The majority of 
those surveyed said they were in full-time employment, suggesting that microwork 
tops up incomes in a moment of ongoing wage stagnation.6 A significant minority 
said they were part-time or self-employed, also suggesting that the growing 
popularity of microwork is a response to under-employment.7 In response to a global 
survey of workers using five microwork platforms conducted by the ILO, over 60 
per cent of respondents expressed a desire for more work other than microwork, 
again suggesting a high degree of underemployment – 41 per cent of participants 
reported actively looking for other paid work.8
Microwork platforms recruit workers by promising flexibility and independence in 
terms of the schedule, quantity and location of work. The flipside of this is that the 
work is highly contingent: temporary and casual tasks, often lasting little more than 
a few minutes. Workers patch together a livelihood out of bits and pieces of work, 
meaning workers end up working for multiple requesters over the course of a single 
day. As ‘independent contractors,’ they receive none of the rights or benefits that 
come with ‘worker’ or ‘employee’ status. 
Treatment of workers differs depending on the type of platform they work for, 
which can be divided into two distinct but mutually overlapping kinds: crude crowd 
platforms and tailored crowd platforms (See Figure 1). Using this typology, it’s 
possible to generalise that curated crowd platforms tend to service long-term clients 
and, for this reason, use tests and formal applications to decide which workers can 
use the platform, while crude crowd platforms are open to anyone who wishes to 
outsource or fulfill tasks (though requesters often provide tests for tasks requiring 
specific skills).
5. Trades Union Council and University of Hertfordshire. “Platform Work in the UK 2016-2019.” 
Foundation for European Progressive Studies. 2019. https://www.feps-europe.eu/resources/publica-
tions/682-com_publications.publications.html.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Janine Berger, Marianne Furrer, Ellie Harmon, Uma Rani and M. Six Silberman. “Digital Labour 
Platforms and the Future of Work: Towards decent work in the online world.” International Labour 
Organization. 2019. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/docu-
ments/publication/wcms_645337.pdf.
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Figure 1: Typology of microwork platforms
 Crude Crowd
 
Curated Crowd
Platforms  Amazon Mechanical     
Turk, Clickworker, Mi-
croworkers, Lionsbridge
Appen, Playment, Mighty AI, 
Hive, Scale, Wirk, Microsoft 
UHRS, Google Raterhub
Tasks Hosted Generalist: clickwork 
such as surveys, data en-
try, content moderation, 
as well as some machine 
learning tasks
Specialist: Machine learning 
training – data classification 
and labelling, audio tran-
scription, sentiment analysis
Project Length
 
Highly contingent: 30 
second – 30-minute 
tasks (though some may 
be longer)
A mixture of highly contin-
gent and longer term ‘task 
projects’, where smaller tasks 
are packaged together to of-
fer 8-40 hours’ worth of work
Requesters General requesters - 
marketing, sectoral and  
academic researchers. 
Also some large tech 
companies
Google, Microsoft, Uber, 
Facebook, Amazon, IBM, 
Tesla
Average Payment $2-3 per hour $7-9 per hour
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Working Without Pay or Rights
a) Low Pay or no Pay
While pay differs significantly from platform to platform, it is generally very low, 
with average hourly earnings often totalling well below the minimum wage in most 
EU countries.9 Pay is especially low on crude crowd platforms (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Hourly pay by platform (US$)
Paid work Paid and unpaid work
Median Mean Observations Median Mean Observations
AMT USA 2017 7.50 8.51 222 5.63 6.54 222
2015 6.00 7.56 652 4.66 5.56 651
AMT India 2017 2.14 3.40 217 1.67 2.53 217
2015 2.19 3.95 98 1.66 2.95 98
CrowdFlower 2017 1.50 2.65 298 1.11 1.95 299
2015 1.50 3.04 306 1.00 1.92 307
Clickworker 2017 3.19 4.49 389 2.13 3.19 390
Prolific 2017 4.55 5.45 450 3.56 4.26 446
Micorworkers 2017 1.60 3.00 444 1.01 2.15 448
All platforms 2017 3.00 4.43 2027 2.16 3.31 2029
2015 4.39 5.92 1056 3.33 4.26 1056
Source: “Digital Labour Platforms and the Future of Work: Towards decent work in the online world.” 
International Labour Organization. 2019.
On these platforms, pay has to be low for the sites to remain both profitable and 
popular with requesters. The majority of work on sites like Mechanical Turk and 
Clickworker is not geared toward doing tasks that algorithms can’t do but tasks 
that workers can do at a lower cost and faster pace than algorithms; thus, price 
as opposed to accuracy is often what motivates requesters.10 The fact that paying 
a minimum wage on these platforms would effectively make outsourcing tasks 
financially unviable suggests that legislators and policymakers should seriously 
consider the role of these platforms in the UK economy, a problem returned to in 
the policy section below.
9. Ibid.
10. Mannas Mittal and Yaron Singer. “Pricing Tasks in Online Labor Markets.” Association for the 
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Workshop, 2011. https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/WS/AAA-
IW11/paper/viewFile/4001/4266/.
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One of the largest surveys carried out on microwork sites found that over 30 
percent of workers regularly experience wage theft.11 While some of this figure is 
due to requester malfeasance, a significant number of incidents are the result of 
the way platforms organise workflow and payment. Wage theft is often baked into 
the architecture of many platform’s, which allows requesters to dock or deny pay 
due to:
1. Task time limits – strict timeframes on the completion of tasks, if broken, can 
result in non-payment. This is because much of the work offered on these 
sites can already be done by machine learning algorithms; workers retain the 
upperhand in terms of pace.12
2. ‘Bad quality’ –  tasks that do not meet requester standards will go unpaid. 
On Amazon Mechanical Turk, for the same task completed by a multitude 
of workers, those in the majority are paid while the outlier is assumed to be 
incorrect and forgoes payment.13
3. Lack of checks and balances –  Requesters can easily deny payment 
illegitimately. While microwork platforms supply rating systems that allow 
requesters to review workers, no such system exists for workers to do the 
same. This means repeated offenders are difficult to identify.
On top of explicit wage theft, workers on these platforms also fall victim to 
excessive and unregulated data appropriation. A platform like Amazon Mechanical 
Turk not only imposes a levy on every transaction between workers and requesters 
but also receives a data set about every task completed on the platform.14 This 
effectively gives Amazon a carbon copy of the task’s product as well as information 
about how the task was completed entirely free of charge.
b) Lack of Workers’ Rights and Benefits
The characteristic contractual arrangement of microwork is ‘self-employment.’ In 
theory, this means that individuals and firms are free to negotiate terms agreeable 
to both parties, according to the minimum standards set out by legislation.15
On microwork platforms self-employment disproportionately benefits the contractor, 
allowing them to avoid costly financial obligations such as national insurance 
payments. The worker, on the other hand, loses the rights and benefits of being an 
employee or worker yet receives few of the gains associated with self-employment - 
for instance, pay is non-negotiable (see Figure 3).
11. Mary Gray and Siddharth Suri. Ghost Work: How to stop Silicon Valley from building a new under-
class. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt: USA, 2019.
12. Alexander Quinn, Benjamin Bederson, Tom Yeh and Jimmy Lin. “CrowdFlow: Integrating Machine 
Learning with Mechanical Turk for Speed-Cost-Quality Flexibility,” Human Computer Interaction 
Lab, 2010. See: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.232.4190&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
13. M. Six Silberman and Lilly Irani, “Operating an employer reputation system: Lessons from Turkop-
ticon 2008-2015.’ Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 37 (2016): 505–542 .
14. Amazon Mechanical Turk. “Participation Agreement.” 2020. https://www.mturk.com/participa-
tion-agreement.
15. Gov.uk. “Employment Status.” 2020. https://www.gov.uk/employment-status/worker.
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Figure 3: Employment rights for employees, workers and the self-employed
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With platforms like Uber and Deliveroo, there is a strong argument to be made 
that workers using the platform are not self-employed, but actually work for the 
companies. Both platforms set the terms of the work, control the workflow, set 
pay rates and even decide when workers can work.16 By the estimation of some, 
workers on these platforms thus represent ‘dependent contractors,’ a section of 
the self-employed who are contracted long-term by a single employer, and should, 
therefore, be eligible for workers’ rights.17
16. Kari Paul, “California landmark workers’ rights bill sends waves through gig economy firms.” The 
Guardian. 11 September 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/sep/11/.
17. Matthew Taylor, Greg Marsh, Diane Nicol, Paul Broadbent, “Good Work: the Taylor review of 
modern working practises.” Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 2017. https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/good-work-the-taylor-review-of-modern-working-practices. 
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With microwork, the case is less clear cut. Instead of one platform doing all of 
the above, a multitude of requesters design tasks, set pay rates and control the 
workflow. Workers on these platforms are employed by innumerable requesters, 
but undertake their work at a single site of work, where pay, organisation and 
often hours are non-negotiable. In short, they neither fit the rigid categories that 
comprise the UK’s system of workers’ rights, nor do they readily meet the criteria 
set out for ‘dependant contractors.’18 As we will see, this is why extending a single 
‘worker’ definition to all employees, temporary and zero-hour workers as well as 
self-employed contractors offers a better – though still imperfect – solution to this 
problem.
Policy Solutions
While microwork represents a global challenge for policymakers, some of the 
proposals recommended here are targeted at the UK’s labour market and are, 
therefore, highly specific to one country’s institutional and legal arrangements. 
Other proposals outlined here are generalisable and thus transferable to the labour 
markets of other national and international jurisdictions.
a. Platform Equality
There are many issues specific to microwork platforms that are not yet covered 
by existing legislation. Problems like wage theft and one-sided rating systems 
are either entirely unique to microwork or do not affect the wider labour market 
to anything like the same degree. For this reason, government should introduce 
legislation that specifically targets the architecture of these platforms:
To prevent wage theft it should be legislated that all completed tasks are paid for 
by requesters. As it stands, payment is only made to those who complete tasks to a 
satisfactory standard, an arrangement that disproportionately benefits requesters. 
To make the errors of workers less costly, requesters should use other channels to 
incentivise good work, i.e. the available ratings systems, which allow requesters 
to mark down workers for persistently poor work. This would mean that rather 
than forfeiting pay, workers who repeatedly produce ‘bad work,’ either through 
negligence or malfeasance, get a bad reputation and are identifiable as such by 
other requesters.
Rating systems should be made multi-sided so that workers can review requesters. 
These should be modelled on Turkopticon, an innovative requester reputation 
system designed by workers on Mechanical Turk.19 The plug-in overlays the worker’s 
screen and allows them to rate requesters and publicize this information in real-
time. Rather than being external to a platform’s architecture it should be made 
internal. By allowing workers to warn others on the platform about ‘bad’ requesters, 
such a system would help iron out inequities between workers and requesters.
Worker messaging services should be made a legal obligation of microwork sites. As 
it stands, workers are forced to use forums and Reddit threads to discuss platform 
18. Ibid.
19. Silberman and Irani, “Operating an employer reputation system: Lessons from Turkopticon 2008-
2015”.
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problems, bad requesters, as well as hints and tips around task completion. This 
creates a lag in response times and makes the real-time communication that 
workers share in other lines of work close to impossible. Internal messaging services 
would go some way to improving communication between workers.
Shorter tasks should include a ‘finders fee’ to cover the lengthy fallow periods 
between tasks. This would cover the large amounts of shadow work undertaken 
by workers to simply find tasks. A worker that undertakes 15 two-minute tasks 
undertakes significantly more unpaid shadow work than one who does two 15-minute 
tasks. The ‘finders fees’ for time spent searching for tasks should, therefore, be 
graded, so that two-minute tasks receive a greater payment boost than a five-
minute task. These payments should be incurred by requesters via monthly taxes on 
their earnings and paid to taskers on a monthly basis.
b. Universal Workers’ Rights
 
In an age where arrangements like the gig economy and microwork are testing the 
very legal definitions upon which the labour market rests; where employees are in 
decline and the self-employed on the rise; and where a highly interconnected world 
means all workers face the same global risks – pandemics and climate catastrophe 
– we need a system of universal rights that no longer privileges certain segments of 
the labour market, but provides the same safety net and benefits for all.
 
This would mean that all who exchange their time for a wage, whether it be a 
salaried employee or a ‘self-employed’ microtasker, are categorised under the single 
banner of ‘worker’ and are given the same access to the full range of rights usually 
preserved for employees.20 As we see in Figure 3, workers on microwork sites are 
not covered by employment law, and are not extended even the most basic level of 
security in terms of rights and benefits. There is no good reason why, for instance, 
minimum wage legislation or holiday pay should not be extended to such workers. 
In most cases, this greater extension of rights would not entail radical adaptations 
to existing legal or institutional arrangements. The scope of minimum wage 
legislation or working time directives, for instance, would simply be amended to 
include a larger section of the labour market. 
But because many rights arrive as financial support from employers, the means of 
receiving such support would need to be adapted for those who are not contracted 
full-time or over the long-term. For these workers, holiday, sick and maternity pay 
should be paid through a new government fund, set up in the country where the 
work is completed, which distributes these benefits, financed by the platforms 
through existent tax and national insurance contributions (NICs). For instance, in 
the UK, this would mean that microwork companies pay national insurance and 
tax on any work carried out on their platforms within the UK, which would go into 
the fund and then be distributed as financial support such as sick or holiday pay. 
Platform companies could choose to place some or all of the burden of this tax 
on requesters via additional levies on using the platform, but platform companies 
20. The Institute of Employment Rights. “UK Sick pay nearly worst in Europe and in breach of 
international law.” The Institute of Employment Rights. 13 March 2020. https://www.ier.org.uk/news/
uk-sick-pay-nearly-worst-in-europe-and-in-breach-of-international-law/.
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should be responsible for paying the tax in the first instance.
The amount of financial support workers would have available to them would be 
defined by the amount of hours they work. This would mean that those who work 
full-time hours on microwork sites would have the same amount of holiday and 
sick pay available to them as, say, a full time employee. Part-time or shorter hours 
would mean a reduction of the full value of benefits available. 
c. A New National Insurance System
 
To make workers’ rights –  and indeed employer responsibilities –  universal, 
the national insurance system should be levelled up, so that all employers and 
contractors of labour pay a set rate of national insurance contributions (NICs) 
per annum, and all in the new universal category of ‘worker’ pay a slightly lower 
rate (with remittances for low-income workers). As it stands, employers are being 
incentivised to misrepresent the legal status of workers to avoid paying NICs, 
frequently downgrading employees to ‘worker’ or ‘self-employed’ and depriving 
them of the rights they deserve (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Type of NICs in 202021
 
 
As it stands, the self-employed pay two 
types of NICs:
 
Class 2: £3.05 a week if profits are 
above £6,475 a year
Class 4: 9% on profits between £9,501 
and £50,000 a year. 2% extra on prof-
its over £50,000
 
 
While employees pay one type of NICs 
and their employer another:
 
Class 1: 12% on earnings above £9,504 a 
year and an additional 2% on £50,000 
a year
Employer NIC: 13.8% of employee earn-
ings above £8784
 
Adjusting the parameters of NICs so that employers and firms continue to pay the 
same but workers pay less overall, all employers and contractors should continue to 
pay 13.8% of earnings per annum and all employees, workers and self-employed a 
flat 10%. While this represents slightly more for some sections of the labour market 
(and slightly less for others) the gains accrued in rights and benefits far outweigh 
what appear at first glance as income losses. There would also be a system of 
remittances for lower earners, making below £9,504 a year, such as those using 
microwork sites as their main source of income (see below).
Unlike the present system of remittances which distinguished between ‘self 
employed’ and ‘employee,’ all workers would pay the same 10% national insurance 
and have access to financial benefits such as maternity allowance and a state 
21. Gov.uk. “National Insurance rates and categories.” 2020. https://www.gov.uk/national-insur-
ance-rates-letters; Gov.uk. “Self-Employed National Insurance rates.” 2020. https://www.gov.uk/
self-employed-national-insurance-rates.
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pension. Due to the nature of being ‘self-employed,’ these benefits would not be 
paid by employers, but by a government fund for ‘self-employed’ workers.
Similar proposals to adapt NICs to curb bogus ‘self-employment’ have been made 
elsewhere but without the significant raise in the standard and availability of rights 
proposed here.22 The system here proposed would mean that the responsibilities of 
employers and contractors are set by their use of labour as opposed to their legal 
relationship to it.23 In other words, any firm, platform or institution that uses labour 
pays the same rate into national insurance, no matter the form of labour. 
 
Making sure all receive the same rights no matter their relationship to the 
contracting firm or employer requires that all workers operating on these platforms 
inside the UK pay a flat percentage of their income. This allows us to soften the 
hard distinctions between self-employment and dependent employment found 
across our legal and social insurance systems. Indeed, microwork to a significant 
degree already flattens these distinctions; thus, adapting NICs accordingly would 
simply reflect a transformation already underway.
 
Rather than this being based on each worker’s income category, all contractors 
would now pay 13.8% of all the wages they have paid each month. This moves our 
insurance system away from one where contributions are worked out by the firm’s or 
contractor’s relationship to individual workers to one where the value of total labour 
used determines how much the contractor pays.
So that all have the same access to universal rights and benefits, all workers should 
pay the same national insurance contributions, once their wages meet a certain 
threshold. However, significant reductions in contributions would be available for 
low-income workers, whether they be microworkers, on a standard contract or 
small business owners. Unlike our present system, these reductions would not entail 
reduced access to any rights. The point being that income should not dictate which 
rights are available to workers.
 
22. Benedict Dellot and Fabian Wallace-Stephens. “Entrepreneurial Audit: Twenty policy ideas to 
strengthen self-employment and micro businesses in the UK.” RSA: Action and Research Centre. 9 
February 2017. https://www.thersa.org/discover/publications-and-articles/reports/the-entrepreneur-
ial-audit.
23. Colin Crouch, Will the Gig Economy Prevail (London: Polity Press, 2019).
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d. Better Rights
 
Even if you are currently an ‘employee,’ the range of rights available are far 
from comprehensive. Indeed, in terms of financial support for workers, the UK’s 
employment rights rank among the worst in Europe.24 Support currently available 
needs significant enhancement to meet international standards.
Of particular concern in wake of the coronavirus pandemic is statutory sick pay 
(SSP). In the UK, SSP is among the worst in Europe, and was found to be in breach 
of the European Social Charter, which described it as ‘manifestly inadequate.’25 
If we compare the UK’s £95.85 per week for up to 28 weeks to other European 
countries, we see just how far it falls short.26 In the Netherlands, which has the most 
generous SSP, workers receive 70% of their pay for up to two years.27 In Norway, 
employers are obligated to pay a worker’s full salary for up to a year.28
SSP in the UK should combine the best facets of the Norwegian and Dutch systems 
and offer full pay for up to two years. Even if micro- or gig-workers had access to 
SSP, at its current rate it would hardly provide enough to live off, given that most of 
these workers do not have savings or other consistent sources of income.
 
Aside from issues with specific rights, the UK system also has general problems, not 
least limits on the rate of income necessary to access the system. Large numbers 
of workers, including those that use microwork sites, currently make below the lower 
earnings limit of £118 per week, meaning they do not qualify for any financial 
support from their employers.29 Considering that part of the point of Universal 
Workers’ Rights is to decouple access to rights from hours and income, this limit 
should be entirely lifted, so that all workers have access to the same amount of 
holiday and sick pay.
24. “Which Countries in Europe Offer the Fairest Paid Leave and Unemployment Benefits.” Glass-
door, 2016. https://www.glassdoor.com/research/app/uploads/sites/2/2016/02/GD_FairestPaidLeave_
Final-2.pdf.
25. The Institute of Employment Rights. “UK Sick pay nearly worst in Europe and in breach of inter-
national law.” The Institute of Employment Rights. 13 March 2020. https://www.ier.org.uk/news/uk-
sick-pay-nearly-worst-in-europe-and-in-breach-of-international-law/.
26. Gov.uk. “Statutory Sick Pay.” 2020. https://www.gov.uk/statutory-sick-pay.
27. European Commission. “Netherlands: Sick pay and benefits in the event of illness.” European 
Commission: Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?-
catId=1122&langId=en&intPageId=4992.
28.. Ibid.
29. Gov.uk. “Rates and Allowance: National Insurance contributions”.
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 e. Data Rights 
On top of enhancing and extending the existing system of rights, any new 
settlement must take into account the growing role data extraction plays in the 
expropriation of workers. To make sure that workers as well as firms see the benefits 
of the data economy, a new set of rights must include:
The right to access data – workers on microwork sites produce vast amounts of 
data, not only about their work but also their personal habits and preferences. This 
data should be made available to workers, so they can gather insights into work 
flow and working time; enhance their own working practises in ways they see fit; 
bolster their power in collective bargaining negotiations; and identify the kinds of 
data that are collected by firms and contractors.30
The right to a data dividend – a data tax should be levied on every microwork 
platform. This tax would be calculated based on a given platform’s monthly profits, 
based on the assumption that platforms with higher profit margins are better at 
extracting and moneitising data. The decision as to whether payment of this tax 
is shared with larger requesters – clients like Google and Facebook – should be 
the prerogative of individual platforms. The balance of the taxes should then be 
paid to all workers on these platforms, based on the hours they work, as a monthly 
dividend.
The right to a data fund – part of the data tax should be collected in a national 
fund, collectively owned by all the microworkers across the platforms operating 
in that country. This could be invested and produce a yearly return, or go toward 
organising workers’ conferences or a union. There has so far been little in the way of 
unionisation among microworkers, partly due to the geographical challenges posed 
by remote work, and the pressures associated with a large global pool of cheap 
workers. Another limit is that starting a union entails sourcing new funding. 
30. Hettie O’Brien and Matthew Lawrence, “Data and the Future of Work”. Commonwealth. 20 July 
2020. https://www.common-wealth.co.uk/reports/data-and-the-future-of-work.
                     Dangerous Brown Workers: How Race and Migration
       Politics Shape the Platform Labour Market
Dalia Gebrial
It is notoriously difficult to secure basic workers’ rights in the platform economy.1 
Across the world, workers have organised against platformisation’s most excessive 
violations, achieving significant gains despite the overwhelming barriers to 
unionisation written in its DNA.2 Many of these struggles focus on the central 
contradiction upon which platforms are built: the (mis)classification of workers 
as independent contractors. This contradiction, whereby workers are legally and 
culturally defined as self-employed, yet subject to levels of employer control that 
often exceed traditional employment, is considered to be at the heart of many of its 
exploitative practices.3 
 
However, platform work is not an abstract model designed in Silicon Valley and 
deployed top-down to workers across the world. It is an unfolding, contingent 
phenomenon that has emerged through and alongside particular contexts – 
contexts it has shaped and been shaped by, and which are critical to understanding 
the particular model of exploitation proliferating throughout the working world. We 
must take these grounded realities into account when building a platform labour 
movement and policy framework capable of asserting platform workers’ rights. 
 
What is the Platform Economy?
 
The platform economy refers to the intersection between the digital and gig 
economy. This paper focuses specifically on what De Stefano calls “work on-demand 
via apps”4 – a subset of the platform economy where gigs are assigned via location-
based apps, typically involving “local, service-oriented tasks”5 like minicab driving, 
domestic work and courier work.6 Popular apps like TaskRabbit and Uber fall under 
this category.
1. Mark Graham and Jamie Woodcock. “Towards a Fairer Platform Economy: Introducing the Fairwork 
Foundation.” Alternate Routes 29 (2018): 242–53.
2. Niels Van Doorn, “On the Conditions of Possibility for Worker Organizing in Platform-Based Gig 
Economies.” Notes From Below (2019). https://notesfrombelow.org/article/conditions-possibility-work-
er-organizing-platform.
3. Miriam A. Cherry, “Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work.” Compara-
tive Labor Law & Policy Journal 2 (2016): 1-27. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2734288#.
4. V. De Stefano, “The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork and La-
bour Protection in the “gig-Economy.” (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2016) 1.
5. International Labour Organization. ‘Crowdwork and the Gig Economy (Non-Standard Forms of 
Employment). https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/non-standard-employment/crowd-work/lang--en/index.
htm.
6. Alex Rosenblat, Uberland: How Algorithms Are Rewriting the Rules of Work (California: University 
of California Press, 2018).
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The prevalence of this work model has skyrocketed in the past decade. In the 
UK, the proportion of adults doing some form of platform work at least weekly 
effectively doubled between 2016 and 2019 – from 4.7% to 9.6%.7 A report by 
the European Commission showed that in 2018, an average of 7% of the adult 
working population across 14 European countries provide some of their labour over 
location-based apps.8 A similar figure was reached for the US, where 7% of workers 
are digital gig workers.9 Similar data for the Global South is harder to come by – 
however researchers are keeping an eye on the particular ways in which this work 
model is unfolding across Africa and Asia in particular.10 Considering many of the 
biggest platforms were founded less than a decade ago, the proportion of the 
Euro-American workforce it engages suggests a rapid rise – and it is forecast to 
continue growing. Researchers have outlined how this rise was facilitated by the 
conditions created following the 2008 Global Recession.11 As traditional economic 
and political institutions failed to protect people’s livelihoods, the appeal of ‘being 
your own boss’ and promise of a job – no matter how insecure – felt like a lifeline 
for many.
 
Where is Platformisation Happening, and 
to Whom?
 
However, there is more to be said about the social, spatial and political contexts 
in which the platform economy has been cultivated. Firstly, platformisation is 
happening in particular spaces – it is a fundamentally urban phenomenon.12 Its 
business model relies on the rapid accrual of data network effects – the data of 
a continually increasing number of people. This requires the population density 
and demands of cities. Gaining a foothold in heavily networked ‘global cities’ like 
London and New York is particularly key to the sustenance of global platforms, as 
they rely primarily on venture and data capital.13 Platformisation is also primarily 
happening in particular sectors – namely urban and social infrastructure. This 
includes the obvious, like transportation and courier work. However, it also refers 
to social reproductive work, like elderly and child-care, private household cleaning, 
7. Ursula Huws, et al., ‘The Platformisation of Work in Europe’, (2019), 5. https://www.feps-europe.eu/
attachments/publications/the%20platformisation%20of%20work%20in%20europe%20-%20final%20
corrected.pdf.
8. A. Pesole, et al., ‘Platform Workers in Europe Evidence from the COLLEEM Survey.’ JRC Science 
for Policy Report. Luxembourg: European Commission, 2018. https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/re-
pository/bitstream/JRC112157/jrc112157_pubsy_platform_workers_in_europe_science_for_policy.pdf.
9. Sarah Grotta, ‘Payment for Work in the U.S. Gig Economy’. Viewpoint. Marlborough: Mercator 
Advisory Group, 2019. https://www.mercatoradvisorygroup.com/Viewpoints/Payments_for_Work_in_
the_U_S__Gig_Economy/.
10. Mark Graham, Digital Economies at Global Margins (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2019).
11. Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017); Rosenblat, Uberland: How 
Algorithms Are Rewriting the Rules of Work.
12. Francesca Artioli, ‘Digital Platforms and Cities: A Literature Review for Urban Research’. Cities 
Are Back in Town. Paris: Sciences Po Urban School, 2018. http://blogs.sciences-po.fr/recherche-villes/
files/2018/06/WP01_2018-Artioli.pdf; Michael Hodson, Andrew McMeekin, and John Stehlin, ‘Platform 
Mobilities and the Production of Urban Space: Toward a Typology of Platformization Trajectories’. 
Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 2020; Jathan Sadowski, ‘Cyberspace and City-
scapes: On the Emergence of Platform Urbanism’. Urban Geography (2020): 1–5. 
13. Jathan Sadowski, ‘When Data Is Capital: Datafication, Accumulation, and Extraction’. Big Data & 
Society 6, no. 1 (2019).
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sex work, home repairs, gardening or beauty and grooming services.14 While not 
often considered ‘infrastructural’, these services are essential to the functioning 
of cities, taking on the omnipresent, systemic quality that defines infrastructure.15 
Furthermore, the on-demand provision of these services is increasingly becoming 
a benchmark for global cities in particular.16 Finally, platformisation is happening 
to particular workers. Existing research on the platform economy often notes that 
the platform workforce is largely migrant workers and/or the racially minoritised. 
However, this is often treated as incidental rather than a central driving force of 
the platform business model. 
 
Austerity Urbanism
 
The post-2008 recession and its fallout had a significant impact on urban workers. 
It dispossessed swathes of the workforce, particularly those already marginalised by 
race, migration, sexuality and gender, pushing them into the hands of the insecure, 
‘entrepreneurial’ work model offered by platforms. It also crippled public and urban 
planning budgets, undermining the provision of public infrastructure and creating 
space for private sector intervention. What Jamie Peck calls ‘austerity urbanism’ 
refers to this dual process of “government downsizing” and “rolling privatization.”17 
Despite the branding of platforms as part of a ‘sharing economy’ – suggesting a 
cooperative model – the political economy of large platform companies is typical 
of a corporate private entity. They are profit-driven, subject primarily to antitrust 
and intellectual property laws and responsive to competition, rather than long-term 
sustainability and public value.18
 
The absorption of public infrastructure needs into the platform model is particularly 
visible with childcare, elderly care (both of which often overlap with cleaning 
work) and transportation platforms – sectors which have all been decimated by 
austerity,19 yet are highly demanded in contemporary urban contexts. Services 
not typically considered public utilities, like private household cleaning and home 
repairs/household tasks, are nonetheless essential urban reproductive services 
reliant on a combination of unpaid and outsourced women workers – the pressure 
14. Ursula Huws, et al., ‘The Platformisation of Work in Europe’, (2019).
15. Kendra Strauss, “Labour Geography III: Precarity, Racial Capitalisms and Infrastructure.” Progress 
in Human Geography, 2019; A. De Coss-Corzo, H. A Ruszczyk, and K Stokes, eds. Labouring Urban 
Infrastructures. Manchester: Manchester Urban Institute, 2019. http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/
institutes/mui/InfrastructuresZine191007.pdf.
16. Ashlin Lee, et al., “Mapping Platform Urbanism: Charting the Nuance of the Platform Pivot.” Ur-
ban Planning 5, no. 1 (2020): 116–28.
17. Jamie Peck. “Austerity Urbanism.” City 16, no. 6 (2012): 626. 
18. Ashlin Lee, et al., “Mapping Platform Urbanism: Charting the Nuance of the Platform Pivot”.
19. For impact of cuts on care work, see: Nick Bailey, Glen Bramley, Maria Gannon, Annette Hastings, 
and David Watkins. “The Cost of the Cuts: The Impact on Local Government and Poorer Communi-
ties.” York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2015. https://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/default/files/jrf/migrated/
files/Summary-Final.pdf; for impact of cuts on transportation, see: TfL. “TfL’s Budget Shows Op-
erating Deficit Almost Halved as Mayor Calls for Government Investment in Transport.” London: 
Transport for London, 2019. https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/media/press-releases/2019/march/tfl-s-bud-
get-shows-operating-deficit-almost-halved-as-mayor-calls-for-government-investment-in-transport; 
For impact of cuts on London councils, see: London Councils, “London’s Local Services: Investing in 
the Future,” 2018. https://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/our-key-themes/local-government-finance/lon-
don%E2%80%99s-local-services-investing-future/london%E2%80%99s-local.
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on which is increased by the dismantling of the welfare and social state. In high-
income countries, the combination of an ageing population, decreased social care 
provision, increased participation of middle- and upper-class women in the labour 
force results in demand for cheap, outsourced domestic work paid hourly.20 This 
greater demand is captured by private platform companies.
 
The capacity of monopolistic platforms to collect vast amounts of urban data 
also gives them a level of insight into the city that is traditionally the domain 
of the state.21 This scale and type of data collection takes on an infrastructural 
quality, as the “managed and built environments increasingly depend on data 
in real-time.”22 The acquisition of such infrastructural power by private platform 
companies, through a mutually dependent combination of accruing data network 
effects and providing cheap labour is made partly possible by austerity urbanism, 
in which the state not only withdraws from the provision of public social and urban 
infrastructure, but actively manages its transition to the private sector.23
 
20. Margarita Estévez-Abe and Barbara Hobson. “Outsourcing Domestic (Care) Work: The Politics, 
Policies, and Political Economy.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 22, 
no. 2 (2015): 133–46. https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxv011.
21. Josh Gabert-Doyon. ‘What Citymapper’s Business Plan Tells Us about the Future of Smart Cities’. 
CityMetric. 2019. https://www.citymetric.com/transport/what-citymapper-s-business-plan-tells-us-
about-future-smart-cities-4800.
22. Peter Kawalek and Ali Bayat. ‘Data as Infrastructure – Paper for the National Infrastructure 
Commission’. Data for the Public Good. London: National Infrastructure Commission, 2017, 1. https://
www.nic.org.uk/publications/data-infrastructure-paper-national-infrastructure-commission/.
23. Mara Ferreri and Romola Sanyal. ‘Platform Economies and Urban Planning: Airbnb and Regulat-
ed Deregulation in London’. Urban Studies 55, no. 15 (2018): 3353–68..
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Immigration and the Post-2008 
Infrastructural Workforce
The urban infrastructural workforces undergoing significant platformisation have 
historically been dominated by migrants and the racially minoritised;24 indeed, 
the reliance of global cities on low-wage migrant work is well documented.25 These 
sectors often have a history of informal, poor working conditions, which is related to 
the social, cultural and political status of the workers in them.26 This is heightened 
when immigration controls are tightened, which results in a higher proportion of 
migrants being categorised as ‘irregular.’ The social and economic effects of being 
‘irregular,’ or dancing precariously on the edge of regularity, creates a pool of 
workers whose material conditions make them vulnerable to labour exploitation. In 
this way, immigration controls function as a “tap regulating the flow of labour” and 
as a “mould shaping certain forms of labour.”27 
The 2008 financial crisis, and the response to it from political and financial 
institutions, further degraded the work opportunities and conditions for migrant 
workers globally. Migrant workers are often among the most vulnerable to labour 
exploitation and social marginalisation in times of economic crisis.28 This manifests 
in the form of hostile immigration policy, a rise in national populism in response to 
perceived job scarcity and the outsourcing of so-called ‘unskilled’ labour to private 
companies as part of cost-cutting measures. Together, these factors place migrant 
workers at heightened risk of precarity and therefore exploitation. 
The UK provides a paradigmatic example. Ethnic minority workers in the UK 
experienced the brunt of the recession - experiencing higher levels of unemployment 
and lower wages than their white counterparts.29 Like many nations across 
the Global North, the UK has also seen an uptick in right-wing populism and 
conservative immigration policy, which has manifested in the 2012 Hostile 
Environment legislative framework. This set of policies pushes service providers, 
like healthcare professionals, educators, employers and landlords, to act as border 
agents - making them legally liable for checking someone’s documentation before 
24. A. Çaglar, and N.G. Schiller. Migrants and City-Making: Dispossession, Displacement, and Urban 
Regeneration (Duke University Press, 2018).
25. S. Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); 
Chris Hamnett, “Social Polarisation in Global Cities: Theory and Evidence.” Urban Studies 31, no. 3 
(1994): 401–24.
26. Huda Tayob and Suzanne Hall. “Race, Space and Architecture: Towards and Open-Access Cur-
riculum.” London: London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Sociology, 2019. 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100993/3/Race_space_and_architecture.pdf.
27. Bridget Anderson, “Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious Workers.” 
Work, Employment and Society 24, no. 2 (2010): 301.
28. Ibrahim Awad, “The Global Economic Crisis and Migrant Workers: Impact and Response.” Inter-
national Migration Programme. Geneva: International Labour Office, 2009. http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---dgreports/---integration/documents/publication/wcms_126183.pdf.
29. Danny Dorling, “Race and the Repercussions of Recession.” Bulletin: Runnymede’s Quarterly. 
London: Runnymede Trust, 2009. https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/360-Bul-
letinDecember09.pdf; Paul Fisher and Alita Nandi. “Poverty across Ethnic Groups through Recession 
and Austerity.” University of Essex: Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2015. https://www.jrf.
org.uk/report/poverty-across-ethnic-groups-through-recession-and-austerity.
Autonomy     Platforming Equality 40
providing them with essential services. It also creates a “labyrinthine immigration 
system”30 that is complex and expensive to navigate and remain on the ‘correct’ side 
of. Migrants often find the rules change “under their feet”, and lose status without 
realising.31 The social effects of this framework is the criminalisation of access to the 
means of survival (work, housing, healthcare, banking) for those without particular 
versions of leave to remain,32 and the cultivation of a culture of surveillance and 
suspicion33 towards racially minoritised people.34
Through a myriad of political, social and economic measures, we can therefore 
see a rise in the systematic enforcement of fear, punishment and precarity upon 
racialised populations in the UK - the sharp edge of which is felt by the working 
class and those with uncertain migration status. This has a significant impact on 
how migrants interact with the labour market. Increased border controls produce 
precarious workforces, who are not officially unionised, unlikely to come forward 
cases of abuse or exploitation and whose (official or unofficial) denial of access 
to public services and formalised work labour makes them prone to being stuck in 
poor working conditions. This is because, while strict immigration controls do not 
abolish the root causes of migration, they do increases the proportion of migrants 
who are classified as irregular, or are forced to stay and live in a country through 
‘illegal’ means.35 
This combination of slashed public spending and the social and material precarity 
of migrant workers provide ripe conditions for rolling out a ‘lean’ model of work 
based on not resourcing labour rights. It is a framework that benefits from its 
workers being socially and politically rendered disposable, and having few other 
options in the labour market. Furthermore, the ‘on-demand’ model relies on a pool 
of constantly available, surplus labour,36 the creation of which is formented by the 
systemic cultivation of precarity and anxiety by the Hostile Environment detailed 
above. Indeed, infrastructural work is not the only kind of work that is adaptable 
to the logistical framework of the platform model – other forms of work can be 
broken down into ‘tasks’ and mediated through a programmable digital platform 
(see Phil Jones’ contribution to this collection). Rather, it is the legal, political and 
social contexts of urban infrastructural work and workforces that lend themselves 
to the political economic interests and power dynamics of the corporate platform 
economy.
30. Maya Goodfellow, Hostile Environment: How Immigrants Become Scapegoats (London: Verso, 
2019).
31. Ibid.
32. NRPF Network. “Who Has NRPF?” NRPF Network, 2017. 
http://www.nrpfnetwork.org.uk/information/Pages/who-has-NRPF.aspx.
33. This is bolstered by increased immigration raids (including in the workplace), data sharing 
between the Home Office and third sector organisations and public political campaigns such as 
Operation Vaken (Home Office UK 2013). 
34. Liberty. “A Guide to the Hostile Environment.” (London: Liberty, 2019). https://www.libertyhuman-
rights.org.uk/issue/report-a-guide-to-the-hostile-environment/.
35. R. Andersson, Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe (Oak-
land: University of California Press, 2014).
36. Alex Foti, General Theory of the Precariat: Great Recession, Revolution, Reaction (Amsterdam: 
Institute of Network Cultures, 2017).
Autonomy     Platforming Equality 41
Case Study: Uber in London 
The material and social precarity of low-income migrant workers in London have 
helped construct the mould that shapes the platform workforce. Indeed, migrant 
workers turn to platform labour for many reasons. The relatively low barrier to entry 
is appealing to people who struggle to find work through other means; for most 
platforms, the ‘onboarding’ process is simple, quick and does not require personal 
networks or an interview/probation period. The dominance of platforms in migrant-
heavy workforces also means that those already making a living in these sectors 
have had to turn to platforms to continue accessing work.  
My own qualitative research with Uber drivers in London indicates that the 
automated distribution of work via the platform is appealing to workers who 
have experienced prejudice or unfair treatment by a human boss - a finding 
substantiated by other studies of migrant platform workers in Europe.37 This relief 
is often expressed alongside frustration with and suspicion of the algorithm that 
designates them work - yet drivers I spoke to often sought comfort in the idea that 
the algorithm does not know their religion or ethnic background. This does not 
mean the algorithm is not shaped by racial and gendered inequalities - in fact, 
the rating system upon which the algorithm is based tends to aggregate existing 
prejudices within society.38 Nonetheless, the relative sense of fairness and autonomy 
makes platform work appealing when compared to other available options.
Different platforms have different documentation requirements in the UK. Larger 
platforms tend to have more stringent documentation requirements and checks 
- possibly due to heightened media scrutiny. Most big platforms have a right to 
work check as part of ‘onboarding,’ in line with Hostile Environment legislation; 
in other European countries, where regulations are less strict, documentation is 
not required by all platforms.39 Undocumented migrants are therefore shut out of 
platform labour in the UK - although anecdotal evidence and observation of online 
worker forums indicates a ‘black market’ where workers ‘rent’ their account for a 
percentage fee to those who without necessary documentation. This indicates an 
ecosystem of practices around the platform economy that provide one of the few 
paths to earning for undocumented migrants. However, this frequently sparks moral 
panics in the media about “illegal immigrants” with potential “criminal backgrounds” 
working in the UK through platforms.40 
37. Niels van Doorn and Darsana Vijay., “The Appeal and Challenges of Platform-Based Work from 
the Perspective of Three Migrant Workers - Part 2.” Platform Labor, 2020. https://platformlabor.net/
blog/the-appeal-and-challenges-of-platform-based-work-2.
38. Aaron Belzer and Nancy Leong. “The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the 
Platform Economy.” The Georgetown Law Journal 105, no. 1271 (2017): 1272–1322; Julietta Hua and 
Kasturi Ray, “Beyond the Precariat: Race, Gender, and Labor in the Taxi and Uber Economy.” Social 
Identities 24, no. 2 (2018): 271–89.
39. Niels van Doorn and Darsana Vijay. “The Appeal and Challenges of Platform-Based Work from 
the Perspective of Three Migrant Workers - Part 2”.
40. Leigh McManus, “Deliveroo and Uber Eats Riders are Renting Their Jobs to Illegal Immigrants.” 
Daily Mail Online, 2019. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6562151/Deliveroo-Uber-Eats-rid-
ers-renting-jobs-illegal-immigrants.html.
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Moral panics surrounding the prevalence of migrant workers in platform work 
in turn shape how platform workers are regulated by the state, and also the 
development of the platform model itself. A consistent theme in my research has 
been Uber drivers reporting feeling excessively surveilled by police and Transport 
for London regulators, who conduct searches and inspections in places where 
drives congregate, such as near airports, train stations and social hotspots. This is 
related to a racialised portrayal of Uber drivers as potential sexual predators and 
terrorists - a moral panic surrounding racialised and migrant men that has a long 
history in the UK, Europe and North America.41 In 2017, Uber’s license was revoked, 
partly citing these ‘public safety’ concerns, despite Uber drivers being subject to 
identical background checks as the white-dominated black cab industry.42 There is 
also no evidence suggesting increased risk of unsafe activity by private hire drivers 
compared to black cab drivers.43 The LTDA - the main union representing black cab 
drivers - has conducted a persistent campaign against Uber, on the basis that Uber 
drivers are threats to the public. Indeed, the LTDA General Secretary described 
getting into an Uber as “like getting in a sea of sharks” because of “these third 
world countries” that Uber drivers come from.44  
The ability of Uber drivers to gather outside airports and train stations has been 
challenged on the basis of anti-terror laws,45 and the gathering of racialised men in 
public space has been flagged by officials within TfL as a potential terror threat.46 
This has been further bolstered by extensive media coverage pointing to Uber 
drivers as sexual and security threats - a sense of which consistently appeared in 
my research as causing anxiety, frustration and fear for those trying to make a 
living through the platform. I have also observed consistent policing of drivers, 
whose cars are searched and inspected, and who are routinely asked to show their 
documentation. Similarly, couriers have described being frequently stopped and 
searched by police in spaces where they gather - such as outside restaurants (where 
they are often not allowed to enter) or outside ‘dark kitchens’ supplying food for 
multiple restaurants on the app.47 
In turn, the design of the Uber app has evolved in light of this systemically 
enforced suspicion and hostility towards its workers. The response by platforms to 
these moral panics - fuelled by the state-sponsored production of marginalisation 
by the Hostile Environment - has been to adapt the algorithm to lower the bar 
of deactivation for workers. The rating system, and the management algorithm 
on which it is built, is centred around suspicion of the worker and the word of the 
41. Gargi Bhattacharyya, Dangerous Brown Men: Exploiting Sex, Violence and Feminism in the ‘War 
on the Terror (London: Zed Books, 2008).
42. Transport for London. “Licensing Information.” 2018. https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-
hire/licensing/licensing-information#on-this-page-3.
43. Georgina Lee, “Are Black Cabs Safer than Ubers?” Channel 4, 2017. https://www.channel4.com/
news/factcheck/factcheck-are-black-cabs-safer-than-ubers.
44. Dominic Gover, “Uber: ‘Third World Immigrant Drivers’ Are Dangerous, Claims Black Cabbies’ 
Leader.” International Business Times, 2014. https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/uber-third-world-immigrant-
drivers-are-dangerous-claims-black-cabbies-leader-1478806.
45. Sian Berry, “Proposals for Reducing Problem Parking on Pancras Road.” London: Camden Green 
Party, 2015. https://camden.greenparty.org.uk/assets/files/localparties/camden/Pancras_Road_Park-
ing_Proposals_Aug2015.pdf.
46. London Transport Committee. “Transport Committee - 8 July 2015; Transcript of Agenda Item 7 - 
Taxi and Private Hire Services in London.” Meeting Minutes. London: TfL, 2015. https://tfl.gov.uk/cdn/
static/cms/documents/board-20170919-item03-minutes-20170719-for-approval.pdf.
47. Sarah Butler, “How Deliveroo’s ‘Dark Kitchens’ Are Catering from Car Parks.” The Guardian, 2017. 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/oct/28/deliveroo-dark-kitchens-pop-up-feeding-the-city-
london
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customer. In Uber’s case, a driver can be deactivated temporarily or permanently 
due to a customer complaint, or if their rating dips below an average of 4.7 stars 
out of 5.48 Appealing deactivation is a difficult and lengthy process, as drivers have 
few modes through which they can contact Uber, apart from a standardised, online 
complaints system. This is of course compounded by potential language barriers. 
The highly reactive and severe treatment of workers, which is coded into the 
management algorithm, is key to how platforms cultivate trustworthiness in the 
context of the moral panics surrounding their workers;49 the claim being that 
workers, prone to unsafe behaviour, are immediately dealt with if a customer flags 
their behaviour. However, this is not mutual; whilst drivers can ‘rate’ customers, there 
is no indication that a customer with a consistently low rating will lose access to 
their account. 
This is similarly the case for Uber’s recently introduced ‘safety toolkit’ for 
passengers, which includes an emergency assistance button, the option to share 
location with up to five ‘trusted contacts’, report if a driver’s behaviour made 
them feel unsafe and access to further information about their driver.50 Such an 
infrastructure of recourse to safety is not implemented in the app’s affordances for 
drivers however, despite minicab driving being a notoriously dangerous profession, 
with drivers frequently at risk of abuse and violence from passengers.51 The app 
design and algorithmic management model is therefore constructed around an 
assumption that risk only exists from the worker toward the customer. This is not 
based in the statistical reality of how risk is experienced on both sides, but rather 
in racialised anxieties surrounding the platform workforce. In this way, Uber’s 
model has been built off the social and political status of its workers - enabling 
the offshoring of the model’s risks, costs and accountability to its demonised and 
disempowered workforce. 
The power of the algorithm to instantaneously cut off a worker from their income 
source is integral to the precarity experienced by workers; one driver described the 
rating system to me as “a sword on top of [his] head”. With limited options in the 
labour market, and the dominance of particular platforms in the sector they work 
in, drivers frequently expressed anxiety around potentially upsetting customers, for 
fear of receiving a bad rating or complaint that could jeopardise their ability to 
work. This encourages drivers to withstand abuse, harassment or repeatedly having 
to undertake unprofitable rides; the phrase “keeping my head down” is a consistent 
theme when interviewing drivers. The lack of labour protections, stemming from 
workers not being legally recognised as employees, leaves workers vulnerable to 
dismissal without process or reason and unprotected by official union recognition. 
The anxiety felt by drivers as a result is compounded by the systemic imposition 
48. Ngai Keung Chan, and Lee Humphreys. “Mediatization of Social Space and the Case of Uber 
Drivers.” Media and Communication 6, no. 2 (2018): 29–38.
49. Alexandra Mateescu and Julia Ticona. “Trusted Strangers: Carework Platforms’ Cultural Entrepre-
neurship in the on-Demand Economy.” New Media & Society 20, no. 11 (2018): 4384–404. 
50. Sachin Kansal, “New Safety Toolkit Arrives in the United Kingdom | Uber Newsroom United 
Kingdom.” Uber Newsroom, 2018. https://www.uber.com/en-GB/newsroom/new-safety-toolkit-ar-
rives-united-kingdom-2/.
51. Rene Chun, “Rough Ride-Share: Why Drivers Are Also at Risk of Violence.” The Guardian, 2020. 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/06/uber-rideshare-lyft-safety-crime; Kristin Klober-
danz, “Taxi Drivers: Years of Living Dangerously.” Consumer HealthDay, 2020. https://consumer.
healthday.com/espanol/encyclopedia/work-and-health-41/occupational-health-news-507/taxi-driv-
ers-years-of-living-dangerously-646377.html.
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of precarity and exclusion from public life that the Hostile Environment creates, 
including the inaccessibility of Universal Credit and secure work - or work where you 
are not under threat from immigration raids in the workplace.52
By excluding migrants from the means of survival or social security, workers are 
pushed to withstand exploitative labour models. There is a strong sense amongst 
migrant platform workers that if you are spat out of the system, you will struggle 
immensely to get back in. The sense of systemic disposability experienced by 
platform workers is therefore constructed in the image of the systemic disposability 
resulting from the racial and migration politics of cities like London post-2008.
Policy Implications
 
Given the racialised and highly-disciplinary nature of the current context of 
platform work, migrants’ rights and anti-racism must lie at the heart of an 
effective platform labour movement and policy framework. This is because without 
the coercive effects of both immigration law and racialisation (which are often 
interdependent processes), the conditions in which the corporate platform model 
has arisen and thrived would not exist – and the socio-political fabric upon which 
this exploitative model relies on would be compromised. This analysis is rooted 
in the understanding that platform work did not have to turn out this way: the 
digitisation of all or parts of the labour process does not unavoidably result in 
the exploitation we see today. Rather, the structural rendering of populations as 
exploitable has been captured, reinvented and adapted by changing technological 
and network capabilities. 
1. Hostile Environment
The Hostile Environment produces material and social precarity for migrants and 
those perceived to be migrants. This pushes many migrant workers into a position 
where they have no choice but to take on poorly waged and conditioned work.
a) Steps should be taken to end the hostile environment, especially the policy that 
renders there being no recourse to public funds (NRPF).
b) NRPF criminalises the access to basic services for a large proportion of migrants, 
and especially affects those with care responsibilities. This forces migrant workers 
to withstand exploitative, unfair and even abusive work conditions as they have no 
safety net for them and their dependents in the event of income loss.
c) Scrapping these policies is key to undermining the “mould” that shapes particular 
workforces to be exploitable by the platform economy’s current form.  
52. Lisa O’Carroll. “‘It Was a Fake Meeting’: Byron Hamburgers Staff on Immigration Raid.” The 
Guardian, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/28/it-was-a-fake-meeting-byron-ham-
burgers-staff-on-immigration-raid.
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2. Labour Rights
The algorithmic management model treats platform workers as disposable, and 
places added insecurity for racialised and migrant platform workers who are 
disadvantaged by the rating system. Instantaneous and unexplained ‘deactivation’ 
violates the norms surrounding fair dismissal as outlined by the UK government.53 
Establishing a framework of fair dismissal for platform workers is sorely needed.
a) A framework of fair dismissal must recognise that loss of income for any period 
of time is a drastic measure of last resort. Before dismissal can occur, workers must 
have a right to an extended investigation process that follows a transparently 
outlined procedure (see point below), the ability to be accompanied by a union 
representative at all stages of investigation or disciplinary procedure, a fair system 
of warning and a genuine opportunity for appeal.
b) Workers must also have access to a written version of the dismissal and 
disciplinary procedure upon starting work, which outlines exactly under what 
circumstances a worker can be disciplined or dismissed. This document must be 
available in a range of languages, and be adhered to during the investigation 
process. 
 
3. Creating Demand for Jobs
If the platform labour market has been built upon - and as replacement for 
- decimated public services and an informalised labour market, then part of 
the policy response will lie in shaping a new labour market with better working 
conditions. One route to achieving this would be state-led job creation schemes. 
Such a scheme would be intended to:
a) Create alternative job options to those available in the platform labour market, 
with better working conditions, including employment security as well as control 
over working hours. Public sector workers need not have to choose between security 
and flexibility (as is often presumed to be the case). A practical balance between 
quantity of working hours, choice of working schedule and decent pay can be struck 
with correct policy in place.54
b) Meet the demands of an ageing population and repair a withered social fabric. 
A large (and growing) part of wealthier economies now centres upon reproductive 
labour. As Hester and Srnicek note, social reproduction jobs across health care, 
education, food service, accommodation, and social work now account for 23% to 
28% of the labour force, and this only looks set to increase over the next 5 years.55 
Their analysis suggests that 47% of total job growth between 2014 and 2024 is set 
to be in sectors associated with social reproduction.
53. GOV.UK. “Dismissing Staff.” https://www.gov.uk/dismiss-staff/fair-dismissals.
54. Living Wage Foundation, “Living Hours.” 2020.
55. Helen Hester and Nick Srnicek, “The Crisis of Social Reproduction and the End of Work.” Open-
Mind, 2018. https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/BBVA-OpenMind-Helen-
Hester-Nick-Srnicek-The-Crisis-of-Social-Reproduction-and-the-End-of-Work.pdf.. 
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c) Achieve sustainability goals necessary to fight climate change. As these public 
works.
Such job creation schemes would echo the large-scale schemes of Roosevelt’s New 
Deal (initiatives that were also spawned in times of crisis and extreme precarity). 
More radically, they could take the form of a job guarantee, that would blunt the 
threat of job shortages (and therefore also the power dynamics between employers 
and workers).56
Why Should the Public Sector Lead this Job Creation?
Public sector employees are relatively cheap. On Autonomy’s calculations, due 
to National Insurance contributions and returns from income tax, the net cost of 
public sector employees is relatively low.57 Creating between 300,000 and 500,000 
new public sector roles, for instance, would amount to just over 1% of annual public 
spending.58
Public sector jobs offer a greater degree of protection from market volatility 
(and exploitative employers). As the Covid pandemic has shown, in times of crisis 
private employers are often the first to deal out layoffs, potentially throwing many 
thousands into unemployment and underemployment; conditions, as we have 
seen, that are fertile for the platform economy to thrive in. The public sector, by 
contrast, can be oriented to aims other than shareholder value and CEO pay, thus 
potentially providing much greater security for staff at all levels.
The More Universal the Better
As demonstrated, the platform economy exploits conditions that place racialised 
populations in positions of extreme precarity and inequality (both materially 
and in terms of opportunity). This production of a particular population 
(stratified predominantly by race and class) is best met with universal measures. 
Universalism - services with little to no cost at the point of use, coupled with a lack 
of conditionality - meets the needs of the most vulnerable and exploited whilst 
also providing social goods for wider society at large. At the same time, a rollout 
of universal basic services would help roll back the cuts that public services have 
witnessed under austerity urbanism.59
56. TUC (2020) “A new plan for jobs - Why we need a job guarantee.” https://www.tuc.org.uk/re-
search-analysis/reports/new-plan-jobs-why-we-need-new-jobs-guarantee.
57. Jones et al., “Public Sector as Pioneer.” London: Autonomy, 2020. https://autonomy.work/portfolio/
publicsectorpioneer/.
58. Ibid.
59. J. Portes, Reed, H. and A. Percy, “Social prosperity for the future: A proposal for Universal Basic 
Services.” 2017. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/igp/sites/bartlett/files/universal_basic_services_-_the_
institute_for_global_prosperity_.pdf.
                     
       Against Digital Colonialism
Renata Avila
Over the past nearly fifty years, the architecture of the Internet has changed 
from a largely democratic network of autonomous nodes to a distributed feudal 
structure, which centralises flows of data into a few hands.1 Rich countries dominate, 
with most of the profits heading to Silicon Valley or China.2 The aim of Big Tech 
is evident. There is a race to connect the next billion people to their ‘walled 
garden,’ a version of the Internet that is no longer open or directed towards the 
public interest. They want to control critical infrastructure globally, from cables to 
satellites, in order to get their hands on the missing datasets of the global poor.3 
This paper examines this process of how dominant countries within a global system 
benefit from the digitisation of poor and middle-income countries in what appears 
to be a new form of colonialism. 
I call this process digital colonialism, referring to the deployment of imperial power 
over a vast number of people, which takes the form of rules, designs, languages, 
cultures and belief systems serving the interests of dominant powers. In the past, 
empires expanded their power through the control of critical assets, from trade 
routes to precious metals. Today, it is not states but technology empires that 
dominate the world through the control of critical digital infrastructures, data and 
the ownership of computational power. By collecting the personal data of citizens 
on a scale unprecedented in human history, companies can serve as conduits of 
misinformation campaigns that can alter the flow of global geopolitics and even 
change the outcome of elections. As Michael Kwet has described: 
‘this structural form of domination is exercised through the centralised 
ownership and control of the three core pillars of the digital ecosystem: 
software, hardware, and network connectivity, which vests the United 
States with immense political, economic, and social power. As such, GAFAM 
(Google/ Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft) and other 
corporate giants, as well as state intelligence agencies like the National 
Security Agency (NSA), are the new imperialists in the international 
1. Tai Liu, Zain Tariq, Jay Chen, and Barath Raghavan. “The Barriers to Overthrowing Internet Feu-
dalism.” HotNets-XVI: Proceedings of the 16th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (November 
2017): 72–79.
2. In this picture, the contribution of the EU market is marginal. Europe’s presence manifests its pow-
er through regulation, with taxes and technical standards to operate in their markets or through liti-
gation. The European strategy, so far, has been merely defensive and focused in the European mar-
ket, but, as the paper later explains, with increased ambition and an eye on setting global standards 
as well. See Adam Satariano and Monika Pronczuk, “Europe, Overrun by Foreign Tech Giants, Wants 
to Grow Its Own.” The New York Times. 19 February 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/busi-
ness/europe-digital-economy.html.
3. UN News, “Globally, Youth Are the Largest Poverty-Stricken Group, Says New UN Report.” United 
Nations. 20 September 2018. https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1019952.
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community. Assimilation into the tech products, models, and ideologies of 
foreign powers – led by the United States – constitutes a twenty-first century 
form of colonisation.’4 
I will add that the phenomenon is not exclusively led by the United States. China is 
increasingly following the Silicon Valley pattern of behaviour and playing a similar 
role in digital colonialism. Yet this new form of colonialism is largely invisible. Public 
disquiet about the growing power of tech companies only touches upon the surface 
of a much deeper problem. With almost half of humanity without access to basic 
forms of connectivity and entire countries with a pending digitisation process, new 
patterns of domination have just begun to emerge. This paper identifies these 
problems and suggests a technical and regulatory path to neutralise and reverse 
them in order to secure a future of digital autonomy, democracy, sovereignty and 
dignity. 
The Infrastructural Takeover of the 
New Tech Envoys 
Last century, car manufacturers were shaking hands with Nazi leaders.5 Today, the 
CEOs of the most powerful tech companies act as envoys to seal deals with heads 
of state accused by human rights watchdogs of enabling genocides and crimes 
against humanity. In some cases, such as Myanmar, their role has been crucial for 
the perpetration of a genocide.6 The modus operandi of tech companies with poor 
nations resembles a continuation of former colonial relationships, this time through 
technology. They offer deals that appear shiny but are ultimately extractive and 
deprive emerging economies of a digital future they can govern. These countries 
use software, hardware and platforms produced elsewhere and end up shaping 
their entire publically funded digital education systems. Tech companies are 
conditioning generations to learn their way of doing technology, with no room for 
alternatives. 
Early manifestations of this process can be seen in the ‘free’ provision of critical 
infrastructure – from cables to connectivity – to large populations. This process 
led to the silent privatisation of the digital infrastructure of entire nations.7 Big 
Tech CEOs were meeting heads of state, shaking hands and promising alliances 
for a connected future.8 The most audacious even used Washington as a backdoor 
4. Michael Kwet, “Digital Colonialism: US Empire and the New Imperialism in the Global South.” 
Race & Class 60, no. 4 (2020): 3–26.
5. Scott Nehmer, Ford, General Motors and the Nazis (Bloomington, Indiana: Author house, 2013).
6. Paul Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar’s Military.” The New 
York Times. 15 October 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-face-
book-genocide.html.
7. For instance, the former President of Argentina, Mauricio Macri, wanted to take the entire 
public administration into “Facebook at Work”. https://www.facebook.com/mauriciomacri/photos
/a.105382683477/10153937457908478/?type=3.
8. Anderson Antunes, “Mark Zuckerberg Meets With Brazil’s President At the 7th Summit of 
the Americas, In Panama.” Forbes. 11 April 2015. https://www.forbes.com/sites/andersonan-
tunes/2015/04/11/mark-zuckerberg-meets-with-brazils-president-at-the-7th-summit-of-the-americas-in-
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to reach places like North Korea, Cuba and China.9 Some nations even opened 
tech embassies in Silicon Valley, signalling their availability to tech companies, 
which increasingly behaved like states who provided “aid” and well-intentioned 
efforts to digitise countries through free infrastructure and services.10 This included 
proposals to build broadband cables and spread connectivity in remote areas using 
balloons.11 What started as an aggressive public relations campaign around 2013 
has continued discreetly by the five leading tech companies in developing countries 
across the world, particularly in Africa.
The accelerated penetration of tech companies in emerging markets has 
taken place not only via generous offers of connectivity and infrastructure to 
populations. Tech giants have also been providing digital infrastructure to dozens 
of governments, ranging from cloud services to entire mail and office suites. 
Amazon and Microsoft have led this process, followed closely by Facebook and 
Google. The fact that an entire nation delegates its digital services to a company 
based in Silicon Valley is alarming. The company is then in a position to handle 
not only highly sensitive government documents, but also is in possession of critical 
information relating to the entire country. 
But national security advisors, parliaments and watchdogs remain largely silent 
about this new form of dependency aside from a few notable cases where 
sanctions and political pressure have been deployed. This has included the case of 
Microsoft providing services to Russian firms;12 Iranian users unable to get security 
updates from US-based products and services;13 and even deleted accounts on 
services as vital as GitHub, a platform which hosts code for developers. This is an 
important reflection on the fragility of a tech industry highly dependent on a US-
based ecosystem of products and services, which becomes vulnerable to political 
vendettas, national security letters and collaboration with security services.14
 
panama/; Newley Purnell, “Mark Zuckerberg Promotes Facebook Growth in India.” The Wall Street 
Journal. 27 October 2015. https://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-zuckerberg-promotes-facebook-growth-
in-india-1445959248.
9. Tom Cheredar, “Google’s Eric Schmidt Makes a Secret Visit to Cuba.” VentureBeat. 29 June 2014. 
https://venturebeat.com/2014/06/29/googles-eric-schmidt-makes-a-secret-visit-to-cuba/.
10. Adam Satariano, “The World’s First Ambassador to the Tech Industry.” The New York Times. 3 
September 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/technology/denmark-tech-ambassador.html; 
Stephen Shankland, “Google’s Third Subsea Cable Will Pump Data from Portugal to South Africa.” 
CNET. 28 June 2019. https://www.cnet.com/news/google-third-subsea-cable-equiano-connect-portu-
gal-south-africa-nigeria/.
11. “Project Loon” was started by Google and is now an independent company actively operating in 
Africa and other continents to bring connectivity with balloons. See: https://loon.com/.
12. Anastasia Lyrchikova, “Exclusive: U.S. Sanctions Curb Microsoft Sales to Hundreds of Russian 
Firms.” Reuters. 22 January 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-microsoft-exc-
lu/exclusive-u-s-sanctions-curb-microsoft-sales-to-hundreds-of-russian-firms-idUSKBN1FB0MU.
13. Maziar Motamedi, “Locked out: Did US Tech Company Overcomply with Iran Sanctions?” Al 
Jazeera. 31 July 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/locked-tech-company-comply-iran-sanc-
tions-190731081829014.html.
14. Erik Kirschbaum, “Snowden Says NSA Engages in Industrial Espionage: TV.” Reuters. 26 January 
2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-security-snowden-germany/snowden-says-nsa-engages-in-in-
dustrial-espionage-tv-idUSBREA0P0DE20140126.
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Digital colonialism is also occurring in the classroom. An entire generation is being 
prepared as a potential workforce for tech giants. As Kwet has argued: 
‘the importance of technology choices for schools cannot be overstated: the 
specific technologies deployed will forge path dependencies by shaping 
the habits, preferences and knowledge base of the first tech generation 
from childhood. Education offers the ultimate breeding ground for Big Tech 
imperialism; product placement in schools can be used to capture emerging 
markets and tighten the stranglehold of Big Tech products, brands, models 
and ideology in the Global South.’15 
Yet, in schools that can barely afford to function, refusing generous donations 
by tech companies offering to provide digital infrastructure, including software, 
hardware and connectivity, is hard to resist. There are almost no rules controlling or 
prohibiting such donations and no global movement seeking to increase awareness 
of these nefarious practices. Any effort to bring technology to schools is generally 
praised. But this masks a colonial diplomacy that provides the companies with more 
than what it costs to deliver these services. By imposing their products and services 
on students, and not offering even a glimpse of an alternative, an entire generation 
will become accustomed to proprietary services and will not be exposed to diverse 
products. 
Workforces receiving training today will only be trained and prepared to use the 
technologies produced by the current wave of tech companies, creating circles of 
dependence. Skills developed by workers will be connected to specific products and 
therefore benefit the profitability of the few.16 It will have a tremendous impact in 
stifling the development of new cultures of collaboration. Children all over the world 
are passively learning technologies they cannot improve, adapt or build upon. This 
stagnates digital innovation. Instead of building blocks, the children of today are 
provided with locked digital black boxes they have to accept as they are. Parents, 
more often than not, are keen and supportive of the implementation of technology 
in the classroom without further analysis of the tech imposed on kids. There is little 
awareness about the long term consequences of the choices adopted by the public 
education authorities. This has the possibility of effectively colonising a country 
beyond its future workforce as it locks organisations into specific software which will 
be difficult to change in the future. 
This also leads to a rapid de facto privatisation of education infrastructure. It is 
not only the individual students that are shaped by the dominant tech firms. It is 
also educational data that are now in the hands of these firms, allowing them to 
develop further commercial products instead of facilitating an ‘education data 
commons’ that would help countries develop public interest digital services. In this 
new form of digital colonialism, data and money flow in one direction, with little 
to no privacy for digital users or taxes on the profits of tech companies. Without 
ownership and control over this data, developing countries cannot develop the 
15. Kwet, “Digital Colonialism: US Empire and the New Imperialism in the Global South.”
16. Lionel Laurent, “Google and Facebook Are Sucking the AI Brains Out of Europe.” Bloomberg, 1 
July 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-01/google-and-facebook-are-sucking-
the-ai-brains-out-of-europe. 
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products they need to become equal participants in the digital economy. A similar 
situation is also occurring with health data, emergency response and even citizen 
security. The technology sector is rapidly moving to provide the infrastructure 
of oppression and control, especially of the most vulnerable, often disguised as 
donations. One company engaged in such practices is Palantir, which provided 
predictive policing systems for six years, ‘free of charge,’ to New Orleans.17 Over six 
years, and without public scrutiny, the program experimented on the population 
without their knowledge or consent.
 
The other use of data-driven state intervention is immigration policy in the US. 
Discriminatory, algorithm-driven immigration enforcement was used to fuel a 
wave of deportations of vulnerable workers in the US, with little scrutiny or public 
accountability.18 The deportation services rely heavily on a data infrastructure 
provided by tech giants. Today, Amazon is the custodian of the most valuable 
dataset enabling deportations, with questions surrounding whether they use their 
customer data to enhance it.
Increasingly, there is also a merger of political power and tech power in the US, 
which is then extrapolated to the rest of the world. A handful of huge corporations, 
like Amazon Web Services and Palantir, have built a ‘revolving door’ to develop and 
entrench Silicon Valley’s capacity to expand their services abroad.19 The neocolonial 
role of international aid takes a new shape, this time as technology, as the 
revolving door between the most powerful governments in the world and technology 
companies manifests in global diplomacy. The CEOs of tech companies navigate 
the world as ‘new envoys’ of digital colonialism – diplomats showcasing the power of 
their enormous technical empires to heads of state. Often, their revenues are larger 
than the entire GDP of their countries they are visiting, and their arrival sends a 
distorted message of prosperity and progress to overcome systemic inequalities and 
leapfrog into a better future. For many precarious and debt-fuelled governments, 
it is difficult to reject offers of ‘free’ digital infrastructure and services. In addition, 
current global trade rules run the risk of consolidating a regime favourable to 
digital empires, blocking the possibility of smaller actors to innovate and take 
ownership of their digital futures.
17. Ali Winston, “New Orleans Ends Its Palantir Predictive Policing Program.” The Verge. 15 March 
2018. https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/15/17126174/new-orleans-palantir-predictive-policing-pro-
gram-end.
18. Karen Hao, “Amazon Is the Invisible Backbone of ICE’s Immigration Crackdown.” MIT Technology 
Review. 2 April 2020. https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/10/22/139639/amazon-is-the-invisi-
ble-backbone-behind-ices-immigration-crackdown/.
19. LLC, Empower, “Who’s Behind ICE? The Tech and Data Companies Fuelling Deportations,” Oc-
tober 2018. https://mijente.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/WHO%E2%80%99S-BEHIND-ICE_-The-
Tech-and-Data-Companies-Fueling-Deportations_v3-.pdf.
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The Global Regulation of e-Commerce: 
the Battle Ahead at the WTO
Trade agreements today are the primary source of rulemaking at the global 
level, encompassing an expansive list of issues. Because of this, they have become 
the preferred vehicle for an accelerated process of digital colonisation. Trade 
agreements cover a wide array of subjects that extend far beyond traditional trade 
matters. They have been useful tools for global corporations to dilute or eliminate 
government policies protecting local industries, minimise regulatory costs, challenge 
domestic consumer protections, weaken the leverage of local producers and 
maximise corporate profits at the expense of citizens’ rights. 
The growing significance of the Internet for international trade means that 
attempts at trade liberalisation of digital systems are inevitable. They are the 
desired vehicle for Big Tech as it is more efficient lobby than influencing domestic 
processes or even regional processes. A global trade agreement, even if it takes 
longer to approve, harmonises rules everywhere. Trade agreements are more stable 
than domestic legislation and cannot be modified when a new government with a 
different agenda is elected. Any breach to them is costly and national governments 
cannot legislate against them without risking dispute. Changing a global treaty 
can take decades and is a costly process. In brief, digital trade agreements are the 
modern vehicle to consolidate digital colonisation. 
In recent years, global trade discussions have increasingly touched on digital 
issues, such as cross-border data transfers, online privacy, cybersecurity, regulation 
of spam, and net neutrality. Large tech companies have high stakes in these 
discussions, as they benefit greatly from both the elimination of what they consider 
to be trade barriers and also the harmonisation of regulations, which reduces the 
cost of compliance and government mandates.20 Through further acceleration, 
we might end 2021 with a global treaty regulating data flows. This will happen 
at a very vulnerable institutional moment, after the 2020 Covid-19 crisis and the 
leadership collapse at the World Trade Organisation. The consequence of this chain 
of events was the suspension of the Ministerial Conference scheduled to take place 
and the departure of the head of the most important multilateral trade body. 
The digital global trade future is both uncertain and unpostponable, and a global 
treaty might be inevtiable. If it takes place, the global negotiation on digital trade 
will not be a balanced one. It will be the result of the power of the few and the 
needs of the many. And, unlike in the past, heads of state will not have the final 
word – their leadership is rapidly being replaced by tech giants. 
20. Burcu Kilic and Renata Avila, “Opening Spaces for Digital Rights Activism: Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations.” Internet Policy Observatory. 31 March 2018. http://globalnetpolicy.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/06/Trade-Report_IPO_FINAL_060818.pdf.
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What happens now when corporations concentrated in a few jurisdictions provide 
all the vital architecture for digital markets? How are such dependencies reflected 
in the political arena, as technology becomes yet another diplomatic area of 
tension? In the most recent global trade negotiation, a new form of polylateralism, 
that is, the inclusion of non-state actors in diplomatic interactions has emerged. 
CEOs of tech corporations such as Jack Ma made their way to the World Trade 
Organisation Ministerial Conference and advocated for provisions favourable to 
them, organising alliances that merged developed and developing countries with 
tech giants. 21 The policy goal of economic development provides ample justification 
for the rapid digital colonisation of entire territories and the rush to approve 
new rules to regulate e-commerce. Multinational companies and governments 
together promote a utopian vision of the future in which technology will be a 
driver of exponential positive leaps for the global poor. However, the reality is far 
removed from this glittery picture. In fact, there is no conclusive data to show that 
e-commerce leads to meaningful development with positive benefits for the global 
poor.
At the moment, talks on digital trade are displacing a development agenda that 
could dramatically reduce poverty. Disguised as pathways to development that 
promise a digital future of prosperity, such plurilateral and polylateral alliances are 
increasingly jeopardising the future of digital sovereignty. For example, accepting 
the proposed terms by tech corporations in a global treaty could prevent city 
governments from deciding to hire local cloud providers to manage their public 
data commons. They could also prohibit a national parliament from restricting the 
use of proprietary software in schools or demanding audits on the algorithms used 
to score pupils’ performance. 
The critical question is to what extent can we rely on privatised services that 
may limit a country’s sovereignty during an emergency or a digital social welfare 
intervention. These are precisely the aspects of government action that may be 
restricted by new global trade agreements. The net effect of these agreements 
has been to impose new standards and practices on people who do not really 
have a choice or the knowledge to understand their long-term consequences. This 
could be devastating for workers, creating increasingly precarious work conditions 
and making enforcement of local labour laws more difficult. It could even enable 
enhance technology-mediated global control over workers’ performance.22 
But most of the headlines, activism and attention around digital issues takes 
place far away from the multilateral arena. News and reporting are concentrated 
in Silicon Valley and certain other places. There is an absence of systematic 
monitoring of what is happening at the global regulatory space, where the 
higher risk of digital colonialism is not only present but planned and starting to 
be implemented. The first challenge for a digital liberation movement will be to 
21. Amiti Sen, “Jack Ma Champions e-Commerce Liberalisation at WTO.” The Hindu BusinessLine. 12 
December 2017. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/world/jack-ma-champions-ecommerce-lib-
eralisation-at-wto/article9989936.ece.
22. Duncan McCann, “e-Commerce Free Trade Agreements, Digital Chapters and the Impact on La-
bour.” International Trade Union Confederation. 2019. https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/digital_chap-
ters_and_the_impact_on_labour_en.pdf.
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block any attempt at creating a new agreement sponsored by tech companies at 
the WTO level. Once a global treaty is approved, tech giants will crystallise their 
dominance through uniform, globally applied rules. This framework would further 
limit smaller actors, block the possibilities of alternatives to emerge, and constrain 
nation states in their ability to regulate tech companies.
The next WTO Ministerial Conference will take place while the world is still dealing 
with a global pandemic which accelerated global digitisation, consolidating the 
market dominance of tech giants.23 It will be celebrated in a highly favourable 
political environment praising the benefits of technology to overcome economic and 
social crises. It will happen without the vigilant eye of civil society in most countries 
focussed on other crises. This is particularly the case in African and Latin American 
nations concerned with internet shutdowns and surveillance.24 It will be the most 
important trade agreement to either consolidate the digital colonisation of the 
world or create a path towards digital autonomy and sovereignty. 
A Blueprint for Digital Sovereignty 
This paper highlights three key issues with which to start a critical conversation 
about establishing the basis for a dignified, sovereign digital future: public 
education, public procurement and international cooperation. I include a set of 
suggested steps below: 
1) Public Education for Digital Emancipation 
The first point is to encourage the development of ecosystems of digital skills 
beyond basic coding. One of the areas of strategic intervention to prevent 
digital colonialism is education and access to knowledge that can create active 
participation in shaping the digital society. Low income countries should not give 
up on the possibility of being actively involved in digital creation. Children should 
be provided with tools and trained in neutral technology to give them options in the 
future. 
Today, many countries fail to do this, training citizens as mere users of 
predetermined pieces of software rather than creators of their own tools. A 
profound reform in the global education system is the first step to produce greater 
awareness of the digital products and services we consume and also the data 
extractivism and the dynamics of control and domination we are subjected to. It is 
imperative to develop an education system that explains how technology is made, 
and how technology could be shaped to reflect other sets of values. Retaking the 
power of digital creation for the next generation will reactivate the stagnated 
digital innovation landscape.
23. UN News, “Globally, Youth Are the Largest Poverty-Stricken Group, Says New UN Report.” Unit-
ed Nations. 20 September 2018. https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1019952.
24. Digital Rights groups in Africa were easily neutralised and did not oppose or even scrutinise the 
deployment of free basics in up to 27 African nations. See Nothias, Toussaint. “Access Granted: Face-
book’s Free Basics in Africa.” Media, Culture & Society 42, no. 3 (2020): 329–48.
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2) Public Procurement to Change the Rules of the Game and Decentralise Tech 
Power
The role of public investment and procurement should be a fundamental part of 
a blueprint against digital colonialism. When imagining a blueprint for the future, 
governments aiming at gaining back control of vital infrastructure should put public 
interest first when assessing new investments in technology. They should invest in 
their own infrastructure to transmit data, at least for government information and 
also information of strategic sectors. They should prioritise and create incentives for 
the creation of regional data centres and for local developers and local industries 
to provide services and equipment. Furthermore, governments should invest more 
and better in decentralised platforms and services to provide citizens with a basic 
participatory infrastructure. They should also pass comprehensive legislation to 
open all black boxes, prioritising sustainability and adaptability of the systems they 
deploy. 
This could be achieved by changing the procurement rules to protect citizens and 
also to allow small actors to compete and local industries to offer added value 
beyond just price and efficiency. Together with a comprehensive reform of public 
procurement of technology, an anti-lobbying frame should be put in place to 
regulate technology donations and aid projects, especially the large ones. 
As an immediate step, attention should be directed to the practices of tech 
giants, exposing their machinations and questioning their narratives, especially 
in relation to tech education and bridging the digital gap. Instead of celebrating 
‘tech envoys,’ media and advocacy groups need to closely scrutinise these visits and 
tech companies’ interactions with governments. The visits should be considered as 
a form of lobbying and both domestic regulation and global ethical norms should 
regulate them. Donations from tech companies to governments should be regulated, 
and their acceptance, just because it is free of charge, should not be automatic. 
This is especially relevant to the education sector, but also important for security 
and internal governmental affairs. When a government seeks to deploy technology 
produced elsewhere and donated free of charge, the long-term consequences 
should be seriously considered 
There should be a mandatory and open registry of ‘public good’ technical projects 
by tech companies. We should demand the full disclosure of the not-for-profit 
projects Big Tech companies conduct in emerging economies. Projects such as 
free laptops and large infrastructure projects should be evaluated as to whether 
they are giving more to a country than they are receiving in terms of data power. 
Rights impact assessments should be conducted for such projects, and the highest 
privacy and data protection standards available globally should be applied. This 
would avoid the global poor becoming the data mine and testing field of Big Tech 
companies. These rules should also apply to private-public partnerships. 
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3) A Different Era of Digital Cooperation
A third point is inter-state collaboration to develop and maintain public digital 
infrastructure and design a more resilient multilateral digital agenda. There is 
currently a lack of global coordination against digital colonisation beyond the WTO 
system. There are many different bodies that all play an important role in shaping 
our digital future, from standards bodies to institutions like UNESCO or UNCTAD. 
The global digital agenda cannot only look at trade, but must also consider 
development, cooperation and even peacebuilding. 
Public sector innovation should be well funded and promoted globally, and 
the public sector North-South exchange should be encouraged as a new form 
of technical cooperation. Instead of transferring millions every year for new 
software licenses going to just two jurisdictions, intergovernmental cooperation in 
public sector free software could grow and lead to the creation of pools of code, 
optimising investment and resilience. The focus should be on developing local 
capacities inside public administrations and tech teams able to solve problems. 
Designing policies against digital colonialism and a digital transformation based 
in sovereignty and dignity is possible. Indeed, by taking back our education 
system, public infrastructure and combining the power of the many, a new digital 
transformation based on sovereignty and cooperation can be enacted. It would 
be more creative, participatory and public interest oriented, with citizens and 
institutions creating the technology they need to serve, instead of serving the data 
needs of quasi monopolies. 
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Conclusion
For the battles ahead in the global trade arena, the path will be easier if digital 
cooperation is already taking place in other areas, such as public education, a new 
set of practices around public procurement of technology and the reconfiguration 
of global norms and standards. While this paper has proposed a positive agenda 
of creating a new public digital infrastructure, current events might prevent it from 
happening. The imminent global trade negotiations demand rapid action before 
the global trade system and emerging trade wars shut down this possibility. 
The future of digital colonialism looks increasingly tied up in a global struggle 
between the US and China. As Juan Ortiz Freuler has argued:
 
‘Everything seems to indicate that we are entering a digital cold war. If this 
is so, it is time for the peripheries to start giving shape to a digital non-
aligned movement. Such a movement could operate as a buffer between the 
PRC and the U.S. – striving to protect the value of an open Internet, helping 
us adapt the Internet to become the knowledge-sharing tool that our times 
demand, and offering the necessary cover so that no nation feels coerced 
into joining an intranet that does not work in the interests of its people.’25
Activists, consumer groups and freedom advocates should design a coherent and 
robust strategy ahead of the next multilateral negotiations on the regulation of 
e-commerce. A global treaty on e-commerce could consolidate global monopolies, 
lead to cultural homogeneity and tie the hands of governments in their ability 
to adapt digital technology to their needs. To avoid a future of subjugation and 
exploitation, developing countries must have more of a meaningful choice aside 
from the pre-drafted plans of multi-national tech companies, backed by the most 
powerful governments of the world. The answer, as presented in this paper, is in a 
combination of new alliances, considerable investment in the digital transformation 
of the public sector, and the necessary delay of any multilateral negotiation at the 
WTO that could block the possibility of a more dignified digital future. 
25. Juan Ortiz Freuler, “TikTok, Trump and the Need for a Digital Non-Aligned Movement.” openDe-
mocracy. 15 August 2020. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/tiktok-trump-and-need-
digital-non-aligned-movement/.
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Care before Code: It’s What Makes     
DisCOs Different
How can emergent technologies be put to use in the service of emancipatory 
goals to reshape how we work? The tech sector has been a great disruptor of the 
labour market and a range of industries. But too often this has been accompanied 
by increased surveillance, data harvesting and precarious labour.1 For all their 
disruption, the one thing Silicon Valley has not touched is the ownership and 
governance structure of a typical capitalist firm.2 How can organisations transform 
work in such a way as to prioritise care, relationships and social value?
We introduce the DisCO model to fulfill this purpose. DisCO stands for Distributed 
Co-operative Organisations.3 This is an accessible approach to people working 
together to create value in ways that are co-operative, commons-oriented and 
rooted in feminist economics. These values are nourished in small, federated 
communities. DisCOs harness the utility of tech without being completely tech-
centric, emphasising mutual trust and the need to have not only reliable but also 
enjoyable collaborative relationships. Distributed ledger/blockchain technologies 
are put to use when these values and their resulting human relationships have 
become strongly rooted.4
DisCOs are a cultural and structural framework combining influences from other 
forms and movements into a practical toolkit. The framework is based on existing, 
disruptive economic alternatives normally absent from the blockchain space. They 
are:
1. The Commons and P2P: Self-organised systems stewarding resources to meet 
human needs while leveraging the power of networks.5
2. Open Co-operativism: Combining Open Source and Commons principles with 
1. Trebor Scholz, Uberworked and Underpaid: How Workers Are Disrupting the Digital Economy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017).
2. Richard Barbrook and Cameron Andy. “The California Ideology.” Imaginary Futures: From Thinking 
Machines to the Global Village. http://www.imaginaryfutures.net/2007/04/17/the-californian-ideolo-
gy-2/.
3. See https://disco.co-op/ and https://disco.co-op/manifesto/ for a more thorough overview.
4. For an accessible yet thorough introduction to the Blockchain, we recommend this video course, as 
well as Daniel Drescher, Blockchain Basics: A Non-Technical Introduction in 25 Steps (New York City: 
Apress, 2017).
5. See https://primer.commonstransition.org/1-short-articles/1-2-what-are-p2p-and-the-commons-and-
how-do-they-relate.
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those of the co-operative and social solidarity movements.6 
3. Open Value Accounting: Enables value sovereignty by rewarding meaningful 
contributions to projects, rather than wage labour.7
4. Feminist Economics: Challenges normative economic abstractions while 
factoring reproductive and care work.8
These influences, together with a strong focus on accessibility and social and 
economic justice, provide DisCOs with vastly different affordances to other 
available alternatives such as Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs). 
DAOs are blockchain-based entities that can operate autonomously to execute 
payments, levy penalties, and enforce terms and contracts with minimal human 
interaction – like a virtual robot that can automate governance processes and 
execute investments and payments for an individual or organisation.9 
DisCOs design their accounting and governance structures as convivial tools from 
the bottom up. These are developed through a process of community deliberation 
on how to best enact a series of co-operative values and principles. Shifting the 
design of technologies and their social impact away from grand architects and 
investors, DisCOs provide more democratic and ethical templates to build disruptive 
technologies. These, as we will see, provide different pathways to enact more 
desirable futures of work which are neither dependent on un-checked technological 
disruption or on top-down governmental interventions. 
The Covid-19 crisis has been a bucket of cold water for many economic forecasts 
about the future of work. The abject failure of neoliberalism to provide urgently 
needed solutions for the crisis has exposed the structural inadequacies of the 
market/state, and revealed the exponential rise of voluntary or otherwise typically 
undervalued work.10 Frontline workers and mutual aid practitioners are routinely 
hailed as heroes, yet economically sacrificed as martyrs. 
6. For more information see https://primer.commonstransition.org/1-short-articles/1-5-what-is-open-co-
operativism.
7. For more information see http://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/Category:P2P_Accounting.
8. For an introduction to feminist economics see https://wbg.org.uk/blog/what-is-feminist-economics/.
9. For a more in-depth look at Decentralised Autonomous Organisations we recommend this critical 
overview by Primavera de Filippi: https://www.guerrillatranslation.org/2014/11/20/ethereum-freen-
et-or-skynet/, for a basic introduction see https://blockchainhub.net/dao-decentralized-autono-
mous-organization/.
10. On the concept of the market/state see David Bollier, “State Power and Commoning: Transcend-
ing a Problematic Relationship.” A Report on a Deep Dive Workshop convened by the Commons 
Strategies Group in co-operation with the Heinrich Böll Foundation. July 2016. https://cdn8.commons-
strategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/State-Power-and-Commoning.pdf. See also David Bollier 
and Silke Helfrich, Free, Fair, and Alive: The Insurgent Power of the Commons (Gabriola, British 
Columbia: New Society Publishers, 2019). 
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Meanwhile, some of the world’s richest companies, often in the tech sector, enjoy 
unprecedented growth.11 Many of these are willing partners in publicly-funded mass 
surveillance and citizen control programs.12 The surge of online remote work is 
treated as a disembodied extension of office work, bypassing the human affective 
needs of digital teams in the rush to demand more invisibilised productivity. The 
uselessness of alienating, unnecessary jobs that exacerbate consumption in the 
name of growth becomes crystal clear, yet stimulus packages are directed towards 
propping up big business with corporate-level payouts, while artificial scarcity 
hampers urgent public health responses. 
Socio-economic instability can be a banquet for predators, especially when 
combined with promises of disruptive technology, but it also provides the 
opportunity for radical innovations and solutions based on human trust. DisCOs 
can address the Covid-19 crisis by creating bottom-up resilience and restoring our 
relationships – both to one another and the planet.
11. See https://www.schroders.com/en/insights/economics/covid-19-why-the-tech-giants-have-emerged-
as-winners/.
12. Félix Tréguer, “The State and Digital Surveillance in Times of the Covid-19 Pandemic.” SciencesPo 
Center for International Studies. CERI Unité Mixte de Recherche. 1 June 2020. https://www.sciences-
po.fr/ceri/en/content/state-and-digital-surveillance-times-covid-19-pandemic.
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DisCO in 7 Principles and 11 Values 
Co-operatives have formally existed for more than 175 years and, arguably, the 
spirit of co-operation that led to their creation has been a hallmark of human 
existence.13 The commons has long been defined as communities working together 
with shared resources to achieve common goals.14 Co-operatives formalise 
the practice of commoning and facilitate legally regulated operations in the 
marketplace.
DisCO adds seven additional principles to the original seven co-operative principles 
in order to reunite co-operativism with its commons origins and better prepare it for 
technological futures.15 Building on the groundwork laid out by movements such as 
Platform and Open Co-operativism,16 the seven DisCO principles are:
1: Put your effort where your heart is: values-based 
accountability 
Most companies and indeed, many co-operatives, orient their production toward 
profit and meeting market demands. In DisCOs, production is explicitly guided 
by need, including social and environmental priorities. This orientation towards 
positive outcomes is the heart of a DisCO’s values. The needs-based priorities 
defined by the co-operative are embedded in each DisCO’s legal statutes, as well 
as the technologies and cultural practices that let DisCOs assess and reflect on the 
outcomes of their effort.
2: Building whole-community governance
Co-operatives are traditionally geared towards bringing democracy to the 
workplace. But their economic activity has knock-on effects throughout broader 
chains of production and consumption. Rather than restricting democratic principles 
to one organisation, DisCOs extend rights of ownership and decision making powers 
to all those affected by a DisCO’s activities. Inspired by the multi-constituent 
social care co-ops in Quebec, Canada and Emilia Romagna, Italy, DisCOs place 
measurable value on the distinctive contributions of a defined community that can 
include workers, neighbouring communities, suppliers, clients, those who perform 
reproductive and affective labor, financial backers, etc. 
13. For a condensed history of the co-operative movement see https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publi-
cations/cultural-survival-quarterly/co-operatives-short-history.
14. Bollier and Helfrich. Free, Fair, and Alive.
15. See https://www.ica.co-op/en/co-operatives/co-operative-identity.
16. See our article on Platform Co-operativism and Open Co-operativism to find out about 
the history and differences between both movements: http://commonstransition.org/from-plat-
form-to-open-co-operativism/.
Autonomy     Platforming Equality 62
3: Active creators of commons 
Typical market enterprises permit the exploitation of shared wealth, such as land, 
natural resources or human knowledge. According to mainstream economics, 
businesses are drivers of a process of enclosure, whereby resources are turned into 
commodities and relationships into services. DisCOs reverse this trend by actively 
generating decommodified, open-access resources. These commons can be digital 
(e.g. code, design, documentation, legal protocols and best practices) or physical 
(e.g. productive infrastructure, deliberation spaces, machinery).
4: Rebalancing the scale: rethinking global/local 
economics
Corporations extract resources as if they were infinitely abundant, while restricting 
immaterial flows of knowledge, usually reproducible at marginal cost, through 
intellectual property laws and patents. Conversely, DisCOs support and provide a 
business model for the Design Global, Manufacture Local template.17 Here, physical 
production is kept local and needs-based, while knowledge, resources and value 
flows are shared at the global level with like-minded initiatives to create political 
and cultural counterpower to the prevailing corporate/capitalist economy.18  
5: Care work is the core
Care and affective work are essential in DisCOs and are supported through 
established mutual support structures. These include a rotating list of designated 
mentors and support “buddies” in a roster where each person both gives and 
receives support within the group.19 Emphasis is placed upon openly expressing 
observations and criticisms about the workings of the group and also sharing 
individual and collective aspirations, preoccupations and humour. This helps build 
stronger interpersonal bonds and better trust-based communication. Beyond 
individual members, DisCOs extend the notion of care work towards the collective 
as an entity represented by the upkeep of its goals and values. This empowers 
individuals to undertake, or at least understand, what would usually be considered 
bureaucratic or administrative work. This work is often channeled to either a 
highly-paid upper management class, or a low-paid assistant function, both 
acting in the interest of the capitalist class. Upkeep of a DisCO’s social mission 
is the responsibility of working circles or self-organised teams which collectively 
manage specific needs (e.g. building community, following leads for livelihood work, 
evaluating potential co-op members) to ensure that the DisCO is healthy and able 
to continue fulfilling its values. 
17. For an overview, see https://truthout.org/articles/reimagine-dont-seize-the-means-of-production/.
18. Value flows is the economic vocabulary informing DisCO interactions. For more information, visit 
https://valueflo.ws/.
19. See https://wiki.guerrillamediacollective.org/Mentoring. See also https://wiki.guerrillamediacollec-
tive.org/Mutual_Support.
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6: Reimagining the origin and flows of value
In the capitalist marketplace, production is determined hierarchically and is 
exclusively oriented toward profit, while value is measured through opaque 
mechanisms and financial instruments.20 Further, the value only becomes manifest 
through market exchange. Everything else is externalised, omitted from the 
value equation. In DisCOs, production is communal and value measurement is 
transparent. Three types of value are highlighted and rewarded:
 
1. productive market value (the DisCO’s goods and services paid for by clients); 
2. pro-bono value (the commons created through self-selected volunteer work); 
and 
3. care work value (towards the collective and among its members, see above). 
All are tracked through complementary value metrics that apply to all DisCO 
members. Recognising different types of value influences functions including 
payments, work priorities and certain key decisions. This recognition gives visibility 
and empowerment to other values left out by the market nexus.
7: Primed for federation
Co-operatives worldwide have a combined turnover of US$3 trillion, which is 
similar to the aggregate market capitalisation of Silicon Valley’s largest businesses 
(Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Apple and Facebook).21 Unfortunately, this economic 
power is dispersed, with many co-ops only nominally acknowledging the sixth co-
operative principle: co-operation among co-operatives. Unlike networks, which 
may or may not share common goals, federations are held together by shared 
commitments and power is equitably distributed among all nodes. Federations also 
provide viable alternatives to the dangers of scaling, where a worldview is simply 
extended from a centre of power and forces everything in its path to conform to its 
values. 
DisCOs are distributed and differentiated structures that replicate themselves 
through a standard federation protocol.22 This allows federations of DisCOs to 
achieve critical mass without regimenting all parts. The modularity of DisCO 
Value Tracking allows DisCOs to mutualise economic power (as well as shared, 
non-monetary resources) for greater impact. Every node retains the levels of 
20. Alex Pazaitis, Primavera De De Filippi, and Vasilis Kostakis. “Blockchain and Value Systems 
in the Sharing Economy: The Illustrative Case of Backfeed.” Technological Forecasting and So-
cial Change. Science Direct, June 10, 2017. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/
S0040162517307084.
21. In 2018, these were similar numbers, but at the time of writing MAGAF has leapt to US$4.9 tril-
lion. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/30/apple-amazon-alphabet-facebook-added-200-billion-in-val-
ue-thursday.html. Source for Co-operative stats: Measuring the size and scope of the co-operative 
economy: Results of the 2014 global census on co-operatives. Dave Grace & Associates, 9 October  
2014: https://portailco-op.hec.ca/in/details.xhtml?id=h%3A%3Ac3357139-31ae-4270-83ef-9d24884e-
2be3. 
22. See https://wiki.guerrillamediacollective.org/index.php/Distributed_Co-operative_Organization_
(DisCO)_Governance_Model_V_3.0#Federation_Protocol.
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trust, mutual support and well-being that only small groups can achieve, while still 
achieving a larger collective impact by being part of broader economic networks. 
The long-term goal is to make co-operatives transcend their status as a form of 
economic alternative and instead, become a collective economic counterpower.
Complementary to the 7 principles, DisCOs also introduce 11 key values which, 
taken together, provide the framework to tackle the present challenges posed 
by the Covid crisis.23 Rather than turn to big state or corporate solutions, in the 
DisCO model, social and environmental change is brought to life from below by 
federated collectives which actively educate in post-capitalist, feminist economics. 
Volunteer work is no longer ignored or undervalued and is factored into the value 
equation. Digital working teams communicate through established working rhythms, 
where both practical and affective realities are continually discussed.24 Finally, all 
production is oriented toward the urgent issues of our time, but without sacrificing 
wellbeing or a friendly, enjoyable workplace environment. 
These principles and values are articulated through DisCO Governance models 
(plural), designed to adapt to the cultural and contextual specificities of each 
DisCO. At the same time, they share common patterns that help fulfil the DisCO 
principles, as we will explain.
23. For the additional 11 DisCO Values see: https://wiki.guerrillamediacollective.org/Open_Value_
Co-operativism_and_DisCO_in_7_Principles_and_11_Values#11_Values.
24. See https://wiki.guerrillamediacollective.org/Community_Rhythms.
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DisCO-Tech and Commons Governance
The DisCO Governance model is an extensive reworking of an orphaned open 
source governance protocol.25 It was developed and put into practice by Guerrilla 
Media Collective (GMC), a Spain-based co-operative focussing on language and 
communications services, which became the first DisCO pilot.26 In 2018, a group 
of experts on decentralised/non-hierarchical organisations, facilitation, peer 
governance, distributed tech and mutualised finance were invited to help reimagine 
the model,27 which resulted in a new version: The Distributed Co-operative 
Organisation Governance and Economic Model.28
Here is a brief overview. Co-op members are owners and shareholders, each holding 
different types of shares in the collective. These correspond to value-tracked pro 
bono and livelihood work, as well as reproductive or care work (see below). Shares 
in these three types of work determine how much is paid on a monthly basis. The 
money to pay shares come from the productive work performed by the co-op’s 
worker-owners, which is accounted for in internal credits (1 credit = 1 Euro), creating 
shares.29 The shares accrued by co-op members correspond to the work done in 
these three areas of value:
1. Paid work performed for outside clients who are invoiced by GMC as an 
agency. We call this the ‘livelihood work’ stream.
2. Pro-bono work in a DisCO’s specific productive area. For example, members 
of GMC choose articles to translate pro-bono based on their enthusiasm and 
how the material aligns with their values.30 These translations are presented 
in Guerrilla Translation’s websites,31 with the consent of, but at no cost to, 
the authors. These translations create an open knowledge commons. This is 
described as the ‘love work’ stream.
3. Care work which, as explained in the 5th DisCO principle above, includes 
‘caring for the collective and its social mission’ ensuring that all the 
collective’s administrative, communication and economic needs are cared for, 
25. See https://disco.co-op/governance-model/ for the full governance model, or read this simpli-
fied overview as applied to Guerrilla Translation: https://www.guerrillatranslation.org/our-gover-
nance-model/. The original Better Means Governance Model can be read here. The changes have 
been so substantial that it should not be taken as a reflection of our current governance model, but 
mainly an inspiration.
26. See https://guerrillamedia.co-op/ and https://wiki.guerrillamediacollective.org/.
27. For a summary of the meeting see https://www.guerrillatranslation.org/2018/08/22/punk-ele-
gance-how-guerrilla-translation-reimagined-itself-for-open-co-operativism/.
28. “Distributed Co-operative Organization (DisCO) Governance Model V 3.0.” DisCO.co-op, Guerril-
la Media Collective. https://disco.co-op/governance-model/.
29. For more on how this model operates in practice see the DisCO Governance Model. https://wiki.
guerrillamediacollective.org/Distributed_Cooperative_Organization_(DisCO)_Governance_Mod-
el_V_3.0.
30. See https://wiki.guerrillamediacollective.org/Guerrilla_Translation%27s_Goals_and_Values.
31. Guerrilla Translation currently has two blogs (English https://www.guerrillatranslation.org/ and 
Spanish https://www.guerrillatranslation.es/) to present their pro-bono ‘Love Work,’ with other lan-
guages planned for the near future.
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and ‘caring for the humans that make up the collective.’
These are proportionally accounted for and treated as shares, and are the basis 
for the distributions of income.32 Note that the same value metrics are used for 
both types of productive work (in this case, translations). DisCO’s model of income 
distribution diverts a portion of paid work towards the pro-bono work previously 
performed by members. Net funds held on account are distributed on a monthly 
basis: 75% to pay members’ agency (livelihood) shares, and the remaining 25% pays 
for pro bono (love) shares. 
Meanwhile, reproductive work is tallied in hours and distributed according to each 
member’s ratio of benefits versus contributions.33 These care work hours dynamically 
affect the 75%/25% Livelihood/Love split described above. Members who performed 
fewer care hours while earning more in the Livelihood/Agency or Love/Probono 
streams will have a proportional deduction from their pay. Those adjustments 
are redistributed towards those contributing more care hours. In practice, this 
means that if all members perform roughly the same amount of care work over 
a month, the 75%/25% split on Livelihood and Love shares will remain intact. Any 
imbalances are immediately compensated. The system enables flexibility and fair 
compensation toward activities that each DisCO values as essential for their health 
and reproduction.
This type of share-holding is in contrast to that found in a corporation. While 
shareholders in a corporation accrue power through money, the DisCO model treats 
power differently. DisCOs value forms of power understood as ‘shared capacity to 
act’ and ‘collective strength’ centered around work undertaken for the commons.34 A 
corporation employs wage labor to produce profit-maximising commodities through 
privately owned and managed productive infrastructures. By contrast, DisCOs work 
together for social and environmental purposes while also creating commons and 
building community, locally and/or globally. The model allows members to choose 
to do work that they consider value-aligned, and therefore worthwhile. This is how 
DisCOs model a practice of economic resistance.
Various things are accomplished through this method. First, all members can gain 
income for both types of productive work, whether pro-bono or paid for by a 
client. Second, nobody has to compete internally for paid work versus the equally 
important pro-bono and care work. All three types of work are equally valued 
within a DisCO. Meanwhile, there are variable tiers of external pricing based on 
the client’s means and budget.35 Clients with the greatest financial means who are 
aligned with the DisCO’s principles and values, and who wish to provide support 
for developing its mission, are offered the top tier rate. Extra income from this level 
of client payment goes directly toward repaying the collective’s internal pro-bono 
32. For more details on how income is distributed in a monthly basis, read the DisCO Governance 
Model’s section on “The Monthly Payment Pipeline”: https://wiki.guerrillamediacollective.org/Distrib-
uted_Co-operative_Organization_(DisCO)_Governance_Model_V_3.0#What_this_looks_like_in_
practice:_the_Monthly_Payment_Pipeline.
33. For more information, consult the DisCO Governance Model’s section on Care Work Value.
34. For a short overview of power to/over/with/within, see this article: https://www.powercube.net/oth-
er-forms-of-power/expressions-of-power/.
35. For the pricing tiers (as used by Guerrilla Translation) see the DisCO Governance Model.
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shares (this additional income is also used to offset the cost for work performed 
for clients in the ‘solidarity tier,’ i.e. value-aligned small organisations with minimal 
or inadequate budgets). This sliding scale helps nurture relationships and supports 
collectives and initiatives with the least financial means, creating better and fairer 
access to the DisCO’s services.
Currently in testing phase, the DisCO Deck is a custom platform being developed 
to facilitate the value tracking, redistribution and payment protocols of this 
governance model. Based on the Value Flows economic vocabulary,36 DisCO Deck 
balances lightweight, DLT tech (such as CommonsPub) for Intra-DisCO accounting 
and blockchain technologies for transactions and value mutualisation with other 
DisCOs and generative economic entities.37 In contrast to an automated platform 
auto-executing smart contracts (i.e. DAO), the DisCO Deck will help educate 
mission-oriented co-operatives in new, inclusive economic flows that support all their 
members.
36. See https://valueflo.ws/.
37. See https://commonspub.org/.
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DisCO Policies
What needs to happen for DisCOs to grow and flourish across the economy? This 
is the purpose of the DisCO Project: to provide educational tools and experimental 
spaces for the transnational development of DisCO.38 It’s an undertaking that needs 
ongoing support to reach a broad base of potential advocates and participants.
DisCOs are designed to be developed from the bottom-up. To create the desired 
co-operative economic counterpower, they will need to find each other and network 
through agreements. Supportive legal and policy frameworks would greatly enhance 
some of the potentials described in this paper. As explicitly political and federated 
initiatives, DisCOs also act as a training ground for deliberative and inclusive 
decision-making processes, preparing members for responsible civic action. In this 
way, DisCOs could act as pilots to prefigure new forms of policy around networked 
politics. 
Given DisCO’s transnational orientation, the following recommendations are 
general and non-domain specific. Individual DisCOs and federated DisCO networks 
need to actively campaign for legislative change at various levels in applicable 
jurisdictions. Additionally, the objective is for the state to provide the necessary 
infrastructure to empower and protect the creation and upkeep of DisCOs, but not 
direct the process of federated DisCO development. 
Arguably, the development of DisCOs centered on ecologically and socially-oriented 
work can directly address urgent crises at their root, radically democratising 
social and public health provision and large infrastructure management. This 
lessens the need for costly post-hoc state interventions and brings a more 
democratic distribution of economic power, alleviating government enforcement of 
redistributional strategies through taxes or benefits.
DisCOs also provide solutions for state actors by providing meaningful employment, 
narrowing the digital divide, and actively addressing the gendered aspects of work. 
To support these goals we propose that states and municipalities enable DisCO 
development through:
1. The provision of special economic incentives for DisCOs, implemented as:
a. Tax benefits, including reducing the tax rate dynamically calculated 
against measurable social and environmental gains, social security 
bonuses for employing underprivileged or marginalised persons and 
more;
b. State-supported microcredit systems with demurrage based interest 
rates based on achievement of co-defined social provision goals. 
These can be delivered through co-operative banks, some of which 
may practice forms of DisCO accounting. State-supported social and 
crypto currencies are another possibility;
c. Direct financial injection and social investment through renewable, 
interest-free loans. These can act as seed funding for DisCOs and 
38. For more information see https://disco.co-op/disco-project/.
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enable positive credit valuation;
d. Public subsidies towards DisCOs Worker Self Directed Nonprofits as a 
more democratic and mandate-accountable alternative to traditional 
NGOs;39
e. The monetary value of employee pro-bono work could be treated as a 
tax-deductible contribution to the non-profit co-op.
2. The development of legal frameworks to provide DisCOs with appropriate 
institutional (i.e. state, federal) support to facilitate their operation and 
innovative accounting practices. 
3. The development of commons-public partnerships as an alternative to the 
established public-private, following the Preston and Evergreen models,40 
with DisCOs facilitating:
a. Municipal service provision for local economies;
b. FLOSS-built & open licensed, common-pool civic knowledge resources;
c. Practical workplace education on feminist economics, the commons, 
decentralised technology and the ethical market sectors offered by 
participating DisCOs.
4. Supportive municipal policies for provision or support for physical 
infrastructures for DisCOs, including hackerspaces, hackerlabs, maker and 
co-working spaces. Unused municipal facilities could serve as short- or long-
term incubators for knowledge work, skill sharing and technology transfer, as 
well as for the development of new, federated DisCOs.
5. Support of community investment funds for federated DisCOs, with 
dispensations for:
a. DisCO federation contributions;
b. Tax-exempt charitable donations;
c. State sponsorship (see point 1).
6. DisCO-oriented work training programs with DisCOs providing practical 
education in their specific sectors, as well as the DisCO methodology and 
tools. This would include credit convalidation for higher education. 
7. Research and higher education support, leveraging existing DisCO open-
access documentation, training programs and pedagogical materials.
39. Read more on worker self-directed nonprofits here: https://www.theselc.org/worker_selfdirect-
ed_nonprofits. Guerrilla Media Collective is constituted as a non-profit and socially oriented worker 
owned co-operative legally registered in Andalusia, Spain.
40. For more on commons-public partnerships (the order of words is important) see https://www.com-
mon-wealth.co.uk/reports/public-common-partnerships-building-new-circuits-of-collective-ownership.
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8. Support of DisCO initiatives as bottom-up facilitators of Green New Deal 
projects. Compared to public-private solutions, this would:
a. Disburse funding for GND projects more equitably and at a lower risk;
b. Enable substantial savings, absent a profit motive;
c. Bring the benefits of impact at scale through highly federated actors, 
focused on regenerative economies of scope, not scale.
9. Prioritisation of DisCOs and DisCO federations over for-profit entities when 
capitalising on products/services derived from publicly funded research, 
including healthcare and medicine, code and end-consumer products. This 
would ensure fair pricing, ethical application and open licensing.
10. Policy development in concert with the International Labour Organisation 
and the International Co-operative Alliance to recognise transnational, 
onchain DisCOs as federated co-operatives.41
At present, a variety of DisCO pilots in various sectors such as the arts, textile 
recycling/reuse, permaculture, education, online marketplaces and medicine 
are presently being created. Research findings from these pilots would 
experientially validate DisCOs advantages and potentially facilitate policy uptake. 
Complementarily, there is abundant existing research on many of DisCO’s formative 
influences, such as multi-constituent social solidarity and co-operative sectors, 
existing Commons-public partnerships, the benefits/savings of FLOSS, blockchain/
DLT experiences in record keeping and inventory tracking, can be included into 
DisCO-focused policy proposals. 
DisCOs are designed to be autonomous in operation and not state dependent. 
From a legal standpoint, co-operatives are private entities. But in the interest of 
long term remediation — social, economic, environmental — governments would 
be called upon to prioritise support for generative, restorative industries, and to 
divert funding and subsidies away from harmful, extractive and exploitative ones. If 
DisCOs, to paraphrase the IWW, aim to ‘build the new world in the shell of the old,’ 
it must be acknowledged that the old world still holds vast amounts of power.42 The 
affordances of radical, prefigurative projects such as DisCOs will always be affected 
by the constraints of existing systems, including public policy.
What DisCO proposes is radical economic subsidiarity: distributed production and 
economies not of scale, but of multi-faceted scope. With the increasing awareness 
and discussion (even if divisive) of our many global crises, taking a stand becomes 
more important, collectively and individually. Covid-19 has required countless people 
41. Onchain and Offchain are terms used in the DAO space to distinguish algorithmic based gov-
ernance (Onchain) from human agreements (Offchain). We argue that the very dichotomy of off/
onchain elevates the blockchain as the primary focus of attention, subordinating social practices. In 
the DisCO Manifesto we argue that everything occurs ‘onlife’ where the corporeal dimension and 
human and environment needs precede all other consideration. For a simple description of On-
chain/Offchain governance, see: https://education.district0x.io/general-topics/what-is-governance/
off-chain-governance/.
42. Industrial Workers of the World. For their website: https://iww.org/ To read their history: https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_Workers_of_the_World.
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to work from home, which has also raised many reflective questions on the purpose 
and effects of those jobs. For true change to happen we must first address the 
productive and reproductive spheres of work, the decisions about what we produce 
and why, and how we regard fairness in the way we treat each other. Lasting 
change can’t be predicated on individualistic patterns of consumption, but consider 
this question: as citizens (more than consumers), can we continue to support 
the exploitative labor practices of the ever-growing economic power monopolies 
exemplified by Amazon, or do we see ourselves capable of contributing to the 
revolution of work, as exemplified by DisCO? 
While compatible with existing economic forms (i.e. co-operatives) and actively 
working to subvert the right-libertarian bent of most blockchain economics towards 
associationist ends, DisCOs also pave the way for decommodification and non-
market exchange thanks to their commons orientation. They train us to resist and 
create capacity for whatever the future may hold.
Finally, DisCOs place a new and more empowered political subject at the centre. 
Beyond the precariat, DisCOs exist to care for and reproduce commoners — 
understood as people in communities who steward their own resources according 
to the rules, norms and values they set for themselves. With the sustenance of 
2.5 billion people depending on natural resource commons and an abundance 
of commoning practices taking place in digital spaces, mutual aid groups, food 
production, cohabitation and fablabs and makerspaces, the logic of commoning 
is evident in the ongoing Covid reality.43 DisCOs catalyse these practices into a 
feminist economic and care-oriented framework, paving the way for pervasively 
sustainable commons-based alternatives to the dominant order.
43. See https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/31/virus-neighbours-covid-19.
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DisCO Resources
The DisCO Project is constantly creating new resources to advocate for DisCOs. 
Sign up to the DisCO.beat newsletter for updates. Also, see DisCO.co-op’s stories 
section for more stories.
DisCO.co-op website
DisCO Manifesto
1 minute DisCO video trailer
Short intro article: Last Night A Distributed Co-operative Organisation Saved My 
Life: A brief introduction to DisCOs
Practical experiences of Guerrilla Translation as a DisCO: Tales of a DisCO Straight 
from the Dance Floor
Take back the App! Episode of the Laura Flanders show featuring DisCOs, Platform 
Co-ops and more…
April 2020 DisCO Webinar recording
45 min presentation (and audio/podcast version) Rage Against the Machine and 
Science Friction: a video introduction to DisCOs. 
All Your DAOs Belong to Us (interview with the DisCO CAT — Community 
Algorithmic Trust)
Deliberate Dancing: A Critical Investigation of DisCO’s Potential to Re-Politicise the 
Economy. (Research paper)
DisCO Governance model Overview from Guerrilla Translation and Full model.
○ 
                     The Co-operativist Challenge
       to the Platform Economy
James Muldoon
After a year of hard work, you want to plan a short vacation in the summer to 
relax and unwind. You log on to Airbnb and search through their listings to find 
an affordable short-term rental property. Barcelona, Valencia and Amsterdam 
all look promising so you start doing more research. But then you learn about 
neighbourhoods overrun by tourists with up to one Airbnb listing for every four 
properties; property barons with over 100 listings, taking houses off the long-term 
market; and Airbnb suing cities to fight against regulations designed to protect 
local residents and collect tourism taxes.1 You also see an article about renewed 
plans for the company’s public listing post-coronavirus, which could see it’s venture 
capitalist backers cashing in to the tune of US$18 billion.2
But as you read more, you learn that in each of the three cities there is a co-
operative alternative that promotes sustainable tourism. Fairbnb.coop, founded 
as a co-operative in 2018, enforces a “one host/one house” rule to prevent the 
displacement of local residents and invests half of its 15 percent commission in 
social projects chosen by hosts and travellers. The co-operative aims to develop 
into a multi-stakeholder platform in which local hosts could support their own 
social projects and plan what’s best for their city. It sounds like a nice idea, but how 
realistic is this as a viable alternative? Currently, it’s only available in a select few 
European cities. You wonder if this model could ever take off and if it could spread 
across different industries. This paper examines the potential for the development 
of UK platform co-operatives and provides specific policy recommendations to 
support the growth of the sector.
The Rise of Platform Co-operativism
Platform co-operatives adopt the democratic ownership and governance 
structure of workers’ co-operatives and utilise a digital platform for the sale of 
goods or services. Advocates contend that platform co-operatives offer a fairer 
alternative to current business models through a plural ownership and governance 
structureimproved conditions for workers and real engagement with stakeholders.3
1. Rebecca Mead, “The Airbnb Invasion of Barcelona,” The New Yorker. 22 April 2019. https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2019/04/29/the-airbnb-invasion-of-barcelona; Niko Kommenda, Helen 
Pidd and Libby Brooks, “Revealed: the areas in the UK with one Airbnb for every four homes,” The 
Guardian. 20 February 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/feb/20/revealed-the-
areas-in-the-uk-with-one-airbnb-for-every-four-homes. Paris Martineau, “Inside Airbnb’s Guerilla War 
Against Local Governments,” Wired. 20 March 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/inside-airbnbs-guer-
rilla-war-against-local-governments/.
2. Erin Griffith, “Airbnb Says its I.P.O. Plans are Back on Track,” New York Times. 9 June 2020. https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/technology/airbnb-ipo.html.
3. For further reading on platform co-operatives see Trebor Scholz, “Platform Cooperativism: Chal-
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They emerged in the late 2000s and there are currently around 400 initiatives 
in 97 cities in the eco-system, with plans for an index produced by the Platform 
Cooperativism Consortium based at the New School for Social Research in New 
York City. Platform co-operatives such as Fairmondo, Stocksy United, Equal Care 
Co-operative, Faibnb, Coop Cycle, Up & Go, Resonate, Modo and Locomotives 
Cooperative are beginning to challenge dominant companies in a range of 
different industries.
The principles behind platform co-operativism are not new. Workers’ co-operatives 
have a long history in the UK and US stretching back to the Rochdale Society 
of Equitable Pioneers, founded in 1844, establishing the Rochdale principles on 
which certain co-operatives continue to operate. These principles included open 
membership, democratic control (one person, one vote), equitable distribution of 
surplus, limited return on equity and the promotion of education. Today, the co-
operative economy is worth £38.2 billion per year in the UK with 7,063 independent 
co-operatives employing 241,714 people and having over 14 million members. 
This amounts to around 1% of business turnover, although roughly half of this is 
accounted for by two large co-operatives: the Co-operative Group and the John 
Lewis Partnership. The platform co-operative market, in contrast, is extremely 
limited with only a handful of platform co-ops trading consistently in the UK.
The Co-operative Economy4
   
   £38.2 billion per year 
   
   7,063 independent cooperatives
   14 million members
lenging the Corporate Sharing Economy,” Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. New York City, 2016; Trebor 
Scholz and Nathan Schneider, eds., Ours To Hack and Own: The Rise of Platform Cooperativism, a 
New Vision for the Future of Work and a Fairer Internet (New York: OR Books, 2016).
4. Co-operatives UK (2020) The Co-operative Economy Report 2020. Co-operatives UK. Manchester. 
Icons created by Aneeque Ahmed, Larea and Thomas Knopp from the Noun Project. 
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In 2018, the UK incubator program, UnFound, was launched to support the 
development of platform co-operatives by providing them with an education 
program, and mentoring on business support, governance models, pitching and 
funding strategies.
A report published by Nesta and Co-operatives UK in 2019 called for further 
investigation into how platform co-operatives could be supported through different 
capital models, regulatory regimes and funding.5 In the same year, Anna Burnicka 
and Jan J. Zygmuntowski published a report revealing that in Europe roughly €1.3 
billion of financial resources could be allocated to platform co-operatives in order 
to support the development of the model.6
A Typology of Platform Co-operatives 
Platform co-operatives can be divided into a number of subcategories based on 
their ownership structure and main activities. The graph below shows the range 
of different options available to organisations wishing to adopt the platform co-
operative model. 
Figure 2. A Typology of Platform Co-operatives
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*Information sourced from the Internet of Ownership Platform Co-operatives Directory.
5. Simon Borkin, “Platform co-operatives – solving the capital conundrum” Nesta and Co-operatives 
UK. London, 2019.
6. Anna Burnicka, Anna and Jan J. Zygmuntowski “#CoopTech: Platform Cooperativism as the Engine 
of Solidary Growth,” Instrat. Warszawa, 2019.
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1. Ownership structure:
Worker-owned: the workers of the co-operative collectively own and manage the 
organisation. This could involve close collaboration in the day-to-day management 
of the collective or allowing a group of individuals to run the platform while workers 
gain increased benefits from their work due to their co-ownership of the platform.
Producer-owned: producers of the goods or services sold on the platform 
collectively own and manage the organisation. Producers of products such as music, 
photography and household goods can use a shared platform to pool resources and 
benefit from network effects without necessarily collaborating in the design and 
marketing of their products.
Consumer-owned: businesses owned and managed by consumers with the aim of 
fulfilling their needs. There are many examples of non-digital consumer collectives 
from credit unions and electricity co-ops to food co-ops. A number of data co-
operatives have emerged in which individuals pool their data to form a trust to be 
controlled democratically by its members.
Multi-stakeholder: An umbrella term which incorporates a range of different co-
operatives that include workers, users, founders, service providers and broader 
community members as part of their ownership and governance structure. An 
example is Resonate, a stream-to-own music platform in which artists (45%), 
listeners (35%) and workers (20%) all have a stake in the co-operative.
2. Activity:
Labour platform: a digital platform to connect workers with clients to fulfil short-
term, on-demand, tasks such as cleaning, care work, food delivery and ride shares.
Online marketplace: facilitates online transactions between multiple parties – either 
for the sale of goods, digital services or experiences. The role of the platform is to 
connect parties and reduce transactions costs through creating a system of trust. 
Governance/software: platform co-operatives that develop new online tools and 
systems for social co-ordination and group management. This could be software 
that allows other organisations to streamline workflow or facilitate new processes of 
digital democracy.
Data/resource sharing: these platform co-operatives can be ways for consumers 
to share resources, pool data in the form of a data trust or enable users such as 
patients to ensure the safety and social utility of their medical data.
The typology is not exhaustive as it is difficult to create a simple table that would 
incorporate every type of platform co-operative. There are a wide variety of 
activities platform co-operatives could undertake, which could lead to a number of 
other columns added to the table. Future typologies might also try to distinguish 
between different classes of ownership and governance to create three dimensions 
Autonomy     Platforming Equality 77
of analysis.
Many platform co-operatives are incorporated through the required legal 
structure, but the most important aspect of being a co-operative is upholding the 
international co-operative values and principles. Not all co-operatives involved 
in digital work could be classified as platform co-operatives, only those that use 
a multi-sided platform as a core part of their business model. Similarly, not all 
businesses that engage in “sharing” or collaborative forms of work and distribution 
of resources are true co-operative following the co-operatives values and principles.
Between Entrepreneurialism and 
Emancipation
Platform co-operatives aim to create alternative organisational forms to 
corporate platforms such as Airbnb, Facebook and Amazon. This is based on their 
democratically owned and governed structure and on their pursuit of a social goal 
rather than being a purely for-profit enterprise. Some of their leading advocates 
such as Trebor Scholz – who popularised the idea in 2014 – understand the 
movement as aiming to remedy the corrosive effects of capitalism by creating a 
more collaborative and less exploitative economy.
As a movement, platform co-operativism harks back to the original spirit of the 
Internet as an open, shared and non-commercial space of collaborative production. 
It seeks to facilitate new forms of digital work that do not rely on hidden forms of 
data capture and the precarious labour of a digital underclass. 
But there is a certain ambivalence regarding the precise aims of the movement 
and its relationship to existing economic and political structures. For some, platform 
co-operatives seek to benefit individual co-operative members and their local 
communities by offering fairer working conditions in which members share the full 
fruits of their labour. In this vision, co-operatives would exist alongside for-profit 
companies in a mixed economy developed through a change in consumer behaviour 
towards more ethical and co-operative businesses.
Institutions such as Co-operatives UK have argued that the co-operative model 
offers significant business benefits such as boosted productivity, innovation 
and resilience. They point to studies demonstrating co-operatives have certain 
advantages in comparison to conventional firms. For example, They are almost 
twice as likely to survive their first five years of trading and are more productive 
than conventional businesses with less staff turnover, lower absenteeism rates, staff 
working “better and smarter,” and production organised more efficiently.7 This is 
due in part to workers being more involved with their organisation, higher levels of 
7. Ed Mayo, ed., “The Co-operative Advantage: Innovation, co-operation and why sharing business 
ownership is good for Britain,” Co-operatives UK. London, 2015.
Autonomy     Platforming Equality 78
trust and more effective knowledge sharing.8 Co-operatives also promote a more 
equitable distribution of profits and a lower pay differential between executive and 
non-executive workers.9
A more radical vision for platform co-operatives is one which views them as 
agents of resistance against capitalism and the embryonic starting point of a 
post-capitalist and co-operative society. This transformative ideal draws from the 
thinking of co-operativists from the early 19th century such as Robert Owen, who 
imagined co-operatives as leading to an ideal harmonious society. The radical 
potential of co-operatives was also seen by Karl Marx who understood them as 
‘great social experiments’ that could serve as transitional institutions between a 
capitalist and future communist society.10 This radical vision looks beyond what a 
single co-operative could do for its members; it seeks to imagine how a movement 
of co-operatives could begin to have a larger impact on a transition towards a new 
economic system. The idea is that through a gradual and peaceful evolution new 
values and practices will emerge which will come to replace the competition, poverty 
and insecurity of a capitalist mode of production.
In reality, most platform co-operatives exist in a space between these two 
poles, combining an ethical business model that seeks innovation and increased 
productivity alongside a broader desire for social change. For some, the desired 
end goal is some kind of suitably tamed capitalism or market socialism, while 
for others it is a post-capitalist and co-operative society. The question is whether 
operating as a co-operative enterprise within a competitive capitalist economy 
creates contradictory tendencies that could undermine the ultimate goals of social 
transformation. 
Critics have argued that co-operatives cannot compete against corporate firms 
because their competitors will always be more willing to lower wages, cut costs, and 
pursue aggressive business practices in the face of competition. Rosa Luxemburg 
believed that cooperatives ‘are obliged to take toward themselves the role of 
capitalist entrepreneur – a contradiction that accounts for the failure of production 
cooperatives, which either become pure capitalist enterprises or, if the workers’ 
interests continue to predominate, end by dissolving.’11 The international history of 
co-operatives throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries reveals that they 
have struggled to compete with corporate firms and scale beyond small initiatives, 
with even the most remarkable examples – such as the Mondragon Corporation – 
offering mixed results.
Marisol Sandoval has studied platform co-operatives and through extensive 
interviews has highlighted the paradoxes of the “entrepreneurial activism” that they 
adopt: ‘on the one hand it seeks to restore a collective alternative imagination, but 
on the other hand it surrenders to market power by relying on the organisational 
8. Virginie Pérotin, “What do we really know about worker co-operatives? Cooperatives UK. Manches-
ter, 2016.
9. Mayo, “The Co-operative Advantage”.
10. Karl Marx, Inaugural Address and Provisional Rules of the International Working Men’s 
Association.
11. Rosa Luxemburg, Social Reform or Revolution (Militant Publications, London, 1986).
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form of a business enterprise to advance this vision.’12 
Once in competition with other firms, there is a tendency to pursue goals that would 
advance the interests of the co-operative and to become siloed from broader social 
issues. While there are many examples of co-operatives that have provided for their 
members, there are few historically significant instances of workers’ co-operatives 
leading social struggle that has created significant change in broader society. The 
historical evidence suggests that co-operatives are most promising when considered 
alongside other forms of activism and political change. This would involve working 
through trade unions, municipal associations and state institutions.
Despite these limitations, platform co-operatives can still play a vital role as one 
piece of a broader institutional puzzle of a new economic system. This would require 
the cultivation of an ecosystem of support from local councils practicing community-
wealth building and local procurement strategies to a revitalised labour movement 
and struggles in workplaces. There are a number of specific institutional forms of 
support that would be required for platform co-operatives to continue to scale.
Policy Challenges for the Platform 
Co-operative Ecosystem
In comparison to other European countries such as France, Italy, Switzerland and 
Germany, which have some of the largest co-operative economies in the world, 
platform co-operatives in the United Kingdom face a particularly inhospitable 
climate. They have limited sources of funding, face complex regulations and 
statutory duties, and must deal with a general lack of awareness about their 
business model. Due to these hurdles, there are few platform co-operatives that 
have emerged in the UK out of start-up phase. This paper highlights three major 
issues for emerging platform co-operatives:
1. Finance
Platform co-operatives face difficulties in accessing sufficient capital for startup 
and development, with venture capitalists and even impact investors reluctant to 
invest in the co-operative model due to a lack of return on investment. The Welsh 
Co-operative and Mutuals Commission found that half of all co-operatives have 
experienced difficulty in accessing finance.13 A lack of capital hinders the capacity 
of platform co-operatives to develop the necessary infrastructure and software to 
compete against corporate platforms and meet consumer expectations.
Research has begun into alternative schemes such as the “community shares” 
model which provides a non-transferable share in the company with “one-member, 
12. Marisol Sandoval, “Entrepreneurial Activism? Platform Cooperativism Between Subversion and 
Co-optation.” Critical Sociology 34, no. 1 (2019): 51–79.
13. Welsh Cooperative and Mutuals Commission (2016) Report of the Welsh Co-operative and Mutu-
als Commission, Welsh Co-operative and Mutuals Commission.
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one-vote.”14 Shares would be withdrawable at the discretion of the co-operatives 
board. This model is designed for patient capital and would encourage a form of 
crowdfunding in which individuals and organisation could invest without granting 
a wealthy shareholder disproportionate influence over the direction of the co-
operative. So far, over £150 million has been raised through this method across the 
United Kingdom.15
However, there are limitations to the amount of institutional investment that could 
be available through this model as it would exclude most venture capitalists and 
limit investors to community members, trusts, foundations and philanthropists. Many 
larger organisations have their own criteria and requirements attached to their 
grants which may not fit with this model. It has been most successful at mobilising a 
community around a platform co-op to invest small amounts of money in its initial 
phases of development.
Another funding idea has been a proposal for the establishment of a National 
Investment Bank to supply capital specifically to the co-operative, mutual and social 
enterprise sector.16 This has the advantage of opening up a larger pool of capital 
without co-operatives having to source funding from within their own networks. A 
National Investment Bank would fill a gap in the supply of patient capital that is 
currently not provided by the private sector and venture capitalists.
2. Regulation
For platform co-operatives to prosper in the UK they will require a more user-
friendly regulatory framework to make it quick and simple to start a new co-
operative and to convert existing companies into co-operatives. Currently, the 
entire legal and regulatory framework is designed for companies, often providing 
disincentives for individuals to form co-operatives due to the extra layer of rules 
and regulations not faced by private companies.
Co-operatives must register with the Financial Conduct Authority rather than 
Companies House, which adds costs and burdens them with more onerous reporting 
duties. Co-operatives UK has gathered evidence that suggests issues with HMRC 
and Companies House resulted in up to £11,000 in additional costs for some newly 
converted co-operatives societies.17 Converting companies also resulted in the status 
of “Closed/Converted” on their records leading some banks to take this as denoting 
closure. Furthermore, it created ambiguities with HMRC, sometimes requiring new 
registrations and partial accounts.
Co-operatives UK has worked with its members and government to create a clear 
agenda for improving the legal and regulatory framework for co-operatives to 
make it easier to form new co-operatives and to safeguard against cooperative 
degeneration. Currently, starting and running a co-operative is more costly and 
14. Simon Borkin, “Platform co-operatives – solving the capital conundrum” Nesta and Co-operatives 
UK, London, 2019.
15. More information on community shares is available at http://communityshares.org.uk/.
16. Mathew Lawrence, Andrew Pendleton, Sara Mahmoud, “Co-operatives Unleashed – Doubling the 
size of the UK’s co-operative sector”. New Economics Foundation. London, 2018.
17. Co-operatives UK, “Making it easier to convert a company into a society,” 5 February 2020. 
https://www.uk.coop/making-it-easier-convert-company-society.
Autonomy     Platforming Equality 81
complicated than it needs to be and action urgently needs to be taken to reduce 
this burden on the co-operative sector. 
3. Support
The co-operative model is not widely known, making it difficult for individuals to 
understand the different options open to them when starting a new business. It also 
increases the difficulty for other institutions to engage with co-operatives once they 
are established. There is a certain familiarity with the traditional business model of 
corporate platforms that ensures it remains dominant in comparison to platform 
co-operatives.
For those starting out as a new co-operative there is limited education and support 
to help them navigate the early years and establish the know-how to run their co-
operative business. It is more difficult for them to seek financial advice, engage in 
business planning and understand the lifecycle of a co-operative. Another challenge 
faced by co-operatives concerns staffing, with greater difficulties in attracting, 
hiring and retaining staff members who may see the co-operative model as less 
attractive than traditional businesses.
It is crucial for co-operatives to have specialist advice available to them that 
address problems specific to their sector. The current lack of government interest 
in and support for the co-operative sector makes it less attractive for further 
investment and development.
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Policy Recommendations
To ameliorate these three main barriers for platform co-operatives, this paper 
recommends the following constructive steps to help support the sector:
 
1. a new co-operative-friendly legal and regulatory framework 
2. the creation of a national platform co-operative incubator
3. new municipal-level digital centres to nurture new platform co-operatives
4. a Digital Innovation Fund for the co-operative sector to provide capital for 
scaling
Policy Recommendation 1: the UK government should establish a legal and 
regulatory framework that addresses the specific needs of co-operatives.
Starting and running a platform co-operative should be as easy as a company 
limited by shares. The government should simplify the current regulations to remove 
disincentives for emerging businesses.18 In addition, it should provide:
1. statutory duties for public bodies to promote co-operatives and consider co-
operatives over private enterprises for government contracts.
2. taxation incentives for profits from co-operatives reinvested back in the 
development of the co-operative.
3. an alternative to the current discrepancy between establishing a for-profit 
enterprise via Companies House versus a co-operative via the Financial 
Conduct Authority
4. education programs aimed at raising awareness of the benefits of the co-
operative model for businesses and the broader economy.
5. Clarification on internal policy for how companies can convert to co-
operative societies while continuing as the same corporate entity for tax 
purposes.
Policy Recommendation 2: the UK government should fund a national platform 
co-operative incubator that provides new co-operatives with the training and seed 
funding needed to get started. 
Those interested in founding new platform co-operatives to serve socially useful 
purposes require a clear pathway for how to move from startup phase to trading 
consistently. The idea behind a national incubator program is to create a new 
model of a startup incubator that mirrors certain aspects of the Y Combinator 
design, but supports ideas that would provide social value rather than generate 
large profits for investors. 
The government-funded program should combine seed funding to pay a platform 
co-operative’s expenses in the early phases in addition to working with them to 
figure out how to refine their ideas and help them understand the purpose and 
direction of their co-operative. It could be based on the pilot accelerator program 
18. See also Lawrence, Pendleton, Mahmoud, “Co-operatives Unleashed”. 
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developed by UnFound with eight platform co-operatives in 2018. It should also be 
sensitive to the issue of gendered and racialised exploitation reproduced within the 
co-operative economy and therefore designed to help founders from marginalised 
communities and those underrepresented in the tech sector.19
Policy Recommendation 3: Local councils should create a digital hub in each 
municipality to support the development of platform co-operatives.  
After the initial support of an incubator program, platform co-operatives will 
require working space and support in specialist business planning, financial 
management and scaling. A digital hub would provide these to new co-operatives 
who could rent out space at the hub from a municipal council for subsided rent. The 
hub would also be a centre for running support and mentoring services to platform 
co-operatives for the first years of the co-operative’s lifecycle.
One prototype for this model is Space4, a tech co-op working space, supported 
by Islington Council in London. The local government purchased a long lease on a 
property and selected tech co-op, Outlandish, to run the space to support a new 
generation of tech co-ops.
Policy Recommendation 4: the UK government should establish a Digital Innovation 
Fund to provide capital for platform co-operatives to expand their business.
The next step in the life of a platform co-operative would be to take an existing 
prototype or model that has proven effective and to expand its operation. To 
compete with existing corporate platforms, co-operatives would require significant 
capital investment which could be achieved through a new fund, similar to 
proposals for a National Investment Bank for co-operatives, proposed by the New 
Economics Foundation. Keeping in the spirit of co-operatives, the Fund could have 
worker representatives on it to ensure co-operatitve members had a seat at the 
table.
This Fund would provide the capital needed to adequate finance the co-operative 
sector with a specific emphasis on the types of loans needed by platform co-
operatives. It would allow successful platform co-ops to access levels of finance 
that could not be provided by a community shares model or other crowdsourcing 
activities. Such funding would need to be limited to a select few co-operatives with 
a proven track record and excellent potential to make a significant social impact 
with their model.
19. Niels van Doorn, “Platform labor: on the gendered and racialized exploitation of low-income ser-
vice work in the ‘on-demand’ economy,” Information, Communication & Society 20, no. 6 (2017): 898–
914.
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Recoding our Digital Future
To find an alternative to the extractive platform models of Big Tech we need to 
support the digital co-operative economy with greater levels of investment and 
support. Platform co-operatives will only thrive in a well-developed ecosystem of 
supporting institutions and infrastructure that enables co-operatives to grow. New 
democratically controlled alternatives to corporate platforms do not necessarily 
create the conditions for a transformation of the broader economic system, but they 
do provide the basis for empowering workers, fairer businesses and a collaborative 
culture of shared value creation. They could serve as practical examples of an 
alternative ownership model, offering inspiration for further struggle and political 
organising.
                     Paths Forward for the Study
       of the Digital Economy
Nick Srnicek
Twenty years ago, the digital economy could plausibly have been portrayed as a 
niche sector. Today, that no longer holds true. Key elements of the digital economy 
– data, computing, networks, platforms, and so on – are increasingly fundamental 
infrastructure for the global economy as a whole. This has only become more 
pronounced with the current Covid-19 crisis, as companies like Amazon, Apple, 
Google, and Microsoft make plays to expand their digital empires across new 
work-from-home realities and to implement themselves at the heart of the new 
surveillance architecture of pandemic healthcare. In this short piece, I want to 
reflect on where contemporary research on the digital economy stands, and give 
some thought as to where it has yet to go. There has been a significant and 
growing body of research paid to the different elements of labour, platforms, and 
capitalism within the digital economy. But as I hope to show, there still remains 
major gaps in our knowledge.
Labour
Perhaps the area that has received the most scholarly attention to date is that 
of workers in the gig economy. Uber drivers epitomise the figure of the worker 
in the modern digital economy: precarious, ostensibly self-employed, poorly paid, 
algorithmically managed, and increasingly organised and resistant. Mountains 
of books and articles have been written about this form of work, its relation to 
longer-term labour market trends around outsourcing and precaritization, and the 
parallels to earlier moments of capitalist history before the standard employment 
relation became the Western norm.1 We know a great deal about the demographics 
of the people taking this work, about the legal loopholes that enable companies to 
evade labour laws, and about how these workers are using new tools and tactics to 
fight back. The amount of attention paid to this type of work is understandable as 
a reflection of the ongoing attacks against labour rights and protections – Uber-like 
work appears as the imminent future of work for many.
While the apparent rise of the gig economy may signal qualitative consolidations 
in the precaritization of work, the quantitative importance of this work is often 
overstated, with relatively few workers being involved in such work – and even fewer 
in the ride-sharing and food delivery jobs that receive the most attention from 
1. Steve Vallas and Juliet B. Schor, “What Do Platforms Do? Understanding the Gig Economy,” An-
nual Review of Sociology 46, no. 1 (2020); Ursula Huws, Labor in the Global Digital Economy: The 
Cybertariat Comes of Age (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2014); Katherine C. Kellogg, Melissa A. 
Valentine, and Angèle Christin, “Algorithms at Work: The New Contested Terrain of Control,” Acade-
my of Management Annals 14, no. 1 (2020): 366–410.
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academics and policy makers. Most workers remains outside the gig economy – and 
even within platform-mediated gig work, more workers are involved in caring for 
others than in carrying passengers. This is one of the endemic gaps in the literature 
– the fact that surveys of gig work repeatedly show that household services is the 
largest type of work being performed via platforms, yet the level of attention this 
work receives is far less than Uber, Deliveroo, or other similar businesses.2 There has 
been relatively little attention paid to the conditions experienced by these workers, 
their demographic make-up, or their business model, despite their overwhelming 
significance to the world of digital work. Given the ongoing growth of social 
reproduction work in the advanced capitalist countries, this neglect of platform care 
labour is striking. How is this digitally-mediated work related to the ongoing crises 
of social reproduction? How does it impact the global chains of care that have 
been studied by many? How does it reflect class, race, and gender differences – and 
how is it impacting their consolidation? We currently know little that might help us 
answer these sorts of questions, and future research needs to focus on carers as 
much as couriers.
Platforms
If gig work has been a significant focus of academic research, so too has its 
capitalist firm corollary, the sharing economy. Research on companies like 
Uber and Airbnb has proliferated in the last decade with a number of scholars 
patiently taking apart the self-mythologising discourse of innovation performed 
by these platforms and their investors. The idea that these firms are innovators, 
democratisers, or even profitable has received sustained (and justified) criticisms 
from many quarters. The more general business model – that of the platform – has 
also been analysed from multiple angles. The impact of these intermediaries, and 
the ways in which they differ from more traditional business models, have been 
examined by critical scholars, business consultants, economists, and many more. The 
importance of network effects, the role of cross-subsidisation, and the significance 
of data to these firms has been well covered at this point, as has the importance 
of fostering ecosystems of groups with a stake in improving and maintaining the 
platform.
Much attention has also been given to another widespread internet-based 
business model, that of the ad-driven (or surveillance-driven) business. Companies 
like Facebook and Google have built their massive conglomerates on the backs 
of personal data siphoned off from billions of users. Turning this data into the 
promise of targeted advertising has become the entire foundation of these 
companies (despite growing concerns about whether these promises pay off). Yet 
at the same time, the shadowy data industry that runs parallel to these major 
platforms – comprised of innumerable data brokers and other similar firms – has 
faced relatively little scrutiny, either in academic research or in the press. These 
companies, like Acxiom or Datalogix, are not household names, but they function as 
surveillance machines just as much as Mark Zuckerberg’s platform does. We need 
2. Ursula Huws et al., “The Platformisation of Work in Europe: Results from Research in 13 European 
Countries” (Brussels: Foundation for European Progressive Studies, UNI Europa, and University of 
Hertfordshire, 2019), 22; Davide Dazzi, “Gig Economy in Europe,” Italian Labour Law E-Journal 12, 
no. 2 (2019): 100.
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to know more about these companies – who they are, what they collect, who they 
sell data and data products to, and so on.
In the past couple of years, attention has increasingly been paid to artificial 
intelligence (AI) as the deep learning revolution continues to change many 
aspects of businesses and the economy more broadly. In this vein, the focus has 
almost solely been on the uses made of AI – for facial recognition, assessing job 
applications, and so on. A number of scholars have pointed out the biases inherent 
to many of these systems and the ways in which they perpetuate existing social 
hierarchies. Facial recognition algorithms have consistently been shown to be 
inaccurate –  particularly so for people of colour. AI systems used to sort through 
job applications have likewise been revealed as easily gameable and often biased 
against non-white-sounding names and working class backgrounds. In response to 
these types of issues, many organisations and academics have put forth calls for AI 
ethics – a set of principles that would lay out the legitimate, fair, and equal use of 
AI. While the specifics of these principles vary from proposal to proposal, they all 
nonetheless remain focused on the use of AI: what is the appropriate way to deploy 
this technology?
By contrast, the provisioning of AI has seen much less scholarly attention. By this 
we mean the fact that contemporary AI requires large amounts of not only data, 
but also hardware and skilled labour. The capacity to create, tune, and deploy an 
AI system typically lies in the hands of a few AI providers – companies like Amazon, 
Google, and Microsoft (not to mention Alibaba and Tencent in Asia). These 
companies are also heavily involved in the world of cloud computing as the basic 
infrastructure for AI provision. While cloud computing receives some journalistic 
and critical scholarly attention (as when journalists periodically come to realise how 
difficult it is to escape Amazon Web Services),3 cloud AI continues to go virtually 
unnoticed. This is important because, if AI is going to become a widespread 
economy-transforming technology (and the jury is still out on whether or not the 
hype will be borne out), then the owners of that technology are in an immensely 
powerful strategic position. The organisation of contemporary artificial intelligence 
requires that all but a handful of companies and users rent access to AI services 
rather than owning these themselves. This leads to an immense concentration of 
capital in the hands of a few planetary-scale companies, and a relationship of 
dependency by all other AI-using firms. At the moment, too little attention is being 
given to the ways in which AI provision, as opposed to AI use, are changing the 
economy.
That being said, the issues around concentration and specifically Big Tech have 
received a vast amount of attention in recent years. Whereas not long ago antitrust 
issues were deemed irrelevant for a world where services are provided for free to 
consumers (a relic of the Robert Bork school of antitrust thinking, where consumer 
welfare in the form of prices is the only valid indicator of a monopoly), today 
it has become common sense to recognise that the leading tech companies are 
monopolies. The meaning of that term may still be disputed, and the mechanisms 
3. Vincent Mosco, To the Cloud: Big Data in a Turbulent World (Boulder: Paradigm, 2014); Kashmir 
Hill, “I Tried to Live Without the Tech Giants. It Was Impossible.,” The New York Times, 31 July 2020. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/technology/blocking-the-tech-giants.html.
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which are driving the monopolisation of these firms is still being debated, but the 
very fact of their existence is now accepted by nearly everyone outside of industry 
lobbyists. This scholarly discussion is increasingly reflected in the policy world as 
well, with Europe leading the way in pro-competition policies and with parties like 
the Democrats in America appearing to shift towards similar ideas. There are still 
uninterrogated assumptions about the links between the problems of Big Tech 
and the size of Big Tech (e.g. will privacy or fake news concerns be reduced by 
proliferating platforms?),4 but the pro-competition side is an increasingly significant 
body of research.
However, there are still gaps in this literature, particularly on the theoretical side 
of things. We do not have a very well-defined idea of the relevant markets for any 
given firm, for instance. Take Amazon: is its relevant market ‘online retail in the 
US?’, ‘retail in the US?’, ‘online retail in the world’ or something else? Depending on 
how one defines the market, Amazon can occupy anywhere from 1% of the market 
to 40% in some countries. Similar issues hold with a company like Facebook. Are 
they competing with Tik Tok, or do their competitors extend to LinkedIn? Netflix? 
YouTube? The inability to theoretically pin down a relevant market has led these 
companies to routinely argue that they in fact occupy only a small portion of the 
market and that they face threatening competition everywhere. We could use more 
work on this issue.
Similarly, we do not yet have a well-articulated theory of Big Tech’s merger and 
acquisition activity. We have numerous descriptions of who these companies are 
buying and we have a growing number of exposés about how these companies are 
going about the acquisition of smaller companies. But we broadly lack a systemic 
idea of why Amazon or Google, for instance, are purchasing the companies that 
they are. On top of this, all of the largest tech companies are increasingly involved 
in corporate venture capital and other investments into start-ups. These can 
sometimes be openly contradictory – for example, SoftBank funding both Uber 
and its rivals – but there are any number of other tensions within the investments 
of these firms. Tracing out the networks of investments that these companies are 
making will give us a better insight into the patterns of growth. But we also need 
theory about capitalist strategy in the twenty-first century. If vertical growth was 
once the goal of the early twentieth century giants, what is the goal today?
Capitalism
One answer here is the expanding search for ever more data. Companies are to 
some extent buying up others simply in an effort to harvest new sources of data 
from across society. The role of data in contemporary capitalism has been very well 
covered – with the idea that ‘data is the new oil’ being perhaps the dominant image 
of the digital economy’s novelty. Even before the rise of deep learning, ‘big data’ 
was already a well-established object of research, with many scholars outlining how 
and why companies were making use of their novel access to millions, billions, and 
4. Nick Srnicek, “The Only Way to Rein in Big Tech Is to Treat Them as a Public Service,” The Guard-
ian, 23 April  2019. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/23/big-tech-google-face-
book-unions-public-ownership.
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even trillions of data points. However, the question of ‘value’ still remains largely 
indeterminate even when it comes to data. Pinpointing the value of data remains 
difficult, not only because of uncertainties about its use value for companies, 
but also because its value is heavily dependent on context. Issues like this are 
particularly important when considering policies around data sharing and open 
data, but also nascent ideas around personal data markets (e.g. how to determine 
the value of one’s data?).
More broadly, value in the digital economy is a topic which remains contentious. 
Some critical theorists have argued for the notion of ‘free labour’: that our unpaid 
online activities (e.g. socialising with friends, watching a streaming service, sharing 
memes, and so on) are in fact value-producing activities within a (modified) Marxist 
framework. According to this approach, value creation is pervasive within the 
digital economy, with billions of users doing unpaid work to create the value and 
subsequently skyrocketing stock valuations of the biggest tech companies. More 
mainstream accounts have instead focused on ideas of value that go uncounted 
in GDP figures. Here, concepts like ‘consumer surplus’ suggest that the major tech 
companies often create value for consumers that, because of the services’ free 
nature, goes unmeasured by the official national accounts. Users get benefits from 
Google Maps, WhatsApp, and other services, despite not paying money for them – 
and this, according to some mainstream accounts, is a vast source of value for the 
economy. Others have argued for the importance of intangible capital as a value 
which is increasingly important but poorly measured by existing macroeconomic 
metrics.5 Still others (myself included), however, have argued that these ideas of 
value creation obscure a more fundamental value capture by the platform giants. 
Rather than being engines of growth, they instead function more as rentiers that 
siphon off value from the rest of the productive economy. As we’ve seen in the case 
of AI, for example, the concentrated ownership of the digital means of production 
entails the ability to charge fees for access – without ever relinquishing control or 
ownership. The issues around monopolisation, provision of AI, and value end up tied 
together into a system of circulation increasingly dominated by a few companies.
This leads us to another area of relatively little scholarly attention: the globe-
spanning nature of these firms is leading to a transformation of existing 
international hierarchies and the creation of new forms of digital colonialism. 
While there are a number of notable exceptions,6 most of the relevant work on 
these issues has gone under the more neutral heading of digital trade. In these 
discussions – undertaken in the academic world but also heatedly in international 
negotiations within bodies like the World Trade Organization – issues around who 
owns data, who gets access, and what digital sovereignty entails are all routinely 
5. Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake, Capitalism Without Capital: The Rise of the Intangible 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).
6. Parminder Jeet Singh, “Digital Industrialisation in Developing Countries: A Review of the Business 
and Policy Landscape” (The Commonwealth, 2018); Michael Kwet, “Digital Colonialism: US Empire 
and the New Imperialism in the Global South,” Race & Class 60, no. 4 (2019): 3–26; Nick Couldry 
and Ulises Mejias, The Costs of Connection: How Data Is Colonizing Human Life and Appropriating 
It for Capitalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019); UNCTAD, “Digital Economy Report 
2019: Value Creation and Capture - Implications for Developing Countries” (Geneva, 2019). https://
unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2466.
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debated. Too often, the debate is presented simply as the virtuous ‘free flow of 
data’ versus the reactionary data nationalists, but this neglects the myriad ways 
in which the unfettered flow of data in fact consolidates the power of the US and 
China as data inexorably flows towards the platform giants located there. There 
is very little existing research, in other words, about the ways in which control and 
power are being built up through these global platforms, and even less on how 
major tech companies are writing the rules of the global system in their favour. 
More attention needs to be given to the mechanisms of power and the implications 
of control here.
Lastly, research on the digital economy has also raised the issue of what the 
alternative to a world of tech monopolists might look like. For most policymakers, 
the answer is often smaller companies who will presumably have less power and act 
more responsibly. The pro-competition policies of the EU are the leading example 
of this approach. Others have made more transformative efforts to outline what 
worker-owned platform cooperatives might look like. Ranging from theoretical 
proposals to actually existing alternatives, this movement towards platform 
cooperativism offers a striking difference from the monopolistic digital economy 
form. However, other alternatives to the platform giants tend to have gone 
underdiscussed. We might imagine here government-supported and/or publicly-
owned platforms for care services, for instance.7 Yet there is relatively little work 
that has been done on the potentials – and the immense challenges – that would 
face such an option. We also lack many detailed studies of individual technologies 
and their potential to be repurposed within a post-capitalist world. Can there be 
such a thing as a communist AI, for example? Or does contemporary AI’s reliance 
on mass amounts of data render the technology intrinsically a surveillance tool? 
What role could cloud computing play in a post-capitalist world? It is worth 
remembering that in the early ages of the mainframe computer, the emancipatory 
vision was of a world where people could rely on computing as a public utility. Too 
often, when we discuss the politics of technology, we fall into binaries of good or 
bad, when in reality technologies offer a variety of affordances that resist easy 
categorisation. If we are to build a better world, we need to not only have critiques 
of this one, but also visions of a better one.
7. Luke Richards, “Automation and Healthcare: An Interview with Helen Hester” (London: Autonomy, 
2017). http://autonomy.work/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Helen-Hester-Interview-02.pdf.
                     
       Letter to a Digital Worker
McKenzie Wark
Dear fellow digital worker,
    
I hope this message finds you swell. Oh, fuck that. Let me start over. Greetings! We 
don’t know each other, but it seems like we do the same job. Do you find yourself 
staring into a screen and clicking around a lot? Me too! Sometimes I talk to other 
people who also look at screens and click around. 
The apps and programs we stare at are probably very different and I likely have 
no clue as to what expertise you bring to your clickery. And yet it is also likely that 
we have similar computers, connected to the same digital infrastructure if you trace 
it all down far enough. Who knows? Maybe our ‘work product’ is sitting next to each 
other on the same servers, nanometres apart, somewhere in the world, even as we 
speak.
If we met at a party, maybe we would not get along. Maybe we have different 
styles of presenting ourselves, different tastes, different interests. Maybe you think 
the digital work I do is useless. Maybe I think the kind you do is evil. Or vice-versa. 
We may be quite different sorts of people culturally or politically or in terms of 
educational background. That makes it hard to get at our common experiences.
Like me, you probably have to interact with other people who are digital workers, 
who do things that neither of us really understand. If you go to the doctor, they will 
probably look at a screen more than at you. Same with your accountant and many 
other professionals you might see. Order a drink in a bar and your server will enter 
it on a touch screen. About all that really changes across these jobs is how rare the 
skills are to do the clicking and hence how replaceable you are. 
I’d also venture that you worry about the same things I do. About whether you’ll 
ever get a secure job, or if you have one, how long you’ll keep it. About becoming 
obsolete and replaced by someone more up to date. About whether you fit into the 
social dynamic with your co-workers and how much effort that takes. About whether 
your boss may or may not be an idiot and that you’ll go down when they do. About 
whether any particular thing you do, or even your whole line of work, really has 
any meaning or value in the grand scheme of things. About all the other far more 
interesting things you could do with your time if there weren’t bills to pay.
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Much of your leisure time, like mine, is probably also mediated by screens, whether 
it’s a streaming service, social media or a game. Digital labour has, as its double, 
digital leisure. You might even be doing your digital labour and digital leisure 
on the same computer, through the same screen, maybe even in the same room. 
Games sometimes feel much the same as my job, except that in games, when I fuck 
it up, I get do-overs.  
What do you do to get away from the screen? It’s good to get away from it. There’s 
a whole raft of services that offer a compensatory feeling of being in touch with 
the world. I like to go to the gym and push hunks of metal up and down. Feels good 
to use the muscles of my body. Although, to be honest, this is also digital leisure in 
that I’ll have my headphones on, listening to podcasts or techno mixes. 
Over the last few years, before Covid, I went back to rave culture, which at first 
seemed ridiculous at my age, but on the dance floor nobody cares and after a few 
hours of pounding beats into my body I can feel like it’s really there again. But 
then if I look over at the DJ what I see is no longer turntables, but digital input and 
mixing devices. My leisure turns out still to be digital—and to be someone else’s 
digital labour. 
Sometimes I really want to get away from it all, so my partner and I will pack up 
the car and go to the countryside—‘upstate’ as New Yorkers call it. There we can 
really get away from both digital labour and leisure. Or so we imagine, but then 
we end up putting bucolic pictures on Instagram. In any case, to pick the day to go 
we need the weather app, and to find the route we need the map app. The digital 
seems to insinuate itself into our desires for its opposite. 
Then there’s what I’d call digital non-work. It isn’t work in that I don’t get paid for 
it. It isn’t exactly leisure in that it is not in itself an activity I choose to enjoy. For 
instance, just walking around, with my cell phone in my handbag, I’m generating 
data for various companies about my movements. It’s being fed into various 
algorithms; in the short run, to figure out how to sell me stuff; in the long run, to 
model all that humans do—so that machines can do some of it instead. 
We live in a world that seems to bifurcate sharply between work that is digital 
and work that is, for want of a better word, analogue. I see an extreme version of 
this among those of my friends who happen to be people like me: trans women. 
There’s been an acceleration in the number of trans women who have been able 
to carve out successful careers in information science and related fields. They are 
conspicuous in the trans community as having money and security of an order that 
most trans women can’t even dream.
On the other hand, I know a lot of trans women who do sex work. It is often the 
only work sisters can get. You could see it as the opposite path: making a living by 
emphasising the analogue pleasures of touch, or even really of just good company, 
emotional release and the entertaining of a client’s fantasies. A lot of their clients, 
my sex worker friends tell me, stare at screens and yammer at phones all day. 
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There’s a psychic and somatic cost to digital labour. It makes our bodies feel like 
sacks of shit. It makes our heads swim and throb. It makes us emotional trash fires. 
That in turn generates whole industries which at least pretend to make us feel 
better. Go to the spa and have a massage. Go to the climbing wall and conquer 
a simulated mountain. Go unload on your psychotherapist. Or, hire a sex worker. 
The efficiencies extracted from digital labour seem to require ever more elaborate 
compensations to restore the analogue world of sense and touch. 
And yet here again the digital insinuates itself into the analogue. Trans women 
who are escorts need a digital presence to find clients. Those who don’t physically 
meet their clients need not only a platform to advertise and to perform but also a 
way to do financial transactions. Since their labour is in many places not legal, their 
livelihood is at the whims of service providers. They experience in an acute form 
what many of us do: that underneath digital labour and leisure, and also under 
analogue pursuits that depend on some level of digital mediation—are the big 
platforms that host and track all these activities—and collect the rent. 
It’s not just that your digital labour, or mine, ends up being monetised by giant 
companies that happen to own the interfaces and servers and connecting vectors 
of the information economy. Some of those same companies seem even more 
interested in owning our information. They own not just the data produced by our 
labour, non-labour and leisure, but data extracted and extruded out of everything 
around us, living and non-living. 
Control of the world through the control of data seems to be the way that power 
works these days. Both governments and corporations are moving in that direction. 
The actual making of a product or the delivery of a service seems to be a low value 
activity compared to controlling the information about activities, both actual and 
potential. The contemporary form of governance is to own as few actual things as 
necessary, but to extract a maximum amount of data out of every activity within 
sight, so they can predict all possible futures—and own them.
It wouldn’t be the first time that a ruling class emerged out of grabbing hold of 
something that was not theirs and making it their property. That’s the history of 
colonialism and capitalism. Grab the land, grab the resources. Grab the labour and 
force work out of it without giving enough in return to sustain that labour. Then go 
turn some other people into workers by taking their land out from under them. The 
new wrinkle is that this process now includes grabbing information from all of us 
and making that their property as well. 
The theft of information leads to the wielding of its ownership over and against us. 
That’s bad for all kinds of workers, including digital workers. Our autonomy over 
our work is being confined by its reduction to observable and measurable actions. 
You could call this proletarianisation. What industrial organisation did to craft 
workers, informational organisation is doing to us. The skills we have are stripped 
down to their component gestures. Those that can be quantified are assigned to 
machines.
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If it’s bad for us, it’s even worse for a lot of analogue workers. Here I’m thinking 
not so much of my sex worker friends as of workers who are driving trucks and 
cars, filling orders in warehouses, assembling products on assembly lines, or serving 
people in shops. It can all be monitored and measured ever more closely. A pause 
of a few seconds in the life of a warehouse worker can generate an ‘inactivity 
report.’ 
Its entirely possible that it’s your job as a digital worker to make the work of 
analogue workers even worse. Or it might be your job to make people feel that 
making things worse for analogue workers is ‘innovation’ or something. Or maybe 
your work is to offer solace or compensation for all that we have lost. I sometimes 
think that’s all that the books I write achieve. There’s digital work that does the 
thing, and then there’s digital work that explains and justifies or even critiques the 
doing of the thing. Regardless: we don’t always have much choice about the work 
we do. Like analogue workers, we’re at work because we don’t own the means of 
production. 
But unlike analogue workers, our work can be less about performing an action 
over and over within a defined labour process. Sometimes our job is to design that 
labour process itself. Or design it out of existence. Or make it sound and feel like 
a good thing that it went away. The problem being of course that our own jobs 
can also be designed out of existence or made routine. So we’re caught up as both 
subject and object of the process of proletarianisation. 
The decision we have to make, as digital workers, is where our interests lie. It’s the 
mission of governments and corporations to make us as inessential and replaceable 
as analogue workers are. Our bargaining power is only as good as the uniqueness 
of our talents. The transformation of labour processes into modular, repeatable, 
measurable tasks is eating away at our workplaces, not to mention our souls. It’s 
time to get organised. 
There’s a couple of steps to this. The first is recognising that we have common 
interests. Digital labour is often presented as a matter of an individual career. 
We’re trained to think of ourselves as on some unique path. We view our immediate 
peers as rivals. In some ways we have to. We are pitted against each other—and in 
ways that are increasingly subject to ‘metrics’ of one sort or another. The first step 
is to try to find common interest with those who are closest to us in the kind of work 
we do.
The second step is to think of this commonality more broadly, as extending to 
all digital workers. Here we might be less instinctively inclined to think of others 
as rivals. The problem is more to stop thinking of others as doing something less 
important, or incomprehensible, or just not anything like what we do. And yet: don’t 
you and I both stare at screens? Use our training and experience to click around? 
Don’t we both worry about the same sorts of things? 
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Could we even think about a shared class interest among digital workers? Twenty 
years ago, I proposed thinking of us as a ‘hacker class.’ It isn’t the best term. People 
tended to think I just meant computer people. Nowadays the media have reduced 
the word hacker to criminality. So that word won’t do. Let’s just call ourselves digital 
workers. We do very different things, and don’t share a common culture. But all of 
our work is becoming quantifiable and interchangeable within a political economy 
that runs as much on digital labour power as it does on analogue labour power.
The next level of solidarity is to think of ourselves simply as workers. It’s a useful 
exercise to look critically at what one is obliged to do as labour, no matter what it 
is. In the seventies, Italian feminists proposed ‘wages for housework,’ as a slogan 
that drew attention to the unpaid labour of women. Work that didn’t make the 
commodity in the factory, but which made the worker who would.
 
The artist Laurel Ptak took the ‘wages for housework’ literature and turned it into 
an art project that accidentally became a social movement: ‘wages for Facebook.’ 
It’s a critique of what I’m calling here digital non-labour. All that stuff we do for 
free for the giant companies that ingest all the information we give them and turn 
it into business strategies against us. 
So maybe labour is a much broader category these days. The image of the worker 
from labour movement kitsch—picture a big-chinned Man with Hammer—just won’t 
do anymore. Particularly as it tends to lock us into a dated image of the real 
worker as a white man whose work is factory work. 
There might still be subtle differences between what I’m calling digital workers—
us—and what I’m calling analogue workers. It’s a crude distinction, and no work 
is ever just one thing or the other. The difference though is between those things 
that involve the clicking and those that don’t. The work of selection on a screen, 
as different to work that involves pushing one’s body through a series of variable 
movements to change on object’s position, directly in the world. 
This sounds a bit like the older terms manual and intellectual labour, or even skilled 
and unskilled labour. But I think there might be different possibilities to thinking 
about digital and analogue labour. It isn’t always the case that digital labour is a 
better thing to be doing. I know some very successful sex workers, including some 
who prefer that work to more controlled and constrained digital labour. It also 
seems somewhat judgy to call someone else’s work manual or unskilled. 
So let’s think then about digital and analogue labour, as all being labour but a bit 
different in the work done is subsumed into commodity production. One difference 
is that with most analogue jobs, the labour ends when the working day ends. With 
a lot of digital labour, it’s not so clear when it ends. Ever quit work, with some long 
list of tasks undone, and have them all stewing away in your brain, the whole rest 
of the evening? 
Autonomy     Platforming Equality 96
On the other hand, we’d all have to admit that not all our time on the job is 
‘productive.’ Sometimes I just sit at my desk and fool about with my Twitter friends. 
It’s hard to get good quality work out of us all the time. Its even harder the more 
our jobs are qualitative to begin with. Commodity economies are just not very good 
at things that can’t really be directly measured. Which is why today’s ruling class 
has a mania for measurements, no matter how arbitrary. 
When we do come up with something of quality, some configuring of the 
information on our screens, it is easily copied. It’s very, very cheap to copy the 
output of digital labour. It’s basically the cheapest way ever invented to make 
something once and copy it indefinitely. To do digital labour is to be caught 
in this bind. On the one hand, it is necessary to commodity production as that 
which makes new things. Nothing is easier to move around and permutate than 
information. On the other hand, its necessary to commodity production because 
it’s so easy to copy. One instance can be replicated over and over, by machines, 
eliminating the need for a good many workers, digital or analogue. 
The plain truth is that digital workers are often working on making life harder for 
analogue workers. Our interests don’t always align. Digital workers are also making 
life hard for each other. And so: either we keep making things harder and harder 
for others, and each other, or we think in terms of our solidarity with all workers. 
That’s the choice, really. 
Solidarity is hard. It means both attending to, and setting aside, our differences, all 
at once. Attending to them because there are a lot of ways all the other cleavages 
in the social world pass through labour and can’t be ignored. The working life of 
women, of people of colour, of queer and trans people, of disabled people, all have 
specific kinds of tensions added to them. It’s not helpful to just pretend that can all 
be swept under the rug. 
On the other hand, solidarity does mean that there’s a point where our difference 
matter less than the fact that we all have to sell our labour time to get paid to pay 
the rent and buy food and so on. The thing we have in common is not as concrete 
and immediate as our differences, but it is very real. It takes a bit of a leap to see 
how we’re all in the same boat.
It’s best to imagine the prospect of solidarity from the point of view of the most 
marginal workers, even if that is not you, or me. The points of view of the workers 
who have to deal not only with the exploitation of their labour, but also with 
oppression and discrimination because they are not white, not men, not cis, are not 
more particular, they are more universal. 
The pandemic has magnified a lot of the problems we experience as digital 
workers, and shown how dependent the digital labour that goes on in our cities 
is dependent on analogue labour. The lockdown compounded the problem of the 
fuzzy border between labour and leisure time, of the lack of separation between 
home and workplace. Not to mention the problem of which of us have also to do 
the care work for children or the elderly, or the housework.
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It exposed in graphic terms how dependent we all are on essential workers we 
rarely think about, who often do the most analogue labour, such as farm workers, 
food process workers, delivery people and so on. Many of whom are people of 
colour, and who in many cases have died of Coronavirus at higher rates. 
We all want a vaccine. Its success depends on both digital and analogue workers. 
It is digital workers in medical research who will make it. It is analogue workers in 
the pharmaceutical factories and supply chains who will manufacture it. But we 
know that those who make it will not own it. The information about it will be some 
company’s property. And we all know that if it works, its distribution will be skewed 
toward those with the power to jump the queue, not to essential workers most in 
need. 
I’m hoping, though, that I’m not alone with some of these thought and feelings, 
dear fellow digital worker. I’m hoping you share some of this too. It doesn’t matter 
whether we agree on everything. It’s more interesting when we don’t, isn’t it? What 
are we to do then? Wish I knew. Politics and policy are not my thing. Maybe they 
are yours, though. Or maybe you know people who have the gift for sizing up a 
situation and picking an effective course of action. Let’s talk to them. Or find those 
capacities in ourselves. We have a world to win. 
Yours sincerely—no, that won’t do.
Yours in solidarity,
McKenzie Wark
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